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Abstract
The Information Security Decision Making Process is comprised of an extremely complex
and dynamic set of sub-tasks, sub-goals and inter-disciplinary practices. In order to be
effective and appropriate, this process must balance both the requirements of the stakeholder
as well as the users within the system. Without careful consideration of users’ behaviours and
preferences, interventions are often seen as obstacles towards productivity and subsequently
circumvented or simply not adhered to. The approach detailed herein requires an intimate
knowledge of both Information Security and Human Behaviour.
An effective security policy must adequately protect a given set of assets (human and
non-human) or systems as well as preserve maximal productivity. Companies rely on their
Intellectual Property Rights which are often stored in a digital format. This presents a
plethora of issues regarding security, access management and locality (whether on or off
the premises). Furthermore, there is the added complexity of employees and how they
operate within this environment (a subset of compliance, competence and policy). With
the continued increase in consumerisation, more specifically the rise of Bring Your Own
Device, there is a significant threat towards data security that persists outside of the typical
working environment. This trend enables employees to access and transfer corporate assets
remotely but in doing so creates a conflict over identity, ownership and data management. The
governance of these activities creates an extremely complex problem space which requires the
need to balance these requirements relying on an accurate assessment of risk, identification
of security vulnerabilities and knowledge pertaining to the behaviour of employees.
The risks to company assets can be estimated by the analysis of the following issues:
• Threats to your assets. These are unwanted events that could cause the deliberate or
accidental loss, damage or misuse of the assets.
• Vulnerabilities. How susceptible your assets are to attack.
• Impact. The magnitude of the potential loss or the seriousness of the event.
The ability to quantify and accurately represent these variables is critical in developing,
implementing and supporting a successful security policy. A methodological based approach
xis an effective way to design, simulate and perform impact analysis of a potential new policy
adoption. Being able to identify both the cyber and human threats is itself a difficult task
furthered by the necessity to accurately populate their data sets.
This thesis documents a methodology towards aiding the policy decision making process.
In doing so, we introduce several experimental design methods aimed at understanding user
behaviours with respect to ‘nudging’ in the field of Information Security. Specifically, we
contribute the following:
• Survey & Literature Review: We conduct a multi-disciplinary review of the relevant
literature pertaining to the study of Human Behaviours within Information Security.
We examine the ‘state-of-the-art’ practices with respect to both academic research and
industry practices.
• Propose a Methodology Based on Empirical Data: We design and investigate the
effectiveness of an iterative methodology based on empirical data as opposed to
simulated, from two separate investigations (the IRIDIUM Study and our pilot study).
Our methodology employs user feedback, CISO interactions and the formulation of
bespoke experiments that aim to identify and improve our understanding of specific
behaviours highlighted within our pilot studies.
• Behavioural Interventions - Nudge: Our research contributes to the field of Human
Computer Interaction and Behaviour Psychology by investigating the first application
of nudging [228] within an Information Security setting.
• Bespoke Experimental Design: We design and investigate three separate user be-
haviours identified from our CISO interaction and pilot study in an effort to improve
our understanding of the problem space. Specifically, we examine the role of nudging
and behavioural interventions with respect to Wi-Fi selection, error-reporting, and
cookie acceptance. Additionally, the work conducted with respect to these studies
required the development of tools that are adaptable to other scenarios, we feel that
these are a valid contribution to the literature.
• Modelling: We extend the BPMN 2.0 formalism through the introduction of new
nodes which aid the expressiveness of the modelling notation. Our contributions aim to
improve the precision in which a CISO can model the current environment and design
new policy using empirical data obtained within the field regarding user behaviours
and practices. The application presented here is somewhat abstract and this is featured
in our limitations. We feel, however, that this is a valid approach to formulating a
solution within the Information Security domain.
xi
The dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 1 provides an abstract overview of
the problem space and highlights our aims, objectives and publications. Chapter 2 details
an in-depth literature review of the cross-disciplinary problem space. This involves both
the analysis of industry standards, practices and reports as well as a summary of academic
literature pertaining to theoretical frameworks and simulations for discussion. Chapter 3
introduces our problem space and documents the rationale for designing our methodology.
Each successive chapter (4, 5, & 6) documents a separate investigative strategy for populating
specific data sets with respect to the behaviours and practices highlighted from our pilot
study and CISO interaction. This provides the rationale behind each approach as well as a
documented implementation and evaluation of our experimental design with reference to
publications in the field. Chapter 7 documents our modelling strategy and highlights the
extensions we propose to the BPMN 2.0 formalism. Chapter 8 concludes our work with
reference to our contributions, limitations and the direction of future study.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Information Security Policies (ISPs) are designed and enforced to protect Intellectual Property
Rights (IPR), assets, and employees. Failure to protect these often has profound implications,
resulting in financial and reputation loss. The need for a robust Decision Making Process to
formulate such policies is of great importance and must be appropriate to the environment in
which it is intended for. Lobban [98] states "about 80 per cent of known attacks would be
defeated by embedding basic information security practices for your people, processes and
technology", a figure that supports the notion that humans are the biggest threat to security.
We must therefore ensure that user practices are understood, supported with appropriate tools,
educational material and technologies as well as having effective remediation processes in
place.
Attack vectors and the complexity of the attacks are growing exponentially, "what was
considered a sophisticated cyber attack only a year ago might now be incorporated into a
downloadable and easy to deploy internet application, requiring little or no expertise to use"
[98]. With a continually evolving threat environment and a multitude of vulnerabilities and
access points it is imperative to devise a strategy to manage cyber risks.
To do this we require a robust understanding of our environment and the critical factors
that govern the behaviour within it. Without this intimate knowledge it is impossible to
formulate an appropriate strategy for defence that fully reflects the needs of the user and the
organisation.
Figure 1.1 presents a high level overview of a typical working environment in the modern
age. The abstraction aims to highlight the numerous working environments along with the
data that traverses these environments. The figure also depicts the wealth of attack vectors
that are exploitable by malicious outsiders and insiders.
The birth of consumerisation and Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) has enabled users
to break the spatial divide and be able to operate remotely (access corporate data off-site).
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Fig. 1.1 Data movement within the modern working environment
This is both beneficial and problematic. BYOD can be seen to boost the productivity of users
as well as the profitability of the company as the potential client base is expanded and the
number of effective working hours are increased. Users benefit from being able to work
during transit as well as being able to collaborate off-site (internationally as well). There
are, however, numerous issues regarding end-point security, access management and the
vulnerabilities regarding the access mechanism.
Let us consider a typical working day involving off-site activities (see figure 1.1). At
arrow position 1 the user is located on the company premises and is equipped with their
own laptop and smartphone that is allowed to be used in the corporate (allowed to access
company resources locally and cloud-based) and non-corporate environment. A typical day
3may involve the employee working remotely or travelling to a client to conduct off-site
activities, requiring remote access to corporate data and cloud-based materials. Any work
is conducted on the user’s device and uploaded to central/cloud-based servers whenever
possible (perhaps passively via a VPN or file-sharing platform). The user finishes their
working day and returns home for the evening. Their device may then be used in their home
environment and not necessarily restricted to a single user.
The above scenario boasts a wealth of critical security issues that require an effective
security policy to manage. The issues are not only from the computer security discipline,
but also require an understanding of Risk Analysis and Human Behaviour. In this example,
it is effective to envisage the vulnerabilities from an attacker’s perspective allowing one to
identify weaknesses within the system.
In an abstract view, without focusing on a specific method of attack or exploit, it is
clear to see where the vulnerabilities reside. With the user’s device being transient and
user managed, the very notion of a changing threat environment creates a difficult problem
space to assess and quantify from both the user’s and security officer’s perspective. Threats
are numerous and mutate to match the vulnerabilities in each given environment, but may
also lay dormant on the user’s device until they enter their specific targeted environment.
This means that an attack may be on-going and persist between locations (a vulnerability
may be exploited in one location to impact a flaw in another). The fact that the device is
user managed and operating outside of a controlled environment inevitably increases the
likelihood of a successful attack.
Changing threat environments and individually managed devices require effective security
policies. Before consumerisation and BYOD, a purely technical ’blanket’ solution could
effectively have solved many of these issues. A strict information security policy of no data
transfers (it is not uncommon for media drives to be banned within organisations) as well
as stringent governance of physical security and staff practices would mitigate many risks,
as demonstrated in [98]. In this scenario, however, the policy must not only govern the
local premises, but also cater for movement between the home/public and other corporate
environments.
This dissertation addresses these highlighted issues of data security in a mobile working
environment and presents methods and tested solutions towards the better understanding
of the threat environment, understanding the users who operate within it, and the ability to
identify and populate data sets. This work aims to empower the decision maker by aiding in
the development of appropriate policies that reflect the needs of the user and the organisation.
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1.1 Example Applications
This section details the example scenarios that are investigated within the dissertation. These
scenarios are referred to with respect to the methodologies and solutions provided.
Designing New Policy - Chapter 3:
Universities present a difficult security environment to manage. Creativity, novel solutions
and continued collaboration play a key role in many disciplines. Maintaining this freedom
whilst understanding the needs of different user groups provides a ideal example for detailing
how to develop an effective policy decision making process.
Data Transfer and Network Selection - Chapter 4:
User X belongs to company Y where BYOD is allowed. User X is working in a public,
off-site location and must submit urgent documents to fellow colleagues. There are no
company approved networks that can be utilised and the company does not have a Virtual
Private Network infrastructure. User X must decide which wireless network to connect to in
order to send the necessary corporate documents.
Understanding Security Behaviours - Chapters 5 & 6:
Users are required to complete a specific task. During this task users are interrupted and
must make security decisions based on their knowledge and the task at hand.
Extending the BPMN 2.0 Formalism - Chapter 7:
Thrombolytic stroke victims require urgent medical attention in order to minimize further
medical complications. A hospital administrator requires a decision making support tool to
optimize patient throughput with a finite budget and time frame.
1.2 Aims and Objectives
1.2.1 Aim:
• ‘To design, develop and validate with scientific rigour, a robust methodology for aiding
the chief information security officer in the policy decision making process’.
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1.2.2 Objectives:
• To understand the current (‘state of the art’) practices through a review of literatures
and best practices.
• To accurately interpret and document the issues and concerns from the CISO and
narrow the problem space into a more focused investigative avenue.
• To identify and formulate solutions to specific problems with respect to CISO and user
requirements.
• To develop tool support and experimentation to aid in the assessment of these problems.
• To evaluate the effectiveness of such tools and experimentation.
• To reflect on the overall impact of the approach, address its shortcomings and outline
the direction of possible future work.
1.3 Thesis Contributions
A cross-disciplinary background and literature review of the factors influencing effec-
tive policy design
The literature review provides an extensive overview of the core concepts and methodologies
from multiple disciplines. The review focuses primarily on the individual aspects of the
environment which must be understood in order to develop an effective policy. Understanding
the threats within these environments and detailing user behaviours is a critical component
of this.
The literature review includes an in-depth survey of academic and industry led research
on user behaviour, user management and information security, as well a formal documen-
tation of many practices within the workplace. Psychology literature provides a necessary
understanding of how users behave under certain conditions and which stimuli are most
influential with respect to interventions. We include this so that a comprehensive impact
analysis can be conducted.
The benefit of a cross-disciplinary approach allows for a more detailed analysis and
understanding of the problem space. Typically, poor security decisions lack the understanding
of how users behave, comply with, and are impacted by interventions. As the discipline
matures, users requirements and behaviours are increasingly becoming a core component of
the policy decision making process.
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A methodology for investigating stakeholder and user requirements
The proposed framework encapsulates the problem space from the perspective of the stake-
holder, and critically, the user. This approach differs from traditional work in the field of
Information Security which often focuses explicitly on technological solutions. This is often
to the detriment of the overall validity or applicability of the proposed solution. User require-
ments and behaviours are important and are often ignored through forced, blanket security
that specifically dictates allowed user actions through policy. This often has profound impacts
on user compliance and productivity and ultimately impacts negatively on the organisation
itself.
Our explicit implementation is based on empirical observations from two separate studies
(the IRIDIUM study, pilot study), benefiting from genuine interaction and feedback from
users with respect to practical tasks within the environment. This provides numerous benefits
over simulated data sets that are often based on assumptions, as we are able to articulate
solutions that specifically match our problem domain.
The benefits of including user requirements enables the CISO to develop a more effective,
holistic set of policies that aim to support ’good’ user behaviours whilst also maintaining
data security. This promotes compliance and productivity by working with and not against
users.
Experimental tool design and implementation
Through experimentation in chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 we develop and evaluate tools designed
specifically to investigate the highlighted user behaviour. The tools we build are multi-use by
design, allowing simple modification for use in subsequent studies. Specifically, we develop
an Android Application for Wi-Fi selection (chapter 4), two web and database frameworks
(chapters 5, 6), and an extension of the BPMN 2.0 modelling formalism (chapter 7).
An iterative methodology for policy design
This methodology facilitates the creation and adoption of policy through an iterative design
process. This differs from previous work which typically aims to improve the decision
making process through a single investigation, problem or observation. Critically, this
methodology understands that policy design is an iterative process and one that requires
repeat investigation to remain relevant and meet the changing requirements of users.
The value of the proposed methodology stems from the iterative process which assumes
that subsequent investigation of the problem space will ultimately yield a more intimate
understanding of the environment variables. This allows for solutions to be augmented
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based on newly discovered variables or behaviours that arise from repeated investigation.
Subsequent solutions will be more effective as they are built from a more accurately quantified
variable set.
Modelling-based approach towards policy testing
This modelling process improves the decision making process by enabling policies to be
simulated on test populations before implementation. These populations can be either
simulated or based on empirical data from our pilot studies that will more accurately reflect
the specific nature of the target environment.
This methodology aims to specifically address the problem of policy evaluation after
adoption. Typically, policies are adopted and then empirically evaluated. The problem
with this method is that it relies on the first implementation of the policy being correct.
By a process of iterative investigation into the environment, and subsequent modelling and
simulation before implementation, the design process is improved as we enable a more
appropriate policy to be designed. The resulting policy implementation process is therefore
optimised as the policy is more likely to reflect the needs of users and the company.
1.4 Publication History
This dissertation includes work that has previously been, or is in the process of, peer review.
These publications are referenced to at relevant points throughout and form the scientific
basis of several chapters.
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Android phones’. British HCI 2015.
• Daniel Nesbitt, James Turland. ‘BPMNdm – Extending the BPMN Formalism to aid
the Decision Making Process’. IEEE Services 2016. Emerging Technologies track on
Formal Methods in Services and Cloud Computing.
• Iryna Yevseyeva, James Turland, Charles Morisset, Lynne Coventry, Thomas Groß,
Christopher Laing , Aad van Moorsel. ‘Addressing consumerisation of IT risks with
nudging’. CENTERIS 2014.
• Iryna Yevseyeva, Charles Morisset, James Turland, Lynne Coventry, Thomas Groß,
Christopher Laing , Aad van Moorsel. ‘Consumerisation of IT: Mitigating risky user
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on ENTERprise Information Systems / ProjMAN 2014 - International Conference on
Project MANagement / HCIST 2014 - International Conference on Health and Social
Care Information Systems and Technologies.
• Deborah Jeske, Lynne Coventry, Pam Briggs, James Turland. ‘Less redundancy and
increased relevance: Encouraging technical and security error reporting’. International
Journal of Human-Computer Studies. (In preparation).
• Debora Jekse, James Turland, Pam Briggs, Lynne Coventry. ‘Personality and Framing
Factors in Privacy Decision-Making: A study on cookie acceptance’. ACM Transac-
tions on Computer-Human Interactions (March 2015). (Submitted)
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Chapter 2
Background and Literature Review
This section details a background and literature review within the subsequent fields of enquiry.
Specifically, it focuses on the multi-disciplinary nature of aiding the Decision Making Process.
This requires in-depth study of the many intricacies that formulate the problem space.
More formally, this section identifies the relationships between the different study areas
and highlights the inter-connected nature of the multiple disciplines. This highlights the
complexity and the difficulties faced when designing policy by exploring the plethora of
variables that constitute to various phenomena. Once defined, these phenomena are then
examined and further understood through an analysis of the relevant literature pertaining to
the understanding and summation of the problem space. The principle disciplines examined
fall under Computing Science, Human Behaviour and Economics.
This approach differs from traditional studies that focus on a single discipline. The
inherent value of this approach is observed due to the more accurate representation of the
problem space from the inclusion of multiple disciplines. This provides a theoretical and
practical base for investigation that considers the technological, social and economic aspects
and ultimately aids the CISO in the Policy Decision Making Process.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 2.1 provides an overview of Informa-
tion Security. Section 2.2 investigates the role of Social Phenomena and Human Behaviours.
Section 2.3 investigates the rise in the Consumerisation and the BYOD trend. Section 2.4
discusses Trust Economics. Section 2.5 identifies the role of Trust within Information Secu-
rity. Section 2.6 details Uncertainty and Probability Theory. Section 2.7 investigates the role
of modelling and its applicability.
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2.1 Information Security
Information Security is required to protect an organisation from unauthorised access of its
assets. The importance of such a practice is highlighted by "A National Cyber Security
Association [168] survey of small business in the US, conducted in 2012, suggested a cyber
security disconnect where 47% of companies believed a data breach would have no impact
on their business, yet 87% did not have a formal written Internet security policy and 69% did
not even have an informal one" 4][144]. More recently in 2016, the same National Cyber
Security Association published that these figures were still alarmingly high with 77% not
having a formal ISP [215] indicating that this is still a serious issue. This realisation sparks
the necessity for a thorough, methodological approach to Information Security and the Policy
Decision Making process.
Information Security is the practice and theory of defending data or information systems
from unauthorised or unintended access with the goal of preventing destruction, disruption
and tampering [234]. Conceptually, the practice can be split into 6 considerations as denoted
by Parker’s Hexad of Information Security [66]:
• Confidentiality: "the assurance that information is not disclosed to individuals or
systems that are not authorised to receive it" [234].
• Possession or Control: denotes the loss of control of a possession or asset but does
not include a breach of confidentiality.
• Integrity: "the assurance that information cannot be modified by those who are not
authorised to modify it, or that any such modifications will not pass undetected" [234].
• Authenticity: the strength of the claim of origin, identity and authorship.
• Availability: "the assurance that information is available when it is needed, and that
mishap or malice cannot affect the ability of the systems to provide information when
requested" [234].
• Utility: the usefulness of the data or asset in question.
These measures are necessary to protect assets. Asset management is typically divided
into an organisation’s "tangible and intangible assets" [107] defined as an item that "has
physical form ... does not have physical form" [107] respectively. Intangible items are diverse
and can range from "intellectual property to goodwill" [107]. Tangible items are typically
easier to track in smaller organisations but are much more difficult in larger organisations.
2.1 Information Security 13
Asset management requires a financial attribution (asset valuation). To calculate, one can
use:
Cost−Salvage Value
Use f ul Li f e
= Yearly Depreciation (2.1)
A temporal aspect is required within the equation as business capital expenditure is
approved based on an assessment of return on investment. The longer a product is viable, the
greater the return on investment, and the less likely it is that further expense is required.
Intangible items are much more difficult to value often owing to the variables one
associates with value. As such, one must ask "what would you pay for the asset if you did not
already own it?" [107], "what revenue will this asset bring to the organisation in the future?"
[107]. With this, it is important to understand the following four methodologies. These
methodologies "have become the most important, whether for transaction, tax, or litigation
purposes, or whether in an ongoing concern valuation or liquidation" [18]:
• Cost approach
Historical cost basis
Replacement or reproduction cost
• Market approach
• Income approach
Future income stream
Duration of the income stream
Risk associated with the generation of the income stream
• Relief-from-royalty approach [18]
With this knowledge it is possible to utilise the "single loss expectancy (SLE)" formula
"measuring the specific impact, monetary or otherwise, of a single event" [18]. Understanding
this likelihood forms part of the rationale behind the policy development process and ensures
that protective technologies and intervention strategies are appropriate to the value of the
asset at risk.
Asset Value×Exposure Factor = SLE (2.2)
The exposure factor (EF) is a combination of the threat and vulnerabilities within the
environment. It is important to stress that this an estimate however, as "it cannot include
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everything possible because we do not know all of the possible exposures" [18]. The EF
is "the percentage of loss a realised threat event would have on a specific asset, that is, the
consequence" [18]. The EF can be a large number owing to the nature of the event and the
method of storage. For example, "a major event such as a fire or a small number like the
loss of a hard drive" [18]. This can also be expressed as a percentage if necessary if for
instance "a virus brought down your Web farm, this may cause a 75% loss in the Web farm’s
functionality" [18].
The exposure can be furthered by adopting an annualised rate of occurrence (ARO) which
details the frequency that the exposure is expected to occur. The "ARO is not a definite
number and can be subjective" [18]. It is based on empirical data and utilises an assessment
of the "organisation’s metrics on hardware, software and past threats" [18]. With this, we can
formulate that if a = average attempt of unauthorised access and b = number of employees:
a×b = ARO (2.3)
Being able to quantify and identify risk vectors it is necessary to define security systems
designed to combat risk and alleviate unwanted exposure. ISO 27001 "specifies the require-
ments for establishing, implementing, maintaining and continually improving an information
security management system within the context of the organization" [123]. This standard
specifies the methods in which security systems can be designed and implemented to address
one or more of the following controls:
• Physical controls - walls, locked doors, guards. [234]
• Procedural controls - managerial oversight, staff training, defined emergency response
processes. [234]
Social behaviour
• Regulatory controls - legislation, policy, rules of conduct. [234]
• Technical controls - cryptographic software, authentication and authorization systems,
secure protocols. [234]
With any intervention method it is essential to conduct a survey on the control mechanisms
to ensure validity, assess impact and apportion budget. These measures should reflect the
current threat environment. For example, if "we have an SLE of £58,000; but if we are
spending £100,000 a year to protect it, we are spending more than we need and new controls
should be selected" [107].
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With the above defined, it is now possible to quantify the return on security investment
(ROSI). The ROSI is calculated by:
Annual loss expectancy (ALE) − Current cost o f control (CCC) = ROSI (2.4)
[107]
Equation 2.4 aids in budget calculation. The following table details the entire process:
Table 2.1 ROSI for Propriety Confidential Data [107]
Steps Formula
Asset identification and valua-
tion
Asset: Proprietary confiden-
tial data
Valuation: £5,000,000
Threat and vulnerability expo-
sure factor (EF)
Threat: Disclosure of data EF: 90%
Determine the single loss ex-
pectancy (SLE)
£5,000,000 × .90 = SLE: £4,500,000 Asset Value × Exposure Fac-
tor = SLE
Annualised rate of occurrence
(ARO)
Based on observed data, the
probability is 1 in 20 years
ARO = 0.05
Compute the annual loss ex-
pectancy (ALE)
£4,500,000 × .05 = ALE= £225,000 Single Loss Expectancy (SLE)
× Annual Rate of Occurrence
(ARO) = ALE
Survey controls Current controls are costing
£95,000
ROSI = £130,000
Calculate ROSI £225,000 - £95,000 Annual loss expectancy (ALE)
- Current Cost of Control
(CCC) = ROSI
Use of the ROSI 2.4 is not without drawbacks and is contested in its’ validity owing
to the assumptions one must make in assessing the given variables. One argument "is that
valuing the ROSI lacks precision and is based on approximations" [107]. A solution to this
problem, however, is through continued data collection of the given variables; "as more
data is collected ... the picture will become clearer, much like insurance actuarial tables can
predict the probabilities of certain events" [107]. Another criticism one must consider is that
"the ROSI is immutable; but if it is made a part of the annual review process, this should not
be the case" [178].
2.1.1 Policy Decision Making
Having defined the above formulae regarding asset valuation and ARO, it is possible to
begin developing policies to combat and mitigate risk. In addition, having determined the
financial cost of intervention systems utilising the ROSI 2.1 we must focus on the users
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within our environment. Policy making is intrinsically a simple process (locate and protect
assets), however, designing and implementing a policy that is sustainable and appropriate for
user’s needs and behaviours is highly complex. Often there is a need to balance productivity,
availability and security to promote user compliance. This notion is cemented in [198] which
states that "literature agrees that the major threat to IS security is constituted by careless
employees who do not comply with organisations’ IS security policies and procedures". It is
unfair, however, to blame the user entirely as the notion of compliance contains a plethora
of variables. It is likely that the policy itself and the method in which it is enforced and
disseminated amongst staff (i.e. staff training) is to blame as it does not accurately reflect the
working environment of the users and thus constitutes a more systemic failure. Providing an
holistic policy that compliments user’s actions in a secure manner is critical and supported
by "the fact that if information security is not addressed in a holistic and comprehensive way,
taking all its dimensions into account, real risks exist preventing a really secure environment"
[244].
2.2 User Behaviour and Cyber Security
The importance of the user in cyber security cannot be disregarded. In a survey conducted
in 2013, "93% of large organisations reported having a security breach in the previous year,
and 87% of small businesses" [144]. Of these, "36%" [144] of the worst breaches were
attributed to "inadvertant human error" [61] resulting in the loss of confidential information.
Furthermore, "87% did not have a formal written Internet security policy ... 69% did not even
have an informal one" and "18% said they would not even know if their computer network
was compromised" [168]. This naturally presents a significant risk area where users are in
essence acting in their own free will without controls, management or monitoring. Further
problems arise with the continued adoption of BYOD which further blurs the line between
device ownership and the policies that govern its use, covered explicitly in section 2.5.
Research highlights that "employees seldom comply with the guidance outlined by their
information security policies" [214] resulting in "billions of dollars lost annually" [46]. The
result of such findings has issued users the moniker of "the weakest link in information
security" [163], [246]. For this reason, it is essential that we understand how to work with
and understand user behaviour to create meaningful, effective security that users trust and
are willing to comply with, thus transforming users from "the biggest information security
vulnerability to the first line of ISP compliance defence" [170].
Organisations have typically relied on technology-based solutions [260] in an attempt
to improve information security. This approach, however, is seldom sufficient to eliminate
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risk [53]. Reports [11], [219], provide empirical and anecdotal evidence that the number of
information security incidents is increasing "even as organizations invest more in technology-
based solutions" [44]. This requires a shift in the approach towards information security; a
new paradigm that requires "organizations to invest in both technical and socio-organizational
resources" [44].
2.2.1 Human Behaviour
Human behaviour in IS has typically been studied by two streams of behavioural research:
• threat-coping perspective. This approach aims to depict how humans assess and cope
with threats. Drawing on protection and coping theory, the suggested models explain
individual user’s responses to perceived threats [94], [131], [151], [256]. We use
coping theory to explore an underlying relationship between employee stress caused
by burdensome, complex, and ambiguous information security requirements (termed
"security-related stress" or SRS) and deliberate ISP violations.
• policy-compliance perspective. This approach draws on theories that explain why
humans do or do not comply with organisations’ IS security policies [94], [44], [167],
[179], [206]. It aims to examine how employees’ intention to comply with policy is
driven by cost–benefit assessments, personal norms and organizational context factors.
Studies indicate that employees’ compliance intention is the result of competing
influences of perceived benefits, formal sanctions, and security risks.
Both of these approaches are built upon studies that define IS security policies as sets of
rules "describing acceptable and unacceptable technology usage" [94]. These rules must be
kept in mind by employees while they perform their day-to-day work tasks with technology.
By understanding how threats are assessed along with how users comply with mitigation
strategies we benefit from being able to design better ISPs.
Decision Making
The method in which humans formulate and act out a decision has been theorised for decades.
If we can begin to understand how we think and subsequently act, we can begin to predict
and in certain cases apply interventions that influence the process and subsequent decision.
This is especially important in IS and compliance as we can modify user behaviour towards a
more secure practice (see section 2.3.2).
Kahneman [135] acknowledges and summarises the many works conducted in decision
making and proposes a "Two Systems" approach, a phrase first coined in [213].
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• System 1 operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no sense of
voluntary control.
• System 2 allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that demand it, including
complex computations. The operations of System 2 are often associated with the
subjective experience of agency, choice, and concentration.
Typical examples of each system are as follows:
• System 1:
Detect that one object is more distant than another.
Orient to the source of a sudden sound.
Understand simple sentences.
• System 2:
Monitor the appropriateness of your behaviour in a social setting.
Check the validity of a complex logical argument.
Fill out a tax form.
The distinction between the two systems is important and enables a deeper understanding
towards how we think. System 1 describes how we "effortlessly originate impressions and
feelings that are the main sources of the explicit beliefs and deliberate choices of system
2" [135]. Principally, "the automatic operations of system 1 generate surprisingly complex
patterns of ideas, but only the slower system 2 can construct thoughts in an orderly series of
steps". System 2 therefore requires us to pay greater attention to the given task and requires
a higher cognitive load.
As detailed in section 2.2.2, user compliance is paramount to any successful ISP. Under-
standing System 1 and System 2 furthers our knowledge through the understanding of "the
busy and depleted system 2" [135]. Within this theory, it is determined that "both self-control
and cognitive effort are forms of mental work". This is important when designing ISPs and
implementing DLP strategies as we know that requiring users to perform additional tasks
increases their cognitive load (which has a finite capacity [32]) and increases the likelihood
of non-compliance. This phenomenon is studied in depth within the field of Psychology and
is known as ego depletion.
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Ego Depletion
Fischer [92], investigated "how the availability of self-control resources affects risk-taking
inclinations and behaviours" and concludes that "risk-taking is increased when individuals
find themselves in a state of reduced cognitive self-control resources (ego-depletion)".
The foundation of this paradigm is self-regulation. To "self-regulate is to exert control
over the prepotent (i.e., automatic) psychological and behavioural responses" [92]. In doing
so, an individual is continually consuming a limited resource, terminating in a state known
as "ego depletion". In this state, "users show reduced performance at other tasks that draw on
the same self-regulatory resource of self-regulation" [242]. Most importantly, this resource
appears to be "global in the sense that this negative effect holds in domains as diverse as basic
level intellectual performance and reduced social self-presentation abilities" [92], [242].
There is a positive correlation between an ego-depleted state and increased risk taking,
whether through the necessity to complete the task more quickly (minimize suffering), or
through the lack of fully understanding the task and risks associated. Risk taking "refers
to one’s purposive participation in some form of behaviour that involved potential negative
consequences or losses (social, monetary, interpersonal) as well as perceived positive conse-
quences or gains [36]. [92] demonstrates through 4 separate studies that sensation seeking,
"which is one of the primary and most prominent determinants of risk-taking behaviour"
[156], reduces self-regulation resources resulting in increased risk-taking.
Ego depletion can be seen as a highly relevant problem for organisations from an IS
perspective. Reducing a users self-regulatory ability through the introduction of inadequate
security measures will increase the likelihood that users will violate policy or behave in a
non-desired fashion. The ability to combat such a scenario is critical and has been discussed
in several studies.
The methods with which to remedy ego depletion have been studied extensively [230].
Throughout 4 separate studies it has been proven that "inducing positive emotion can coun-
teract the effect of ego depletion" [230]. More specifically, the studies involved users mixing
tasks by creating an "initial state of self-regulation" on one task, and then asking users to
perform another different task. The self regulation was measured between these two tasks
and it was noted that "for some participants, positive mood was induced in between the two
self-regulation tasks. The positive mood resulted in improvement in self-regulation in all
four studies, as compared to participants who performed the same self-regulation tasks but
did not have positive mood induced" [230].
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Stress and Security Related Stress
Stress is a complex concept that has typically been defined and operationalised in terms of
stimulating conditions that produce stress reactions [71], [187], [188]. In IS, the literature
"provides the technostress creators construct, which delineates five stress-creating aspects of
organizational IT usage: overload, invasion, complexity, insecurity, and uncertainty" [71],
[189], [222].
Security related stress (SRS) is a common cause of IS violations [71]. Within psychology
there are numerous literatures that detail empirical studies that have shown that negative work
"stressors predict a variety of undesirable employee behaviours" [99], [195]. Specifically
for IS literature, "research indicates that employee stress-related to the use of information
technology influences a number of IT and non-IT-related cognitions and behaviours" [189],
[222].
SRS is conceptualised in terms of "overload, uncertainty and complexity dimensions"
[71] and is similar in principle (with respect to a finite capacity) to ego depletion.
• SRS Overload: is a term related to scenarios where "requirements increase workload
for employees, and as a result, create added time pressure for them to complete job
duties" [71]. A common example includes users requiring administrative access on
their computers to complete a task, a process that often requires additional paperwork
and valuable time to complete.
• SRS Complexity: defines situations where security requirements are viewed as complex
and thereby force employees to expend additional time and effort in learning and
understanding procedures. For example, where "security policies involve multiple
contingencies or contain technical jargon, employees will have to devote greater time
and effort toward understanding the appropriate policy and deciding how to act" [71].
• SRS Uncertainty: refers to an organisation’s continual update of job-related security
requirements (whether internally driven or as a result of government or industry
regulation. ISO 27001 [123]).
Coping Theory
Coping theory [188] provides a usable framework for understanding how employees respond
to SRS. Coping theory traditionally describes cognitive and behavioural processes to "manage
psychological stress, of which SRS can be considered an example" [71]. Importantly, this
theory states that individuals go through two interrelated forms of appraisal, "primary
and secondary" [71] when determining whether a particular situation is stressful. Primary
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appraisal refers to the evaluation of a situation and whether or not it is benign or stressful
(stressful situations are defined as harmful, threatening, or challenging [188]). Secondary
appraisal refers to the individual’s control of the stressful situation. It is important to note,
however, that these two appraisals often "operate in unison" [188] supporting the belief that
SRS is an outcome of this combined process.
Defining the primary and secondary appraisal approach enables the understanding of
coping efforts that aim to alleviate stress. The definition of coping has undergone numerous
iterations (often specific to the scenario at hand) but the most common distinction is between
"problem-focused and emotion-focused coping" [71].
• Problem-focused coping: defines the direct effort made to manage or alter the stressful
situation. In a working environment this could constitute as evading obstacles that
hinder productivity (possibly increasing the likelihood of non-compliance) or engaging
in knowledge building exercises that enable the user to complete a task more easily.
• Emotion-focused coping: refers to the manner in which an individual feels towards this
stressful situation. Specifically, it refers to the way in which the user employs "cognitive
processes (e.g., reappraisals, distorting reality) directed at reducing emotional stress"
[71]. The likelihood of this coping method is increased when there is little that can be
done to address the problem directly (via problem-focused coping). The opposite is
true in high controllability situations where problem-focused is more a more probable
application.
The role of coping theory in IT is witnessed through various processes. Technological
change [71] requires user adaptation, a concept similar to coping (see above). Much of
the literature within IT [31], [151] identifies several coping strategies including "mental
relaxation techniques, modifying work tasks, and reinventing and adapting the technology"
[71]. Importantly, user adaptation research indicates that "when the expected consequences
of an IT event are appraised as a threat of personal or professional relevance, and users
feel that they have limited control over the situation, their adaptation efforts will be mainly
emotion-focused" [31], [151]. This is of great significance for policy design as it reinforces
the belief that security is an obstacle in the users’ mind and therefore a mitigation strategy
is required to either educate the users (to combat problem-focused coping) or to implement
security measures in a non-intrusive, undetected fashion.
Moral Disengagement Theory
MDT enhances our understanding of SRS. Though they share many parallels related to stress
literature, MDT provides a thorough and detailed explanation of the cognitive disengagement
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process within a theoretical framework [71]. Specifically, MDT can be seen as a method in
which to extend the understanding of emotion-focused coping.
Studies [99], [195], have shown that negative stressors predict undesirable employee
behaviours such as "counterproductivity and deviance". MDT is grounded in social cognitive
theory [27] and provides "eight interrelated cognitive mechanisms, conceptualized as three
broad categories (reconstruing the conduct, obscuring or distorting sequences, devaluing
the target)" [71] that allows users to "disengage the internal self-sanctions that govern their
behaviour" [28].
Within the field of social cognitive theory, Bandura [28] discusses emotion-focused cop-
ing in terms of moral disengagement mechanisms that "cognitively restructure the meaning
of stressful situations" [71]. Importantly, this provides evidence for a "theoretical linkage
between the emotion-focused aspect of coping theory and MDT" [71]. However, as stated
in [71], the question remains as to how moral disengagement can serve as emotion-focused
coping in an organisational context. Several independent research studies have shown that
negative stressors (including technology characteristics and aspects of the IS environment)
"produce strain on the employees" and "foster negative emotions and affect" [24], [148],
[183]. Moral disengagement can be enacted to address this strain and negative emotion in
an attempt to "restore emotional stability and reduce the tensions emanating from stressful
work conditions" [71]. In this frame, one can conceptualise that moral disengagement may
serve as an "instrumental coping function that mitigates the negative effects of workplace
stress on subsequent strain" [71]. In such instances, moral disengagement may also be
motivated by "a desire to cope with uncontrollable stressors in the work environment (e.g.,
SRS) such that MDT’s cognitive rationalizations allow employees to assert and regain a
degree of psychological control" [70].
Table 2.2 defines the cognitive mechanisms and self-sanctions that can be deactivated
along with their IS consequences. It provides a useful reference for identifying and adapting
policies towards user behaviours.
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Table 2.2 Moral Disengagement Mechanisms [71]
Category Mechanism General Description IS Security Policy Context
Reconstruing
the conduct
Moral justifica-
tion
Reconstructing harmful conduct as personally and socially
acceptable by portraying it as serving worthy or moral pur-
poses; that is, service of a greater good.
Employees may justify an ISP violation in the name of get-
ting the job done more efficiently or meeting a particular
deadline, whether it is for personal accomplishment or be-
cause they feel they are doing a service to the organization.
Euphemistic
labelling
Relabeling harmful conduct through sanitized or convoluted
language or concepts to make it sound benign. For example,
terrorists label themselves “freedom fighters” and in the busi-
ness context laying people off is referred to as “downsizing."
Employees may euphemistically label certain ISP violations
as “no big deal,” not such a bad thing, or an inevitable reality
in the workplace.
Palliative com-
parison
Considering harmful acts as acceptable by contrasting them
with more reprehensible behaviors.
Employees may justify a seemingly innocuous ISP violation
such as password sharing or failing to logoff a workstation
by comparing it to a more severe policy violation such as
stealing company information.
Obscuring or
distorting con-
sequences
Displacement
of responsibil-
ity
Viewing harmful acts as stemming from the social pressures
or dictates of authority rather than being one’s own responsi-
bility.
Employees may deny responsibility for an ISP violation due
to perceived work overload or a lack of alternative meth-
ods for getting the job done (both of which are the fault of
management).
Diffusion of re-
sponsibility
Diffusing responsibility across a collective (i.e., division of
labor) rather than holding oneself personally accountable for
harmful conduct.
Employees may perceive management, the IT department,
or other employees as more responsible for IS security than
themselves. An employee may also perceive that other em-
ployees are violating policy, which limits his/her overall
responsibility for security.
Distortion of
consequences
Cognitive efforts to ignore, minimize, or distort the harmful
consequences of one’s actions.
Employees may distort the consequences of ISP violations
by deeming them as not hurting the organization, at least
not directly. This is plausible given that the negative ef-
fects of many ISP violations are often not directly seen or
experienced by employees.
Devaluing the
target
Dehumanization Divesting the target(s) or victim(s) of harmful conduct of
human qualities.
Harm resulting from an ISP violation primarily affects the
organization (and not humans), and so violations may occur
if employees view the company as bureaucratic, lacking
emotions, or not being people oriented.
Attribution of
blame
Ascribing harmful conduct to compelling circumstances out-
side of one’s control, such as the environment or surround-
ings, rather than a personal decision.
Employees may attribute ISP violations to the strictness or
unreasonable nature of policies.
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With the culmination of the above theories (SRS, MDT, Coping Theory), D’Arcy [71]
proposes the following model of the influence of SRS on employees’ deliberate ISP violations.
It is important to note that the model depicts the ISP violation intention rather than actual
behaviour, a stance that is consistent with several security compliance research studies [70],
[206] and is "driven by the difficulties in obtaining actual policy violation instances" [71]; a
problem often associated with the reluctance of organisations to share their IS policies for
fear of future attack (exploitation) or culpability (financial loss).
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Fig. 2.1 Influence of SRS on employees deliberate ISP violations
Acknowledgement of this model is important with respect to identifying and rationalising
potential violations and forms an intrinsic component of our study design. Knowledge of how
user’s formulate their non-compliance behaviours enhances our problem identification pro-
cess. This in-turn enables the targeting of these behaviours along with bespoke experimental
design aimed at mitigating the likelihood of occurrence, such as nudging.
2.2.2 Compliance
There are a multitude of threats (viruses, malware, corporate espionage, etc) "to the confi-
dentiality, integrity and availability of organizational information and information systems"
[22]. Whilst there are a plethora of security mechanisms to attempt to control and mitigate
the risks posed by these vulnerabilities, "it is often incumbent upon users to utilize the
technologies for them to be effective" [22]. In order to understand user compliance, it is
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necessary to understand hows users behave with respect to information security procedures.
This requires an understanding of the "theory of planned behaviours" (TPB) [22] which itself
is an extension of the theory of reasoned action (TRA) [14]. The TPB dictates that human
behavioural intention to perform an action is driven by perceived behavioural control, attitude
towards the behaviour and subjective norms [12], [13]. [13] states that Subjective norms
are beliefs about the normative expectations of other people that result in perceived social
pressure. Furthermore, an employee’s attitude towards a behaviour is determined by their
belief that performing (or not performing) the behaviour will lead to certain consequences
[44]. Lastly, perceived behavioural control refers to a person’s perception "about the presence
of factors that may facilitate or impede the performance of a behaviour" [13], [147].
Fig. 2.2 Theory of planned behaviours model
The use of 2.2 is documented throughout many core literatures in the field of ISP
compliance [44], [170], [225], [70] in areas such as insider security contravention [255] and
computer abuse [147]. [22], however, argues that without a "common theoretical framework,
and use of consistently operationalized constructs, comparison of past studies is hindered
and focus for future research is obscured". To remedy this, [22] produced the following ISP
behavioural compliance framework Fig: 2.3 based on "empirical studies that were published
in high-quality, peer-reviewed journals".
The critical contributions of this composite ISP behavioural compliance framework can
be seen when compared to the previous version in 2.2. [22] discusses the advantages, stating
that the "value of the composite framework for behavioral compliance with information
security policies is twofold. First, the framework synthesizes the results of related recent
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Fig. 2.3 Composite ISP Behavioural Compliance Framework
research to produce a more complete, yet still parsimonious, model based largely upon the
theory of planned behaviours". By adding a "core theoretical extension of organizational
security commitment" a more complete model of the problem space is constructed allowing
practitioners to "better focus their security education, training efforts and technology to
maximize ISP compliance".
The use of figures 2.2, 2.3, provide a complex, detailed model of user behaviours (specific
to compliance) which allow for bespoke policy implementations. This benefits the policy
decision making process but it does not ensure that such policies are implemented or enforced
correctly (itself a product of the environment in which it is deployed), thus compliance cannot
be guaranteed. Simply understanding the user’s compliance preferences is insufficient, it is
necessary to adopt and fit technological solutions that are effective .
The complexity of the issue is further demonstrated when perceived beneficial techno-
logical implementations are in fact further hindrances towards security. This is the result of
user intervention as "problems of appropriate response to cyber incidents are exacerbated
when security technology is perceived as an obstacle to the user" [199] as they are often
overwhelmed by difficulties in security implementation, or may mistrust, misinterpret the
security" [199]. Whitten & Tygar [253] examined these difficulties from a Human-Computer
Interaction (HCI) perspective and determined that "many human failures are caused by
security mechanisms that are too difficult for a non expert to use. Even users with good
technical skills, such as system administrators and software developers, often struggle to
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keep up with the increased complexity and workload created by security mechanisms". This
suggests a disconnect between users and security system design requiring a fundamental
reassessment of usable security. HCIsec is a relatively recent venture into understanding
the importance of usable security [134] with the goal of providing "security tools that the
intended users can operate correctly and complete a security task" [32].
To "achieve effective security from an organisational point of view, security designers
and managers need to consider that:
1. Individual users have a choice on whether to comply with security policies, and
2. This choice is influenced by the individual’s own goals, perceptions and attitudes, and
norms which govern the individual’s behaviour." [9] [248] [249].
The importance of user choice is something which cannot be ignored. Even if strict
policies and practices are adopted, a user may simply decide to circumvent them or not fully
comply. Managing employees’ security behaviour is still a major challenge:
“My biggest challenge is changing behavior. If I could change the behavior of
our Dow workforce, then I think I’ve solved the problem.” [130].
It is clear that changing behaviour is important, but "needs to be accompanied by changes in
the security tools and models used" [32]. The best method of adoption, however, is somewhat
convoluted and there are contrasting views on how to approach it. Whilst current attempts
focus on "placing more responsibility on line managers, in some cases even imposing
financial penalties on them if an employee they are responsible for causes a security breach"
[130] there is also significant research that shows that "negative reinforcement - which should
include financial sanctions for security transgressions – used in isolation, are as ineffective in
changing security behaviour as they have been in changing behaviour most other areas of
life" [249].
Bélanger et al [33] examined "resistance behaviour" in mandatory password change
and discovered that "even when passwords were changed as required, the changes were
intentionally delayed and the request perceived as being an unnecessary interruption" [199].
In fact, "people are concious that a password breach can have severe consequences, but it does
not affect their attitude toward the security policy implementation" [33]. Furthermore, "the
more technical competence respondents have, the less they favour the policy enhancement. ...
In a voluntary implementation, that competence may be a vector of pride and accomplishment.
In a mandatory context, the individual may feel her competence challenged, triggering a
negative attitude toward the process" [33]. This finding is critical and further demonstrates the
importance of the user in the field of Information Security. If we cannot find a secure, holistic
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approach that does not inconvenience the user the likelihood that any security measures will
be adhered to are very low.
Cost Benefit Analysis in Compliance
The perceived cost and benefit from a user’s perspective towards performing a task plays
a critical role in compliance. Numerous studies [9], [248], [249], support the notion that
to "achieve effective security from an organisational point of view security designers and
managers need to consider that:
1. Individual users have a choice on whether to comply with security policies, and
2. This choice is influenced by the individual’s own goals, perceptions and attitudes, and
norms which govern the individual’s behaviour." [32].
This belief that "individuals and organisations place different values on the cost and
benefits of behaviours associated with security policies" [32] is supported empirically but
requires a finer granularity with respect to the user’s motives. It is stated that "[the users]
choice is not an entirely selfish one - individuals consider the cost and benefits to both the
organisation and themselves - but:
1. The perception of cost and benefit is centred on the individual employee’s immediate
work context,
2. There is a limit to the amount of effort individuals are prepared to expend on compliance
unless there is a perceived benefit to balance it,
3. Cost-benefit imbalances accumulate until the compliance limit is reached" [32].
Understanding this user requirement and knowing that users act in this fashion greatly
aids towards ISP creation and management. Simply designing and implementing a system
does not necessarily mean that users will comply, regardless of how secure that system is.
This reinforces the importance of the user in security 2.2. Thus, the ’compliance budget’ is
seen to addresses the necessity to understand the user’s needs and behaviours and accounts
for their behaviours by tying them to their perceived benefits. Understanding the ’compliance
budget’ provides "2 key benefits:
1. Organisations can focus their effort available on key security tasks to maximize their
return on investment and avoid wasteful expenditure on less critical measures.
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2. It is possible to determine the cost of achieving an employees’ compliance with a
security measure, and to include this cost in models of cost and benefit of security
measures." [32].
This section 2.2.2 highlights some critical findings but also introduces difficulties towards
how best to solve them. Users work and behave independently and of their own free will
presenting a difficult problem to manage. Users effectively behave according to their own
perceptions of the cost and benefits of a given task. This is problematic as it suggests a
disconnect between the security policy (what the organisation feels it must protect) and
the user (what they feel is important to adhere to). This requires education of the users to
effectively understand the purpose of the ISP in place, and readdress their assumption of
perceived cost and benefits.
2.2.3 Educating the User
Traditional literature has often fallen into two distinct categories; "strict technology-based
controls of computer-based human behaviour" [199] along with "comprehensive education
and training of system developers and users" [199]. Through subsequent research, neither
has been found to have been particularly beneficial as extremes rely too much on depth rather
than breadth of the problem space. Ofsted [235], conducted an investigation throughout 35
schools that supports this claim. They chose institutions "where the provision for e-safety
was outstanding, the schools had managed rather than locked down systems. In the best
practice seen, pupils were helped, from a very early age, to assess the risk of accessing
sites and therefore gradually to acquire skills which would help them adopt safe practices
even when they were not supervised" [235]. To summarise, "the most successful security
behaviours were exhibited in schools where students were taught appropriate behaviours
and then trusted to behave responsibly" [199]. The belief behind this notion is to combat
the undermining of user’s abilities (as noted in [33]) and instead cement trust and belief in
user’s actions with the knowledge that they have been given the necessary tools and received
sufficient information to appropriately decide their actions and then to be trusted with their
cyber security decisions. Through the continued implementation and support of such an
approach, it is possible for it to become culture or common practice.
These findings are complimented in [20] where Julie Peeler (Director of the (ISC)2) states
that "organisations need to think beyond IT when planning IT security awareness training,
and tackle it from the bottom up, as well as the top down". This involves identifying the
"movers and shakers" within the organisation to better understand the formal and informal
communication channels. Doing so will "help to identify the best way of putting security
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messages across and who needs to be involved and onside to ensure the programme is
effective".
Peeler discusses the top down approach stating that it is essential to include company
executives in any new security practice as "their actions, intentional or unintentional, can
have a greater impact and be more difficult to uncover" [20]. She states that you must begin
with the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) "who will know the potential cost of a breach", as
well as the compliance team, "who will know the potential liabilities" (both critical in the
calculation of the ROSI 2.1). In order to boost awareness, "security professionals need to
stretch their leadership skills across the organisation and form partnerships at all levels".
Most critically, "anyone putting together an IT security awareness programme should use as
many of the ways people learn as possible and plan to reinforce the messages continually to
ensure IT security becomes part of the way the organisation operates".
2.3 Nudge
A nudge is defined as:
"any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a
predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their
economic incentives. To count as a mere nudge, the intervention must be easy
and cheap to avoid. Nudges are not mandates. Putting fruit at eye level counts as
a nudge. Banning junk food does not". [228].
2.3.1 Choice Architecture and the Choice Architect
A choice architecture refers to the choices we have available within a given environment, at a
given time with the necessity to make a choice. It encompasses all eventualities at a given
time whether it is choosing what to eat at a canteen or which clothes to purchase in a shop.
By its’ very nature, a choice architecture is therefore highly random.
A choice architect is someone who modifies this environment and presents choices
in a multitude of possible ways. Essentially, a choice architect has the "responsiblity for
organizing the context in which people make decisions" [229]. Continuing the previous
canteen analogy, consider the following:
Figure 2.4 highlights the plethora of choices available and the power that the choice
architect holds. Each choice is different and fits to serve a different purpose. For example;
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Synopsis: The director of food services for a large city school system runs a series of
experiments that manipulate the way in which the food is displayed in cafeterias. Not
surprisingly, she finds that what the children eat depends on such things as the order of the
items. Foods displayed at the beginning or end of the line are more likely to be eaten than
items in the middle, and foods at eye level are more likely to be consumed than those in
less salient locations. The question is, What use should the director make of this new found
knowledge? [229]
1. Arrange the food to make the students best off, all things considered.
2. Choose the food order at random.
3. Try to arrange the food to get the kids to pick the same foods they would choose on
their own.
4. Maximize the sales of the items from the suppliers that are willing to offer the largest
bribes.
5. Maximize profits, period.
Fig. 2.4 Choice Architecture - A Worked Example [229]
• Option 1: appears to be the most appealing and logical at face value. One might argue,
however, that it seems somewhat paternalistic and undermines ones’ sense of choice or
preference.
• Option 2: makes sense with respect to overall fairness. It aims to favour no one but
perhaps is somewhat chaotic for staff and customers alike (it make no sense to have
different parts of a salad scattered along the length of the canteen).
• Option 3: is perhaps the most honourable attempt although the merits of such an
approach are limited in their feasibility. For instance, perhaps younger students are
unable to make sensible choices as to their meal as they are not old enough and thus
ill-informed to make appropriate choices. Another problem arises with trying to please
too many people that will all have different preferences. Finally, what does it mean to
try to determine what the students would choose? Furthermore, no matter which you
choose it will be impossible, with physical objects, for there to not be some kind of
organisation or arrangement.
• Option 4: may attract the attention of a corrupt cafeteria manager that is operating for
their own personal gain at the expense of others.
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• Option 5: seems logical from a financial perspective where budgets and targets are
required.
It is therefore extremely difficult to balance these seemingly insignificant choices without
having far larger implications (in this case significantly modifying people’s behaviours).
As Thaler suggests [229] it is better to assume "everything matters" when altering the user
environment.
2.3.2 Nudging
Nudging can be applied by manipulating the choice architecture. To be successful, nudges
should:
• Nudges maintain freedom of choice: in this sense, a nudge can be seen as a "soft form
of paternalism" [218] with the goal to steer an individual without limiting the overall
choice. A GPS routing system is a good example.
• Transparency and effectiveness: nudges should be open rather than covert. This is
increasingly important in governmental nudges (automatic pension enrolment for
example). Disclosure of information can increase performance, combat inefficiency
and help to reduce corruption.
• Evidence and testing: the most effective nudges tend to be based on empirical evidence
and draw heavily on behavioural psychology [218]. Some nudges seem promising in
the abstract but tend to fail in practice. Empirical, randomised controlled trails provide
a rigid testing platform for designing, testing and implementing successful nudges.
2.3.3 Defaults and Least Resistance
"Treading the path of least resistance" refers to people’s natural desire to adopt the easiest
method of task completion (a process often involving some attribution of "laziness, fear and
distraction") [229]. It implies that if given a task (where a default option is available - an
option that is automatically selected if the user does not respond), we can expect the majority
of a population to end up with this choice irrespective of whether or not it is best for them.
The impact of such a default is magnified in its’ effectiveness if there is some form of explicit
or implicit suggestion that it reflects normative behaviour or the recommended choice.
A default is therefore an extremely powerful component of the choice architecture owing
to its unavoidable, ubiquitous nature. In presenting a choice, there must always be a rule that
governs the system’s behaviour if the user does not choose an option. The importance of
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defaults is further stressed through the common belief that "if I do nothing, nothing changes"
[229]. This is highly problematic and completely open to manipulation from a corrupt choice
architect.
In Computing, the role of defaults can have profound impacts on IS. During software
installation, many install wizards often contain additional pieces of software that are defaultly
selected for installation (that are typically not from the same vendor) in order for them to
profit from additional software sales or advertisement revenue. This software is from an
unknown source which may or may not be trustworthy. Once installed, the software may
then execute whichever commands it has been programmed to do so.
Defaults are also controversial in nature. Most common to cause complaints are those
defaults that relate to financial transactions or cause some form of loss to the user, recurring
subscriptions for example. Other examples include the necessity to manually opt-out of
default charges (environmental CO2 off-set, or default travel insurance).
To those who oppose the idea of defaults, Thaler [229] suggests the idea of "required
choice, or mandated choice", a concept that is clearly illustrated through the example of
organ donation [129], a decision that often sparks considerable debate especially given
the pretence that many people are willing to accept an organ but far fewer are registered
donors. This has similarities with Information Security decisions where users often view
their personal sensitive data with higher regard than corporate data, and thus are more likely
to take proactive measures to protect it. Within Thaler’s study, it is noted that some countries
have an opt-out policy with respect to organ donation, a term coined "presumed consent".
This approach inevitably increases the number of people who implicitly agree to organ
donation. The initiative has had strong negative feedback, however, as people feel that the
government has no right to presume anything with respect to their organs and body after
death. To remedy this, a mandated choice could be adopted. Thaler [229] discusses such an
approach with respect to driving licence renewal in the state of Illinois, where upon renewal
drivers are asked whether or not they wish to become organ donors. Such a policy has had
a considerable effect on the number of donors resulting in a rise to 60% adoption from the
national average of 38%.
2.3.4 Feedback
An essential component of any effective choice architecture is the ability to provide feedback
to the user [229]. Examples include digital cameras that allow the user to instantly review a
photograph they have taken (allowing the user to identify any errors) rather than having to
send the film to be developed and finding out that the photograph is imperfect when it is too
late.
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Other useful feedback mechanisms can be visualised in the home energy market with
the recent addition of smart meters. These smart meters aim to give a visual representation
(through the use of colour coding) as to the amount of energy you are currently using in your
home. similar visual stimuli can be observed in the automotive industry with the inclusion
of miles per gallon displays which aim to push drivers into adopting a more economical,
environmentally friendly driving style. (Defaults will be further discussed in 2.3.4).
MINDSPACE
MINDSPACE is a framework for understanding "nine effects on behavior operating largely
on the “automatic” system: messenger, incentives, norms, defaults, salience, priming, affect,
commitment, and ego" [84], [83], [82]. Dolan et al [84] use the following diagram to
highlight the links between the respective nodes.
Fig. 2.5 Mindspace Diagram [84]
MINDSPACE is important in understanding how nudges are effective as it describes
specific behaviours and how they can be modified. It is a tool for changing behaviour. To
effectively change behaviour one must combine MINDSPACE with the 6 E’s of learning
[84]. This process consists of understanding how users react to MINDSPACE and delivering
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our nudges in methods that conform to the 6 E’s, both of which have been extensively
documented within literature. Delivery must be holistic to working practices in order to
improve the effectiveness of our nudges.
Fig. 2.6 Mindspace Diagram with 6 E’s [84]
Defining the specific elements of behavioural change and how they may be altered is a
powerful tool as it allows focused attempts to modify specific behaviours. Such a process
enables the creation of highly effective nudges that can have a significant impact on the way
in which people behave in a given environment.
Nudges are designed to exploit a given behaviour. Understanding the intricacies of
MINDSPACE allows for the specific targeting and deployment of such nudges. Sunstein
[218] provides a detailed overview of the ten most important factors with respect to nudges:
1. Defaults: see 2.3.3.
2. Simplification: complexity is a serious issue in both rich and poor nations. Programmes
should be easily navigable and simplification in all forms should be a high priority.
Overly complex procedures deters participants from important processes.
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3. Use of social norms: social norms aim to highlight normative behaviour, essentially
they reinforce the user that their behaviour is in line with most other users within the
system. The use of social norms can be effective in reducing crime and promoting a
healthier lifestyle (smoking and alcohol campaigns are highly prevalent).
4. Increases in ease and convenience: people often tend to choose the easiest option and
thus a good strategy to adopt is "make it easy". If the desire is to promote a certain
behaviour then it is a good idea to remove barriers that prevent adoption. Resistance to
change is often a result of perceived difficulty or complexity rather than disagreement
or scepticism.
5. Disclosure: openness of data repositories promotes trust through partnerships (open-
governmentpartnership.org for example). Simplicity is of the utmost importance in
any strategy. Sunstein [218] states that "disclosure can operate as a check on private or
public inattention, negligence, incompetence, wrongdoing, and corruption".
6. Warnings, graphic or otherwise: If a risk is serious, the best nudge might be to issue
a public warning. "Large fonts, bold letters, and bright colors can be effective in
triggering people’s attention" [218]. The central belief to this theory is that "attention
is a scarce resource" and warnings are attentive to that fact. Warnings aim to counteract
the natural human tendency to towards unrealistic optimism and "simultaneously
increase the likelihood that people will pay attention to the long-term". Warnings can
be discounted by users in the belief that it will not happen to them, but can be combated
by informing users (via descriptions) as to the relevant strategies to mitigate risk (if I
do x I can combat y).
7. Pre-commitment strategies: denote a person’s actions with respect to their predeter-
mined goals. In essence, people with goals (i.e., quitting smoking) are more likely to
behave in a manner that will help them to accomplish this goal rather than actions that
will prolong its fulfilment. Such behaviour typically reduces procrastination.
8. Reminders: Reminders serve to combat non-fulfilment of a time dependant task.
Whether it is through reluctance, procrastination, competing obligations or any other
reason, reminders can have a profound impact on completion. Timing is of great
importance with reminders as there needs to be sufficient time to complete the task at
hand.
9. Eliciting implementation intentions: "people are more likely to engage in activity if
someone elicits their implementation intentions" [218]. As a result, a simple question,
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"do you plan to vaccinate your child?", can have significant impact on the user’s choice
and likelihood to act.
10. Informing people of the nature and consequences of their own past choices: Public and
private organisations often have detailed information on their customer’s past financial
transactions (bank statements, energy bills), often having a more detailed account than
the customers themselves. Being aware of one’s past choices has a profound impact on
future choices and can be a useful tool for behavioural change.
2.3.5 Ethics of Nudging
The ethics of nudging have been debated within academic literature for several years now.
As such, it is an important and highly popular issue as users are increasingly aware of its
adoption (many people are aware of Thaler’s International Best-Seller ‘Nudge’ [228]). For
this reason, it is important to understand why we should be concerned with respect to its
implementation, and how these ethical concerns manifest themselves. As many of the studies
included in this thesis investigate such interventions, it is important to discuss where ethical
concerns may present themselves.
The ethics of nudging is a complex issue that stems from the belief that no matter how
subtlety affected, a user’s choice is being influenced and thus the decision is not entirely of
their own free will. Ethics are closely related to the core elements of nudges and thus require
analysis in a similar light.
Further complexity pertains to the application of the nudge and the context in which
it is adopted. For example, one may argue that in a physical security context, a shove is
indeed the correct manner in which to influence choice as the alternative may be detrimental
to the user’s safety or well-being. Within the context of IS we can envisage the process of
securing sensitive data where the consequences of not securing it may outweigh the SRS
implications related to shoving. There are several instances where data cannot be accessible
to non-permitted users.
The discussion follows the 9 components of the MINDSPACE framework 2.3.4.
• Ethics of Incentives: Careful consideration is required before adopting incentive
based behaviour change. It is necessary to determine:
– the amount of incentive offered [38]. If the amount is set too high it may be
considered coercive and present the user no realistic alternative (a "shove" rather
than a nudge).
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– whether the incentive will disadvantage the people most in need [202]. Schmidt
[202] likens this to the current highly incentivised models adopted in Germany
where the "participation rates among people in the top socio-economic quintile
are close to double the rates among those in the poorest quintile".
– whether the incentive will result in the group that fails to meet the criteria
for receipt being treated unfairly [202]. Perhaps it is better to have different
completion requirements for different groups of people.
– whether the incentive will harm the patient-physician relation [202]. For health-
care it is important that medical staff are not visualised as police causing patients
to withhold important medical information. Volpp et al [243], found that enrolling
patients in a lottery after successfully detailing the specifics of their medical his-
tory resulted in a drop from 22% to 2.3% in cases where the wrong medication
had been prescribed.
– and whether the incentive is fairly directed [38]. In the above example, the
physician clearly plays a key role in determining the correct course of medication,
but so does the patient.
• Ethics of Defaults: Defaults are a powerful tool that can have a significant impact on
user behaviour. It is important to consider the following:
– it must be easy to opt out [38]. This is necessary to preserve choice and requires
that users are aware of the existence of the default, knowledge regarding how to
opt-out and can opt-out without significant burden.
– the harms and benefits of the default nudge [38]. It is important that we default
people towards the most beneficial decision for them. Whilst seemingly obvious,
Hanssesns [109] describes the process of opt-out HIV testing where it is beneficial
physically to determine whether or not you have HIV, but the psychological harm
can be significant.
• Salience and Effect: The method with which choices are presented has significant
ethical effects that trigger certain methods of thinking and system 1 responses.
– Does the use of salience affect an individual’s autonomy [38]?
– If so, is this ethical (manipulation can be ethically justifiable in some scenarios
[105])?
– Is the data presented accurate and true or is it exaggerated and misrepresented
[38]?
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• Norms and Messenger: The people that we listen to and gather advice from are not
always the best role models.
– we often nudge people towards bad decisions due to our "herd mentality" [38].
Obesity in the United States can be seen as a clear example of this process. Many
celebrities and television personalities that are held with high esteem in the public
eye often exhibit traits that are not in an individual’s best interest to emulate.
– there is a temptation to falsify accounts of users’ actions [38]. For instance, "we
could tell them that five out of seven people get screened [cancer] - but this would
be a lie".
• Priming: Subconscious priming is conducted with good intentions but requires ethical
considerations.
– As such, the decision should be based on empirical evidence [38]. For instance,
exercising promotes a healthy lifestyle and is compatible with the values of the
individual.
– Is it still easy for the individual to make their own decision rather than the decision
they are being primed towards?
– Is the priming ethically justifiable? In many cases, a user is unaware of the
priming they are subject to. This manipulation must be used to promote "benefits
that outweigh risks" [38].
• Commitments and Ego: The belief is that people wish to be consistent with public
"promises and commitments and act in ways that make them feel better about them-
selves in order to nudge them toward healthier behaviours" [38]. The main ethical
issues are:
– whether ego is used for "good ends and good reasons" and whether this approach
is preferable to reasoned argument. Spellecy [211], dictates that commitments
based on intentions are "reason-centered commitments" and thus deserve more
weight than desires.
– whether bypassing this reason is done for "good ends" (e.g., not selfish ones) and
for "good reasons" (people are harming themselves) [38].
The ethics of nudging are therefore a highly complex set of individual concerns which
relate to specific components of the nudge. A detailed summary follows:
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Table 2.3 Summary of Recommendation [38]
Nudge mechanism Ethically relevant considerations
Incentives •The amount and kind of incentives used.
•Whether the incentive plan will disadvantage those most in need or result in the group that fails to meet criteria for
receipt being treated unfairly (e.g., cost-shifting to those who fail, leaving those who fail by the wayside).
•Whether the incentive plan will harm the patient–physician relationship (e.g., through actual or perceived monitoring).
•Whether the incentive is fairly directed (e.g., at patients as opposed to or in addition to their physicians if the patients
themselves are the ones who improved their health).
Defaults •Whether people are aware of the existence of the default and whether it is fairly easy for people to opt out.
•Whether the expected benefits of the default outweigh any anticipated harms, where harm is construed not just physically
but also psychologically, socially, and financially.
•Whether there are injustices or harms brought about to vulnerable or marginalized populations by the default (e.g.,
presumed consent for organ donation exploits the homeless who do not have easy opportunities to opt out/dissent) and
whether attempts have been made to mitigate those effects.
Salience and affect •Whether what is being represented saliently is true and accurate, as opposed to exaggerated or misrepresented.
•Whether the use of salience and affect techniques will be perceived negatively by those it is directed toward.
•Whether bypassing people’s capacity for reason is done for good ends (e.g., not selfish ones) and for good reasons (e.g.,
people are harming themselves).
•Whether there is a justification for using salience and affect instead of rational argument.
Norms and messenger •Whether the information about what “most people are doing” is true and accurate.
•Whether the use of comparisons and norms will do more good than harm in light of the fact that “what most people do”
is often unwise.
•Whether the power differentials between messenger and recipient have been considered.
Subconscious priming •Whether it is fairly easy for people to go in a direction other than the one in which they are primed.
•Whether subconscious priming is done for good and evidence-based ends.
•Whether there is a justification for using subconscious priming instead of rational argument.
Commitments and ego preservation •Whether ego is used for good ends and good reasons and whether there is a justification for using ego instead of rational
argument.
•Whether the person is making a commitment to self-destructive ends.
•Whether the commitment is to long-term preferences or fleeting ones.
2.4 Human Computer Interaction in Security 41
2.4 Human Computer Interaction in Security
Human Computer Interaction (HCI) governs the methods in which we interact with technol-
ogy. The discipline has undergone significant transformation as our dependency increases
and technology advances, generating new problems and the necessity for new technological
solutions.
Carroll [50] defines HCI as "one of the first examples of cognitive engineering", a term
coined within cognitive science that presents "people, concepts, skills, and a vision for
addressing such needs through an ambitious synthesis of science and engineering". The
inter-dependencies and multi-disciplinary nature of the subject can be visualised below (see
2.7):
Fig. 2.7 The variety of disciplinary knowledge and skills involved in contemporary design of
human-computer interactions [50].
The "original and abiding technical focus of HCI was and is the concept of usability"
[50]. Usability accounts for:
• well being
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• collective efficacy
• aesthetic tension
• enhanced creativity
• support for human development
A more dynamic view of usability is one of "a programmatic objective that should and
will continue to develop as our ability to reach further toward it improves" [50]. HCI has
traditionally been associated with the ’desktop’ environment but in recent years has expanded
to encapsulate many new areas of technology (smart devices, information systems) which
are typically more mobile.
To design effective HCI solutions, a cyclical design process is adopted known as the
"task-artefact cycle" [51], 2.8.
Fig. 2.8 Task Artefact Model [51]
The Task-Artefact Cycle relates to the "co-evolution of the activities people engage in and
experience, and the artefacts - such as interactive tools and environments - that mediate those
activities" [50]. HCI is therefore a process of critically evaluating the interactive technologies
people use and their user experience. It is also about understanding how those interactions
evolve with the adoption of new technologies and also how users’ knowledge, expectations,
skills and visions expand. It is this assessment of such variables that drives forward the
realisation of new devices and systems.
Carroll [50] states that the "dialectic of theory and application has continued in HCI"
(approximating perhaps a dozen "currents of theory") that can be grouped into the following
three eras:
• theories that view HCI as information processing,
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• theories that view interaction as the initiative of agents pursuing projects,
• theories that view interactions socially and materially embedded in rich contexts. [50]
The change in paradigms throughout these era is represented in 2.9:
Fig. 2.9 A Series of Theoretical Paradigms Addressing the Expanding Research Ambitions
of HCI [50].
To design effective HCI one must follow a strict set of criteria (successful HCI design
will require an iterative approach often requiring repeated steps). It is essential to:
• Establish the requirements [196]. This requires careful consideration as to how the
users interact with the product and what it is they are trying to achieve.
• Determine the alternatives [196]. This denotes predicting what alternatives are present
and why they may be suitable or indeed preferable to the user. Assimilation of features
may be necessary.
• Prototype [196]. Any implementation requires a testing phase. This allows for a
visualisation of the solution and user testing.
• Evaluate [196]. Analysing the prototype and user feedback is critical to assessing
whether the user requirements have been met. If not, this requires the repetition of
previous steps.
2.4.1 HCI and Behaviour Change
The role of HCI is important when one considers the effectiveness of a given program or
technology device in influencing behavioural change. Numerous studies have focused on
health behaviour change encouraging physical activity [[17], [57], [58]], healthy diet [[75],
[97]], glycemic control in diabetes [[157], [209]] and self-regulation of emotions [165].
Based on extensive empirical research, Prochaska et al [185] conclude that "for behaviour
change to truly stick, a person has to maintain the target behaviour for several years". The
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problem associated with change is evident when one considers relapses or setbacks. For
example, behaviours are often entrenched within an individual’s routine requiring significant
effort to alter. Cycling to work may seem a healthy alternative but may require the person to
arrange child care, shower on arrival, find somewhere to secure their bike and accommodate
bad weather [142]. Neglecting these prerequisites often has a negative impact on the user
(changing routine can often affect social and workplace relations) causing resistance and
resulting in failure with respect to behaviour change. There is also a budget (similar to
ego depletion), where a user has a limited capacity for change and after a point, a user will
typically revert back to previous behaviours. This often occurs during unexpected disruptions;
catching a cold may dissuade a user from cycling to work.
It is therefore a complex process to ascertain the impact that technology plays on be-
haviour change. To be able to rule out "renewed commitment, social pressures, the effect of
participating in a study" one must adopt a control group of "hundreds or even thousands of
people and a matching control group" [142].
Efficacy Trials
Randomized control trials (RCT), a technique traditionally adopted during medical drug
trials, are increasingly being utilized within the assessment of technological interventions.
van der Berg et al [237] noted 10 cases where "internet-based interventions for promoting
physical activity" had used RCTs exclusively as a method of trial. This process also featured
heavily in testing mobile phone applications.
It is clear that RCTs play a vital role in the testing and evaluation of behaviour change
systems but it is important to state their limitations. RCTs are often not feasible for smaller
groups with early prototypes. Large trials require significant financial and time contributions
which may not be viable at an early stage. RCTs often "reveal little about why the technology
under evaluation is or is not effective" [142].
Hurling et al [119] recently adopted such a trial strategy to evaluate the effectiveness
of a physical activity application that used accelerometers to assess physical movements.
The data was subsequently viewed on mobile and web-based systems. The approach itself
involved numerous behaviour change strategies: "self-monitoring, identification of barriers
to change, planning, problem-solving, public commitment, and customized feedback". This
approach was cross-analysed with a control group that used the accelerometers but did not
receive feedback (N=77).
The results showed that there was no significant difference between groups "in overall
physical activity" but "indicated that the intervention group increased their amount of leisure
time activity more than the control group" [142],[119]. Whilst these results seem compelling,
2.4 Human Computer Interaction in Security 45
Klasnja [142] aruges that there are 4 main issues that "limit the usefulness [of the study] and
suggest why RCTs should not be seen as the only valid model for evaluating ... especially in
the early stages of research".
1. Sample Size: Although Hurling et al’s [119] study was large by HCI standards, it was
very small in relation to RCTs. For this reason it is impossible to rule out any outside
changes that may have had an effect on the group. In addition, the results were deemed
strongly suggestive and not the conclusive, a factor which can only be combated by
a much larger RCT, something that typically involves hundreds if not thousands of
participants.
2. Multiple Behaviour Strategies: As the study involved numerous behaviour changes,
it is unclear to which had the most effect or indeed which changes affected which
behaviour. To fully assess this, it would require an even larger RCT than the one
previously mentioned for sample size.
3. Qualitative Data: The study lacked qualitative data that is needed to make "a thorough
analysis of how participants perceived the system". Hurling [119] concluded that
intervention was effective but did not know how or why. From a HCI perspective, this
is highly significant as we cannot design a better system without knowing which parts
of the system worked and which did not [142].
4. Time and Cost: Due to their size and cost, "efficacy trials typically evaluate complex
systems that combine many intervention strategies to maximize effectiveness" [142].
Therefore, Hurling et al’s [119] study of N = 77 over a 3 month period are short
compared to typical RCT studies. Klasnja [142] concludes that "the resources and
effort required to run true efficacy trials make evaluations of innovative technologies
that embody early-stage, high-risk ideas simply infeasible".
These limitations are important to acknowledge with respect to our bespoke studies that
typically include similar small-scale samples. It is important that the design of our studies
are sensitive to such limitations, specifically in relation to the effects of testing multiple
behaviours simultaneously. We do, however, combat the lack of qualitative data that is
highlighted as we specifically assess the impact of our interventions upon the user.
Klasnja [142] offers novel solutions to these problems. Based on over 40 years of research
it has been shown that (with respect to self-monitoring) "simply keeping track of a behaviour
changes the frequency of that behaviour in a desired direction" [143], [169]. In light of this,
a self-monitoring intervention should therefore evaluate:
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• The rates of the target behaviour increase from their baseline levels prior to the
interventions [142].
• Whether after the intervention is stopped, the rates of behaviour begin to go down
again [142].
It is therefore necessary to tailor evaluations to specific intervention strategies. This
enables HCI researchers "to show that their systems are doing what they are supposed to
be doing, without requiring a full-blown demonstration of behaviour change" [142]. Such a
strategy is beneficial as it allows for direct comparisons of the same intervention strategies
across different implementations. This leads to being able to determine how "the design of a
technology for behaviour change affects the technology’s use by its target audience in situ"
[142].
2.5 Consumerisation & BYOD
The inclusion of Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) in the workplace is no longer a new
phenomenon, it is an everyday occurrence. The consumerisation of the workplace is partly
due to employees expecting "to be able to use all the innovative new devices and tools at
their disposal, both to do their jobs and to maintain their always-connected lifestyles while
being able to work whenever and wherever they need to" [37].
The trend in BYOD is controversial as it introduces both a number of benefits and risks
to the individual and organisation. In summary:
• Benefits: increased employee efficiency, improvement of employee satisfaction, and
eventually lower IT costs [37].
• Risks: multiplicity of devices, the right to use those devices freely, greater access to
the company network can degrade security, reduce productivity, increase support costs,
and expose companies to compliance and reputational risks [37].
To integrate users’ devices within the workplace there are generally two methods. Firstly,
they can "bring in" employees under the "corporate umbrella" allowing them to use corporate
devices as if they were their own. They can install custom software, use the device for social
and out of work activities and loosen restrictions on web access. Alternatively, they can
"reach out" allowing employees to use their own devices to complete work, perhaps with the
aid of virtual clients [37]. Fig 2.11 identifies the full choice matrix.
2.5 Consumerisation & BYOD 47
Fig. 2.10 Consumerisation: Corporate vs Consumer [37]
Fig. 2.11 Bring Your Own Device Matrix [221]
The scale of the problem is highlighted in a survey conducted by Harris Interactive and
ESET (Nov 2012) [48] where it was discovered that "more than 80% of employed adults
use some kind of personally owned electronic device for work-related functions". Further
investigation also shows that:
• 47% of employees use personal desktop computers to access or store company infor-
mation
• 41% of employees use personal laptops to do this
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• 25% use smartphones
• and 10% use tablets
Morrow [166] argues that as "half of these devices" are not protected by even the
most basic security measures, organisations may begin to feel that the "security challenges
associated with BYOD far outweigh the benefits".
One of the most difficult challenges that organisations face is the knowledge that corporate
data is being accessed and shared with devices which are not within the control of the IT
department. This has profound impacts on the likelihood of "data leakage, data theft, and
regulatory compliance" [166]. Morrow [166] further highlights the issues of BYOD through
analysing the semantics of the acronym itself. He states that the D (device) includes more
than just smartphones. It also includes:
• Employees logging into web applications such as Outlook Web Access and SharePoint.
• SaaS applications such as CRM systems.
• Healthcare billing applications hosted in the cloud services.
and concludes that "laptops, smartphones and tablets that connect to corporate networks
significantly increase threats to sensitive data". Organisations must be aware and should
be concerned about the security risks these endpoint devices pose. The ability to steal
confidential information and share via cloud based storage solutions (Dropbox, YouSendIt,
E-mail) is significant and companies must do more to "control the data after it’s delivered
to the device in order to prevent accidental or intentional loss by careless of malicious end
users" [166].
Loss of devices is also of critical importance in the realm of BYOD. Ernst & Young
[259] define loss as one their "five basic concerns" along with physical access, the role of
ownership, always on with increased data access, and lack of awareness. They speculate that
approximately 22% of the total number of mobile devices produced will be lost or stolen
during their lifetime and over 50% will never be recovered. Although the motives are often
opportunistic, and focused on the value of the hardware itself, "a growing amount of lost or
stolen phones have their content accessed by someone other than their owners" [259]. This
highlights the importance of "basic security features such as password protection, encryption
and robust procedures to wipe the device once lost".
In light of the above ’five basic concerns’, Ernst & Young [259] propose the following
with respect to securing employees’ devices:
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• Evaluate device usage scenarios and investigate leading practices to mitigate each risk
scenario.
• Invest in a mobile device management (MDM) solution to enforce policies and monitor
usage and access.
• Enforce industry standard security policies as a minimum: whole-device encryption,
PIN code, failed login attempt actions, remotely wiping, etc.
• Set a security baseline: certify hardware/operating systems for enterprise using this
baseline.
• Differentiate trusted and untrusted devise access: layer infrastructure accordingly.
• Introduce more stringent authentication and access controls for critical business apps.
• Add mobile device risk to the organization’s awareness programme.
2.5.1 Mobile Devices
It is estimated that there is now in excess of 7.4 billion mobile devices [122] and 3.7 billion
"unique mobile subscribers" [122] with an annual growth rate of 6.1% and 5.35% respectively.
A study conducted by Infonetics [121] found that almost all enterprises they surveyed had
instances of malicious apps being downloaded onto a devices. Furthermore, 64% reported
that users’ devices "containing sensitive or proprietary data had been lost or stolen" but there
were very few enterprises who had security measures in place to protect those devices [166],
[121].
Symantec [220] claims that during 2011, within the Android environment, "more than
half of all Android threats currently collect device data or track users’ activities" and almost
a quarter of mobile threats are designed to send information such as personal data (see Fig
2.12). A common example of such a practice is the ’free-to-play’ game marketplace (these
apps are consistently within the top 10 most downloaded apps [103]) where users often
ignore permissions or do not fully understand the implications of the software. When using
the device in a corporate environment this may lead to inadvertent leaks of confidential
company information simply by saving email attachments or other media to the local storage
[166].
In a similar fashion, the rise in Quick Response (QR) codes has enabled the rapid spread
of malware. These codes are simple to use (take a photograph or actively scan using your
camera enabled device) and provide a hyperlink to website. The problems occur with respect
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Fig. 2.12 The Purpose of Malware [220]
to the obscurity of the URL and the pending web page or download. It is difficult if not
impossible to fully verify the address as they are often adopt URL shortening, in an attempt to
mask their malicious nature, and often open by default on the mobile operating system. This
may result in malicious software being downloaded under the guise of an official product.
The user must then act upon the download or web page for the attack to be complete or indeed
it is possible for actions to be automatically taken if the user has decided to automatically
ignore prompts. The device is then open to data leakage and malicious activity [220], [221].
2.5.2 Device Vulnerability Management
Tenable [226] reported in 2012 that device vulnerability management was a top concern for
security professionals. Their study surveyed attendees at the RSA Conference 2012 and
discovered that nearly 70% of people believed that mobile device vulnerability management
was ’very important’ when compared to other security avenues. Furthermore, almost all
participants believed that mobile devices posed a significant threat to their businesses security,
yet 68% said they currently have "no way of identifying known mobile device vulnerabilities
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that could be affecting their network and 67% said they either have no controls in place for
mobile device usage on their network, or their employees simply ignore existing mobile
device usage policies" [166], [226].
Although the majority of corporate data we access, and material we consume via the
internet is encrypted and tunnelled via Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) encryption and Transport
Layer Security (TLS), the end point device used to access this content poses a significant
security threat if unsecured. In BYOD this end point is an unknown (with respect to non-
managed user devices). IT professionals are unaware as to whether the device has software
defences (virus/malware scanner) and even whether this is up to date. Furthermore, a
2012 study conducted jointly by Skype, Norton and Tom Tom [208] found that 40% of the
respondents admitted they don’t upgrade software when they should leaving them open to
many cyber attacks and malware.
Whilst virus/malware scanners are somewhat effective tools for mitigating malicious
software acquisition, they do not prohibit man-in-the-middle attacks (or more appropriately
malware specific to mobiles, man-in-the-mobile), or man-in-the-browser attacks [166]. This
observation is important for numerous reasons:
• Browser-based sharing is a popular and highly problematic activity with respect to
BYOD. (See Fig 2.13).
• Such software does not provide security against such an attack.
• IT professionals cannot control which browser the user chooses to use (each have
separate vulnerabilities), or indeed which plug-ins and security patches they have.
• It is impossible to know whether or not the device is currently infected.
• IT staff cannot access the devices’ cache, password storage, web history etc. Simply
copying and pasting may cause sensitive data to be compromised by malware scraping
cache files.
• Browser-based file-sharing is set to become more popular and require ever closer
management (see Fig. 2.14).
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Fig. 2.13 The percentage of users who use browser-based file-sharing [184].
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Fig. 2.14 Reasons the security of browser-based file sharing will become more important [184].
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From the previous discussion and Figs 2.13, 2.14, it is clear to see why BYOD introduces
many significant risks with respect to information security management. It also shows
how this trend is set to continue (2.14) and how at present there are few security strategies
in place to mitigate the risks. Furthermore, many IT professionals are either unaware, or
simply do not know how to calculate this risk, let alone manage it. Morrow [166] argues
that there is no single solution to securing your network from the vulnerabilities and risks
that BYOD introduces. Instead, he proposes that "to counter these sophisticated threats,
organisations should employ a layered security strategy that provides necessary access to
corporate information while minimising risk and maintaining compliance". To go further, one
must place importance on more than just authorised and unauthorised access and must ensure
that content delivery is secured from transport to delivery and subsequent end-point access.
To do so requires the dismissal of archaic network visualisations, a BYOD device is a part of
your network that needs to be protected. Employing strategies such as "compartmentalising
access to sensitive data", employing better "auditing logs" and log analysis, and deploying
strategies that are actively engineered to address BYOD are all required to reduce data loss.
Education can also be seen as a critical factor in BYOD security (see section 3.4.2).
Enabling users to be able to distinguish between the use and appropriateness of such devices
in the workplace will help to reduce accidental, careless leaks. Ensuring that employees are
familiar with security policy and procedure will also be of benefit [166].
2.6 Privacy
The role of privacy is important to our investigations as it contributes towards a user’s
decision-making process. Specifically with respect to data, privacy is often a key concern for
users. In the digital age, inter-connectivity and the BYOD trend presents many challenges in
areas such as location tracking, search history, and cookie usage. As such, it is necessary to
understand exactly how privacy is defined, how it can be related to specific problem domains,
and ultimately how it impacts the decision-making process.
Privacy is a "state in which one is not observed or disturbed by other people" [79].
Information privacy refers to "the user’s ability to control when, how, and to what extent
information about themselves will be collected, used, and shared with others" [162].
Figures [2.15, 2.16] [162], denote which information users share, and to whom they share
it with respectively. The likelihood of information sharing and the willingness to share with a
given party reduces radially meaning that users are more likely to disclose sensitive personal
information with somebody they know and trust rather than a large organisation with whom
they do not.
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Fig. 2.15 Who users share their information with [162]
Fig. 2.16 The information users share [162]
Privacy was far simpler to preserve before the digital technology age. Records were
physically based, and observations were physical and impossible to record in real-time. Since
then, the birth of modern technology, specifically computer-based technologies, has allowed
for autonomous data collection and mass surveillance. No longer are records solely physical,
or observations simply literal recollections; there is now a digital footprint. The impact of
this footprint is significant and the rights to control and the methods in which it is controlled
and secured is a topic that is highly controversial and not fully understood. In essence, the
problem has arisen far quicker than a remedy can be doctored.
Acquisti [2], highlights the complexities we face with modern day privacy and states
that "several technological approaches have been proposed to solve the problem of personal
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privacy" and that "in almost any conceivable scenario, when making purchases, ... the
identity of the individual can be disassociated from the rest of the information revealed
during the transaction". Furthermore, he states that "comapnies based on such technologies
(preserving anonymity) ... have struggled to balance the differing needs of the various parties
in the privacy equation ... failing to gain to widespread adoption". This is important as it
implies that identities are requested outside of necessity, eluding to the presence of external
influences.
This idea is supported through the knowledge that whilst "privacy and security of per-
sonal information remain a concern for many, the economic incentives have not generated
widespread adoption, and government intervention has increased the responsibilities for
companies to collect personal information, without determining their liabilities for misuses of
those data" [2]. For this reason, it is common to view privacy from an economics perspective.
One of the major difficulties underlying preserving privacy lies with the very ambiguity
of the phrase itself and hence, "protecting privacy is a vague concept" [2]. This is exemplified
through the notion that not only do different parties "have opposite interests and views about
the amount of information to disclose during a certain transaction" but that the individual
may also "face trade-offs between [their] need to reveal and [their] need to conceal different
types of personal information" [2].
2.6.1 On-line and Off-line Identities
People often have separate on-line and off-line identities that are utilised to differentiate
which information they share and how they share it (ultimately affecting the manner in which
they can be identified). From an economic perspective:
• On-line: typically includes information such as purchase history, browsing behaviour,
IP address, and cookies. Economic models would differentiate users by adopting types
that aim to categorise users based on their preferences and behaviours. For example,
"when I log into Amazon.com with a Hotmail.com email address ... I am revealing my
on-line identity" [2].
• Off-line: differs in that it actually defines the identity of an individual. Identifiers
include personal attributes such as credit card numbers, National Insurance Numbers.
When completing the same transaction on "Amazon.com with my personal credit card,
I am revealing my off-line identity" [2].
The problem with maintaining this difference in identities is exacerbated by the depen-
dency on several "legacy" processes and existing infrastructure that is still in operation [2].
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Re-identification often requires simple cross-analysis between records. For instance, when
purchasing from Amazon cookie data may be cross-referenced with credit card information
sharing online behaviour and spending habits with other third parties.
It is important to state, however, that not all outcomes are negative. Several studies have
identified numerous scenarios where it is beneficial to have your identity known:
• "allowing firms to use cookies make society better off, because the buyer can benefit
from the seller knowing him better and thereby providing him target services" [6].
• "sharing information between sellers reduces the distortions associated to asymmetric
information between buyer and seller" [47].
• "when the seller is facing strategic customers, she will autonomously tend to adopt a
policy that protects the privacy of her customers" [223].
Many of the problems related to "the distrust of newcomers is an inherent social cost of
easy identity changes" [192].
2.6.2 How can Economic Models and Technology Help?
Acquisti [2], argues that "economics can assist in the design process of mechanisms to solve
the impasse when no party alone would have the incentive to perform certain actions", a
premise that is achievable for example by parties sending "dummy" traffic to one another
to increase anonymity within the system. Furthermore, in a more general sense, "socially-
informed design of privacy technologies economics can be used to define what information
should be shared, and what protected" [2].
These proposals can then be assisted by technology within the realms of law and gover-
nance. Samuelson [200] states that such an approach "should place constraints and liabilities
on the side of the parties receiving private information, calibrating them in order to com-
pensate the moral hazard and asymmetric information in the market of personal data, and
combining them with information technology as a “commitment” device in the system".
This in turn creates an incentive and opens a market for third parties to create solutions
that help to preserve anonymity off-line but make it possible to act privately on-line. Scoglio
[203], adds that if privacy is a holistic concept, only a holistic approach can provide its
adequate protection and define:
• economic tools to identify the areas of information to share and those to protect [2].
• law to signal the directions the market should thereby take [203].
• the technology to make those directions viable [203].
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2.7 Prospect Theory
Prospect theory presents a detailed understanding pertaining to user decisions in risky
situations. This notion fits our problem domain well and provides reasoning behind user
actions that others may deem unusual or contradictory given the context and options available.
Kahneman [136] presents Prospect Theory (PT) as a critique to Expected Utility Theory
(EUT) for situations of decision making under risk. He states that "choices amongst risky
prospects exhibit several pervasive effects that are inconsistent with the basic tenets of utility
theory". This approach proposes that people "underweight outcomes that are merely probable
in comparison with outcomes that are obtained with certainty". The theory is intrinsically
different to EUT with respect to the following areas:
• Value is assigned to gains and losses as opposed to final assets.
• Probabilities are replaced by decision weights.
• The value function is normally concave for gains, and typically convex for losses. It is
mostly steeper for losses than gains.
• Decision weights are generally lower than the corresponding probabilities (except
when faced with low probabilities).
• Overweighting of low probabilities may increase the likelihood of both insurance and
gambling.
2.7.1 Definitions
Decision making under risk can be conceptualised as a choice between prospects and risks
[136]. A prospect, defined as:
x1, p1; ...;xn, pn
is a contract that yields outcome xi with probability pi where:
p1 + p2 + ...+ pn = 1
To simplify notation, we omit null outcomes and use (x, p) to denote the prospect
(x, p; 0,1− p) that yields x with probability p and 0 with probability 1− p [136]. The
(riskless) prospect that yields x with certainty is denoted by (x).
Kahnman further specifies that the application of expected utility theory is based upon
three tenets; expectation, asset integration, and risk aversion.
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• Expectation: U(x1, p1; ...;xn, pn) = p1u(x1)+ ...+ pnu(xn).
That is, the overall utility of a prospect, denoted by U , is the expected utility of its
outcomes.
• Asset Integration: (x1, p1; ...;xn, pn) is acceptable at asset position w if U(w+x1, p1; ...;w+
xn, pn)> u(w).
That is, a prospect is acceptable if the utility resulting from integrating the prospect
with one’s assets exceeds the utility of those assets alone. Therefore, the domain of the
utility function is final states (which include one’s asset position) rather than gains or
losses.
• Risk Aversion: u is concave (u
′′
< 0).
A person is risk averse if they prefer the certain prospect (x) to any risky prospect with
expected value x. In expected utility theory, risk aversion is equivalent to concavity of
the utility function.
Certainty
The Certainty Effect (CE) [136] relates to the manner with which people overweight outcomes
that are considered certain, relative to the outcomes which are merely probable. The CE uses
demonstrable examples to prove this:
Problem 7: A: (6,000, .45), B: (3,000, 0.9).
N = 66, A = [14], B = [86]
Problem 8: C: (6,000, .001), D: (3,000, .002).
N = 66, C = [73], D = [27]
where (x, y) x = prize, y = probability; N = number of responses; [z] = percentage of N
Fig. 2.17 The Certainty Effect - A Worked Example [136]
From 2.17 we see a stark contrast between the participants’ responses. Problem 7
includes substantial winning odds and in this case the majority of participants chose answer
B. In Problem 8, however, there is a possibility of winning although the probability of
doing so is highly unlikely. In this instance, most participants chose the option with the
higher odds and were less interested with the prize value. This difference highlights the more
common aspects of risk that cannot be captured using the EUT. Kahneman [136] proposes the
following empirical generalisation to the manner in which the substitution axiom is violated:
If (y, pq) is equivalent to (x, p)
then (y, pqr) is preferred to (x, pr),0 < p,q,r < 1
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2.7.2 Reflection Effect
The Reflection Effect examines the impact of negative rewards. It is important as it implies
that risk aversion in the positive domain is accompanied by risk seeking in the negative
domain [136]. To exemplify, let us refer to a different problem:
Problem 3: Positive Reward A: (4,000, .8), B: (3,000, 0).
N = 95, A = [20], B = [80]
Problem 3: Negative Reward C: (-4,000, .8), D: (-3,000, 0).
N = 95, C = [92], D = [8]
where (x, y) x = prize, y = probability; N = number of responses; [z] = percentage of N
Fig. 2.18 The Reflection Effect - A Worked Example [136]
Figure 2.18 details the change to risk seeking behaviour when choosing between negative
prospects. Users are more willing to risk losing larger sums of money in preference of a sure
loss of 3,000. Studies show that a "translation of outcomes produces a dramatic shift from
risk aversion to risk seeking" [254].
Figure 2.18 details another important factor. Both the positive and negative prospects
demonstrate that "outcomes which are obtained with certainty are outweighted relative to
uncertain outcomes" [136], a finding that is inconsistent with EUT. In the positive domain,
"the certainty effect contributes to a risk averse preference for a sure gain over a larger
gain that is merely probable". Conversely, in the negative domain we observe that the same
behaviour in fact leads to a risk seeking preference for a loss that is "merely probable over a
smaller loss that is certain".
2.7.3 Probabilistic Insurance
Insurance, with respect to both large and small scale loss, is considered strong evidence for
the concavity of the utility function when dealing with financial numeration. This belief stems
from the fact that many people spend large sums of money on purchasing insurance policies
that often exceed the expected actuarial cost. On closer inspection, however, it is noted that
the relative attractiveness of various forms of insurance does not support the concave nature
of the utility function with respect to money [136]. People often prefer insurance plans that
offer "limited coverage with low or zero deductible over comparable policies that offer higher
maximal coverage with higher deductibles - contrary to risk aversion".
Figure 2.19 depicts a scenario where one pays a certain cost in order to minimize the
probability of a given event without eliminating it altogether. As is visible from the participant
answers, this is not a popular choice. To summarise, p/2 is less desirable than p = 0.
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Problem 9: Suppose you consider the possibility of insuring some property against damage,
e.g. fire or theft. After examining the risks and the premium you find that you have no clear
preference between the options of purchasing insurance or leaving the property uninsured.
It is then called to your attention that the insurance company offers a new program called
probabilistic insurance. In this program you pay half of the regular premium. In case of
damage, there is a 50 per cent chance that you pay the other half of the premium and the
insurance company covers all the losses; and there is a 50 percent chance that you get back
your insurance payment and suffer all the losses. For example, if an accident occurs on an
odd day of the month, you pay the other half of the regular premium and your losses are
covered; but if the accident occurs on an even day of the month, your insurance payment is
refunded and your losses are not covered.
Recall that the premium for full coverage is such that you find this insurance barely worth its
cost.
Under these circumstances, would you purchase probabilistic insurance:
Yes, No.
N = 95 [20], [80] respectively.
Fig. 2.19 Probabilistic Insurance - A worked Example [136]
In contrast to this finding, traditional EUT (with a concave u) would imply that probabilis-
tic insurance is preferable to regular insurance [136]. This is an interesting yet perplexing
finding because "probabilistic insurance appears intuitively riskier than regular insurance,
which entirely eliminates the elements of risk". Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that
"the intuitive notion of risk is not adequately captured by the assumed concavity of the utility
function for wealth" [136].
2.7.4 The Isolation Effect
The Isolation Effect examines how individuals choose between alternatives. Specifically,
it focuses on the components of that choice and proposes that "people often disregard
components that the alternatives share, and focus on the components that distinguish them"
[232]. This method of choice resolution typically yields inconsistent preferences as a "pair of
prospects can be decomposed into common and distinctive components in more than one way,
and different decompositions sometimes lead to different preferences" [136]. For example:
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Problem 10: Consider the following two-stage game. In the first stage, there is a probability
of 0.75 to end the game without winning anything, and a probability of 0.25 to move into the
second stage. If you reach the second stage you have a choice between:
(4,000, .80) and (3,000).
Your choice must therefore be made before the game starts, i.e., before the outcome of the
first stage is known.
Fig. 2.20 The Isolation Effect - A worked Example [136]
In figure 2.20, the final outcome probabilities can be summarised as (4,000, .2) and
(3,000, .25). From this study (N = 141), 78% chose (3,000) and 22% chose (4,000, .8).
This is in direct conflict with Problem 4 where:
Problem 4: A: (4,000, .2) B: (3,000, .25)
Fig. 2.21 The Isolation Effect - Problem 4 [136]
From this, we deduce that people ignored the first stage of the game (whose outcomes
are shared by both prospects) and merely focused on the odds in the second part. To further
examine this phenomena one can build a decision tree to more closely examine the mental
process (This process forms part of the rationale behind Section 7). Squares represent
decision nodes, circles represent chance nodes.
From analysis, we are able to visualise the different placement of the decision point
between figure 2.22 and figure 2.23. More specifically, this different reflects a change to the
decision prospects whereby figure 2.22 denotes a choice between two risky prospects and
figure 2.23 requires a choice between and risky and riskless prospect. This is possible as
there is now a "dependency between the prospects without changing either probabilities or
outcomes" [136]. This is now apparent as the event ’not winning 3,000’ is included in the
event ’not winning 4,000’ (in the standard formulation), but is separated into two independent
events in the sequential formulation. Thus, "the outcome of winning 3,000 has a certainty
advantage in the sequential formulation, which it does not have in the standard formulation"
[136].
This is highly important as it details how preferences may be altered by different repre-
sentations of probabilities and forms a mathematical basis for the theory of nudging (see
section 2.3).
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Fig. 2.22 Problem 4 as a decision tree (Standard formulation) [136]
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Fig. 2.23 Problem 10 as a decision tree (Sequential formulation) [136]
2.8 Trust
Trust is "the belief that someone is good and honest and will not harm you, or that something is
safe and reliable" [176]. This definition holds true for Information Security and incorporates
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Table 2.4 Summary of common set of trust characteristics [73].
Characteristic Example
Trust is context aware Entity A may trust B to download files but does not trust B to perform
routing
Trust can be measured Entity A has more trust in entity B than A’s trust in C
Trust changes with time The amount A trusts B may increase or decrease as interactions happen
Trust is socially aware Entity A must trust entity C because C was presented by entity B, and A
already trusts B
Trust may be directional Entity A may trust B, but B may not trust A
both the user, "someone", as well as the physical and technological solutions, "something".
Since 2010, there have been several influential papers that highlight the role of trust in users
[182]. An important finding is the use of "trust to mitigate risk" [182] building on work
conducted by the European Union in their multi-disciplinary, several-year project in Online
Trust (iTrust)1 [133] "documenting the many ways that trust can be created and broken"
[199]. In addition, frameworks have been developed that aim to analyse the ways in which
trust is built and maintained within computer applications [193].
Trustworthiness defines the "competence of an entity to act dependably, securely and reli-
ably" [104]. It is not dissimilar from the concept of dependability which refers to the "ability
to deliver a service that can be justifiably trusted" [23]. Trust and trustworthiness are not
static and may change based on whether they adhere to specific criteria. The understanding
of this has led to many organisations requiring management of "trust relations" [104]. This is
highly relevant in dynamic environments where the understanding of disposition [67] (the
level of tolerable uncertainty within an organisation), affects the dependency.
The following figure details the common set of trust characteristics [73]:
2.8.1 Trust in Information Security
Trust is an integral part of any IS policy and organisational structure. Organisations trust
that employees will behave appropriately and in a trustworthy manner (often dictated by
contractual obligations and policy), and employees expect that companies will act in a
trustworthy manner ensuring their general well-being (securing personal details, honouring
work contracts). The all-encompassing nature of trust within organisations can be visualised
as:
With respect to trust, Albuquerque et al [74] argue that "when it comes to security, trust
is zero or one", you either trust completely or not at all. Trust can usually be acquired
1Workshop papers available at: http://www.informatik.uni-trier.de/~wley/db/conf/itrust/
itrust2006.html.
2.8 Trust 65
Fig. 2.24 Layered Trust Information Security Architecture [74]
through empirical observation, "by formal proof of the systems and the mechanisms involved
and other techniques" [145]. Once all expectations are met, you may trust. The problem
with this belief is that trust is "an expectation", "it is a probability that things will work
and keep working as they are supposed to" [74]. Failing to do so results in the system
being untrustworthy through its unpredictability. Further complications arise from the
unpredictability of users in a number of scenarios stemming either from a reasoned decision
to conform or defy policy, or involuntary non-compliance promoted through issues such as
cognitive fatigue. These issues create an environment where trust is not necessarily binary
and in fact is related to a number of components often out of the control of policy maker.
Security relies heavily on processes such as access control, authentication, non-repudiation.
In reality, however, information practices should follow "trust, but verify" [60]. The layered
approach in 2.24 allows one to see that "trust is connected as part of the security architecture"
and may be addressed when required in "all layers and in all components that are part of the
architecture" [74].
The IEEE Cybersecurity Initiative [204] placed trust as a key factor within their list of
the top 10 security design flaws. They state that "data sent to an information system by
untrusted clients or channels should be assumed to be compromised until proven otherwise".
Ultimately, if the data cannot be verified it is inherently not trusted.

Chapter 3
Methodology for Decision Making
This chapter proposes a methodology for aiding the policy decision making process using data
from empirical investigations, and continued interaction with the stakeholder. Specifically,
we identify behaviours through CISO consultation and user interviews (our pilot study and the
IRIDIUM study), alerting us to important behaviours and practices within our environment.
This process forms the rationale for subsequent bespoke investigations (see chapters 4, 5, & 6)
that aim to specifically identify how users form their decisions with respect to that behaviour,
and how we can manipulate this process through behaviour interventions (predominantly
nudges). This approach enables a more accurate understanding of the problem space as our
articulation of critical components is improved through repeat investigations that are relevant
to both our users and the problem space.
The methodology highlights the necessity to understand user behaviours, and to identify
common technological processes that may pose a security risk within a mobile working
environment. This chapter examines current trends in BYOD and consumerisation with
respect to security, data mobility, and access. Within our assessment of the problem space,
we adopt a case study that initially focuses on a university environment but subsequently
expands on this to include an abstract overview of security practices in other domains.
Successive chapters follow the steps highlighted within the methodology and help to improve
our understanding of the problem space by investigating specific methods aimed towards
populating and analysing these data sets through experimentation. Ultimately, this approach
enables the policy maker to produce a more robust modelling environment to test future
policies, and ultimately aids the policy decision making process.
Section 3.1 introduces our study and outlines our direction. Section 3.2 outlines a
methodology for investigating the omissions in our understanding through repeat, small-
scale, targeted studies and interaction with the CISO. Section 3.3 details a case study and
uses a pilot study as part of the methodology providing the first iterative step of the process.
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Section 3.4 discusses the results obtained within the pilot study. Section 3.4.1 defines the
problem space and highlights the challenges we face with respect to policy design. Section
3.5 discusses the results with respect to future investigation. In section 3.6 we outline
the remainder of the thesis and introduce the following chapters with respect to the key
behaviours outlined within our pilot study and CISO interaction.
The IRIDIUM Project
Within the IRIDIUM project I was appointed as a researcher to fore mostly assess current
policy documentation within the university. This required a university wide assessment
of central policy along with investigation into faculty level, more specific policy related
to the governance of bespoke practices. The necessity for such disparity and inclusion of
additional bespoke policy is often tied to affiliation with industry and collaborative initiatives
between the university and external parties that often required the dissemination and sharing
of sensitive data.
Following this review I conducted a series of stakeholder interviews (33 in total of
varying seniority) capturing common practices within specific departments (those defined
as high value) to understand vulnerabilities and threats and whether current policies were
indeed being adhered to. This process required assessment of current ’shadow security’ (a
phenomenon where users often adopt their own security practices that are not necessarily in
direct compliance of policy, but are often deemed ’sufficient enough’ to work securely whilst
remaining productive), direct non-compliance and an assessment of where the stakeholder
felt they were vulnerable. These observations and concerns were captured and reported back
in order to understand our current threat landscape and determine where new policy could be
designed to improve our security and minimize data loss.
3.1 Introduction
Universities have increasingly become targets for attackers who wish to obtain ‘desirable
research’ and ‘student’s personal and financial details’, as documented in a January 2015
report on the Queen Mary University cyber-attack [106]. As such, it is necessary for academic
institutions to evaluate their environment from an Information Security perspective and assess
the effectiveness of their data management policies with respect to university IPR.
The objective of this chapter is to introduce and design a methodology for aiding the
information security decision-making process. This involves determining stakeholder require-
ments and investigating user behaviours. In doing so, bespoke tools and studies are designed
and subsequently conducted in order to understand current user behaviours and practices,
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and determine where potential threats may lie. We wish to improve our understanding of our
problem space, and ultimately to empower the CISO to design more effective policies that
are tailored to both the user and the organisation in an effort to maximize compliance and
productivity.
Central to this methodology, which we call Model-Based Information Security Decision-
Making methodology (or Model-Based methodology for short) is the development of a
testing framework (discussed in chapter 7) to aid in the design process and subsequent testing
pertaining to the possible consequences of new policy decisions. Special emphasis is placed
on the understanding and representation of how employees behave within the current environ-
ment as we believe that users play a critical role within security. The presented Model-Based
methodology is iterative, increasingly improving the expressiveness of human behaviour and
providing a more precise quantification of environmental variables. Specifically, we investi-
gate a set of activities and behaviours identified from out pilot study and CISO interaction
(see chapters 4, 5, 6, 7) in order to test our approach and validate our iterative, small-scale,
user-centric method. We believe this approach to be scalable, and that this work provides an
assessment of its viability with respect to the problem definition.
We apply this methodology to a case study of practices within a university environment
and aim to improve our understanding of data mobility and user security behaviours under
the umbrella of Data Loss Prevention (DLP). To do this, we work closely with the IT team
that governs the university’s IT infrastructure. Within this initial chapter we focus on the use
of USB memory storage and BYOD and discuss these mediums with respect to collaborative
work. This is a conscious decision based on the needs of our partner, and also the popularity
of the trend within the institution and other working environments (obtained through our pilot
study and literature in chapter 2). Focusing on the devices most common to our environment
adds feasibility to the study with respect to scope, as well as enabling finer granularity
regarding their use, ultimately aiding our understanding of data transfer.
Throughout this process we maintain continual interaction with the CISO and support
staff responsible for the policy decision making process. This is beneficial as it enables us to
specifically target the requirements of the CISO and relate these to activities and behaviours
witnessed through participant interviews. This approach benefits our methodology as we
are able to base our analysis and subsequent recommendations on ‘real-world’ data that
is obtained through focused investigation techniques. Specifically, we use the following
empirically derived data sets:
• The IRIDIUM Project: The project [186] was funded by the Joint Information
Systems Committee (JISC) and represented a collaboration between the University
Research Office, the Digital Institute, the University Library, Information Systems &
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Services and MEDEV, School of Medical Sciences Education Development. The aim
of iridium is to make recommendations for a complete holistic plan and infrastructure
for research data management in the University, making data generated by research
at the University both available and discoverable with effective curation throughout
the full data lifecycle in consultation with the researchers who produce it. It should be
noted that:
– central to the project is the formulation policy and appropriate support for its
implementation.
– information technology will likely play an important role in supporting com-
pliance with newly developed policies, with a significant part of the project.
investigating the assessment of this.
The principal project outputs are:
– an institutional research data management policy (as required by the funding
councils).
– a costed business case for a sustainable institution-wide research data manage-
ment infrastructure to support that policy.
• CISO Interaction: We maintain regular meetings with the CISO and support staff
to document their main concerns. We subsequently encapsulate these via a process
of problem formulation and identify the behaviours and practices we need to further
investigate these areas through bespoke user studies.
• Pilot Study: The pilot study is part of our iterative methodology and aims to identify
user behaviours and practices identified from the above CISO interaction. We include
this process as we believe that understanding how users form their decisions and
ultimately act upon these decisions is critical in understanding how to improve security
and formulate appropriate policy.
3.1.1 Problem Domain
During initial meetings, the CISO has expressed concerns towards a lack of understanding of
where vulnerabilities and potential exploits lie with respect to the protection of university IPR.
We examine the policies currently in place and interview users to determine areas of further
investigation to address this omission. Our aim is to provide a better understanding of the
IPR within the university, assessing value (from a user’s and organisation’s perspective) user
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awareness and common practices. From this, we aim to identify areas for further investigation
with the goal of developing model-based tools to aid in the policy decision-making process.
3.2 Methodology
The methodology aims to:
• Encapsulate the requirements of the CISO and identify high value assets/targets.
• Use this to formulate an initial investigation strategy.
• Conduct a Pilot Study based on this strategy to articulate our understanding of security
practices.
• Extract data obtained from the pilot study to generate specific subsequent investiga-
tions.
• Understand the Human Decision Points (HDPs), data value and user practices.
• Begin to model the environment.
• Extend the modelling formalism if required.
• Determine which areas of our model are under/not represented.
• Repeat the investigation strategy to complete the omitted data sets.
• Iteratively refine the model to aid the decision-making process.
With reference to figure 3.1 it is necessary to discuss the individual steps.
Step 1 defines the initial contact with the CISO (ISS) and aims to formalise the problem.
It is essential that the needs of the CISO and stakeholders are sufficiently understood and
addressed so that we may aid the decision-making process. We determine ‘end goals’ (a
collation of interests, preferences and requirements) that will be the basis of the work we
conduct.
Step 2 conceptualises Step 1 and promotes the necessity for a case study. From our ‘end
goals’ we understand some of the requirements that our Model-Based approach is required
to address. We visualise additional steps towards fulfilling these goals as sub-processes to
our model and begin to formulate data collection strategies.
Step 3 represents the pilot study and data collection phase. Within this process, we
determine which variables we need, highlight which users we are going to investigate, and
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Fig. 3.1 Case Study in Relation to our Model-Based Methodology
formulate which questions we will ask. This is based on uncertainties and omissions from
our understanding of the environment obtained through Step 1. As visible, these are an
assessment of the Human Decision Points, and the user’s Opportunity. Willingness and
Capability to complete a task [89].
Step 4 denotes the iterative nature of our methodology and highlights the relationship
between our modelling and data collection phases. Data collected from Step 3 is used
to populate our model and determine where focused investigations pertaining to specific
behaviours are required. This process may require further extension of the modelling
formalism (see chapter 7). When completed, it is then necessary to determine whether to
revisit Step 3 (obtain specific data regarding identified behaviours - chapters 4, 5, & 6), or
move to Step 5. With 1 iteration, we argue that there is insufficient understanding to move to
step 5 as it is not possible to accurately model the environment (a feature highlighted through
the myriad of phenomena discussed in chapter 2). As such, we revisit Step 3, typically
including a greater number of participants from a wider selection of appropriate user profiles
in order to further our understanding of a specified behaviour or practice.
Step 5 illustrates a functional model that satisfies the goals highlighted from CISO
interaction in Step 1. At this stage, our model can either be used to aid in policy decision
making, or must be rejected forcing us to transition back to Step 6.
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Step 6 is necessary in order to further our belief in an iterative strategy. As we discuss in
chapter 2, threat environments and user behaviours change temporally as new technology
influences our lives. This process enables a continued iterative process that should aid in the
discovery of these trends and enable an adequate test-bed for future policy formulation.
3.3 Pilot Study in the School of Computing Science
The pilot study was conducted to expand our understanding of the problem space, and
as a follow-up to the areas highlighted in our CISO interaction. This process represents
our inclusion of users into the decision-making process, as we believe that understanding
user behaviours plays a critical role in improving user compliance, and ultimately aids the
successfulness of any policy implementation. The pilot study forms an important part of our
methodology as it provides a quick, highly targeted method of obtaining data pertaining to
user behaviours and practices within a given problem space.
Our study was piloted within the Computing Science Department using a stratified
sampling method to reduce sampling bias. This involved placing participants into sub-
populations that were homogeneous with respect to their job role and title. Although the
sample was small, it was important to separate members in such a fashion as there are specific
risks and attack vectors that are commonly associated with each population (risks that pertain
to their given daily activities).
We believe that overall, participants operating in this environment will have a higher
base knowledge of information security due to the nature of their research background and
the working environment itself. We believe that this increased knowledge is beneficial as
it will highlight more behaviours and practices that less technically skilled users may lack.
This approach may also represent a ‘worst-case’ scenario as we would expect more informed
and technically able users to adopt more secure computing behaviours. We this process
documented in Fig 3.1, by interviewing people of various positions within the department
categorized as either Lecturers, PhD Students, Technical Support Staff or Clerical. In order
to justify this selection it is necessary to briefly describe each category in terms of policy.
Lecturers have access to student records, exam scripts, coursework and crucially their
own research which often has ties with outside industry and other academic institutions as
part of collaborative projects. This often has a value associated with it as research grants
have tangible budgets that can often run into several million pound figures. There is also
an expectation for return on investment from the research body and subsequent publication.
Lecturers also mentor doctoral students further increasing their involvement into research
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and potentially sensitive information that may have contractual obligations or non-disclosure
agreements.
PhD students are seen with a similar importance to Lecturers as research typically
produces new IP which is funded by various institutions. This category is also responsible
for marking students’ work through demonstrating (a process where PhD students assist
lecturers in practical classes). The way in which this work is stored and subsequently marked
could have a significant risk in terms of data protection, identity and confidentiality.
Technical support staff are also included in the study as they are responsible for the
maintenance of existing systems, and data backup of the department’s servers. Part of their
duties also include the procurement of software and hardware as well as its installation
requiring access to many areas with multiple levels of physical access-based security.
Clerical staff typically comprise of members from the Human Resources department.
Typical responsibilities of staff within this department include the management of student
and staff finances (including personal details), purchasing of items using the Department’s
credit card, personal hardware requests and the restocking of office supplies, and the collation
and storage of student’s coursework and examination results.
The use of user profiling is beneficial as we enable the specific identification of practices
and behaviours with respect user groups (a process made possible by an assessment of their
seniority, access rights and contractual roles). We assume that lecturers and PhD students
within this Department have a high preference for security and are making more security
conscious decisions with respect to their data. We assume that they are taking adequate
precautions to protect their data based on the risks they perceive. Countering this, we believe
that clerical staff (specifically within the Human Resources Department) are less likely to
have this technical awareness and as a result will have a lower knowledge of computer based
security. This places them at a higher risk, but ultimately they have lower value data.
3.3.1 Investigation Strategy
In line with the methodology, it is important to produce a quick, small-scale assessment of
our environment as the start of the iterative process (a sub-process of our talks with the CISO).
To do this, we have produced a semi-structured interview as defined in Step 3 of Fig 3.1.
With reference to Wengraf [250], we have produced a framework for interviewing individuals
which aims to investigate users, their devices, and the data they handle. Barribal [154]
discusses how to improve the credibility and reliability of data obtained from semi-structured
interviews and this interview strategy has been conducted with respect to this. The questions
have been specifically designed to investigate areas of concern highlighted from our CISO,
and current trends and behaviours noted within our literature survey.
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The interview questions follow a logical progression where the objective is to provide
both qualitative and quantitative results as an assessment of an individual’s current practices.
This involves asking questions in a specific order so that answers are not inferred and so that
users do not answer in a manner in which they feel obliged to. Both data types are important
and can be utilized in different manners when assessing the problem space.
More specifically the questions are designed to assess current practices and behaviours
within the target environment. The answers to these questions allow for the identification
of security vulnerabilities that will later be investigated through our bespoke experiments
that are aimed at assessing the validity of nudges as an intervention mechanism. We are not
attempting to formally test a hypothesis, more encapsulate the behaviours and capture user
practices and preferences.
The questions we asked are thus:
1. Which words and/or phrases do you associate with Data Security?
2. What security measures are in place where you work?
3. Please rank the above in order of importance.
4. What devices do you use to store university data?
5. What devices do you use to store personal data?
6. What devices do you use to transfer university data between locations?
7. What devices do you use to transfer personal data between locations?
8. How often do you transfer data? From where to where?
9. How do you carry your device during transit?
10. What types of data do you transfer?
11. What measures do you use to secure the data?
(a) Have you considered other measures you do not use?
12. Briefly describe the implications if you lost university data.
(a) Would you report it?
13. Briefly describe the implications if you lost your personal data.
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(a) Would you report it?
14. What can others do if they obtained university data you are responsible for?
15. What can others do if they obtained your personal data?
16. Do you ever transfer data without backups?
17. Do you create data remotely?
(a) How long between backups?
18. What device(s) do you use to work remotely (off-site)?
19. Do you connect to non-university managed networks with this device?
20. Do people other than yourself have access to the device?
21. Do you submit error reports if they occur whilst on campus?
22. Do you submit error reports if they occur whilst off campus with the same device?
The questions follow a specific progression in an effort to gain honest responses where
the individual does not question their own practices and thoughts. Open ended questions
allow the user to comment freely on the subject at hand whilst requiring little prompting from
the interviewer. As HDP’s and OWC are critical to our understanding, this method allows
for a detailed assessment of participant. From these questions, we wish to highlight and
investigate specific behaviours and practices which are common throughout our participants
in order to develop bespoke investigation strategies.
Initial questions (Q1-3) aim to assess the security of the given locale across a broad
spectrum from the user’s perspective. This enables assumptions to be made about a par-
ticipant’s awareness to current policies, and technical expertise in that domain or specific
practice. Such questions aim to investigate whether the user is aware of their surroundings,
and understand their preferences with respect to their perceived impact on security.
Questions 4-11 begin an in-depth analysis of data security and mobility with respect to
data type (organisation vs personal). We gain insight into how users value data, and how
this is reflected in their choice of device. Importantly, we also learn the types of data the
individual transfers and the locations this entails, enabling the CISO to begin to quantify the
risk the university faces upon a data leakage event. These questions can highlight whether
users are sufficiently able (OWC) to select the correct device to use in a given scenario
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highlighting whether current policies, training and practice are adhered to or sufficiently
understood for employees to operate securely.
Questions 12-15 aim to investigate whether users are aware of the impact that data leakage
can have. This provides an assessment of personal and non-personal data and the role this
has in the way users protect or select their device.
Questions 16-18 examines how users mitigate risk when transferring data and working
remotely. We question which devices they choose in order to assess the penetration of BYOD
in the workplace (rationale for chapter 4) and subsequently determine whether this medium
is the preferred choice of access and storage with respect to university data.
Questions 19-21 further examines the role of BYOD and investigates multiple user
devices. We ask how users behave when outside of the university network with respect to
unknown and non-university networks (detailed further in chapter 4) and data transfer/access.
From this we begin to understand how access and location are related with respect to specific
practices and can better articulate our threat environment. Assessing multiple users furthers
this as we investigate how sharing devices with non-university staff may impact data security.
We ask specifically whether the device is used to access the internet outside of the university
network to understand whether this is a legitimate attack vector (rationale for chapter 5).
Furthermore, we examine whether users report errors if they occur in order to minimize the
impact of data loss or breaches (rationale for chapter 5).
3.4 Results
The pilot study had n=35 participants and included the following breakdown: 3 Lecturers,
20 clerical staff, 10 PhD students, and 2 technical support staff. These numbers reflect the
expertise of staff (we have a higher percentage of clerical staff as they are responsible for
personal records and the transfer of financial documents) and the expertise of staff with
the belief that less technical staff pose a higher risk to security. We include lecturers and
PhD students for their involvement with current research, which may have industry data or
sensitive material, as well as lecturers who may also have far more sensitive information.
This breakdown is in line with recommendations from the CISO.
There were a number of significant results obtained from the pilot study that have helped
to formulate subsequent investigations. Most surprising is the contrasting ways in which
people of different profiles (Lecturers, PhD, Technical, HR) see and utilise security methods.
This was witnessed in chapter 2 in several studies where seniority and a higher level of access
often resulted in a far higher risk to the organisation (attackers will often expressly target
such people). As such, we discovered that less technically skilled staff (clerical staff), were
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less capable of identifying which devices and methods of data transfer should be adopted
when handling sensitive data (a reason why we chose to investigate non-experts in chapters 4,
5). Furthermore, there is a clear divide between physically-based accessed such as doors and
swipe cards, and computer based solutions such as encryption and User Managed Access
with respect to security mechanisms (a further example of the technical divide). This is
an important observation as it suggests that current policies are ineffective with respect to
security, or that staff are receiving insufficient training.
To further analyse our results, we will discuss them in order:
Question 1. 80% of the sample population mentioned IT based solutions such as access
management (user authentication via user name password login). It is important to stress that
this figure represented 100% of Lecturers, PhD students, or Technical staff, whilst only 65%
of clerical staff. This suggests that there is a difference in technical awareness and ability
amongst different employees. Of the remaining 35% of clerical staff, there was confusion
as to what they actually considered security with many participants requiring significantly
longer than their counterparts to answer.
Question 2. We witness an almost identical distribution with respect to IT-based solutions.
The only difference was an increase to 68% (1 participant) of clerical staff who mentioned
such mechanisms in the workplace. This is important and suggests that there is a disconnect
amongst users. More specifically, it suggests that these people had either not actively thought
about the security around them or were unaware due to a lack of sufficient training or
prominence in the workplace.
Further analysis revealed that 73% described password based access as the most common
and important form of security followed by 50% of participants mentioning physical access.
This is an important find as whilst password based security may seem obvious, physical
access as a form of security is often overlooked. The physical access response was most
common from technical support staff, perhaps due to the nature of their profession; they
have several locations throughout the department where expensive hardware and software
are stored, and they also carry master keys that enable access throughout the department.
Perhaps most alarming is that 15% of the population (all clerical) were unable to identify
any security measures at all.
With respect to question 3, user authentication followed by physical access to the building
via smartcard were deemed to be the most important.
Question 4. From our sample, 100% of people used personal storage space on university
provided computers (these are virtual drives located on university servers), and 75% of them
used an additional personal Laptops or other storage mediums. As all participants used
computers provided by the university, it is important to further analyse the use of personal
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devices. Of these, 24 used USB sticks and 3 used external hard drives; none of which were
highlighted as encrypted or password protected. 12 participants highlighted they used tablets
and mobile phones to transport data. This is an important observation and poses a significant
security risk. We highlight this finding as significant and is our rationale for chapter 4.
Question 5. Personal data was less commonly stored in the workplace than university data
with only 20 (57%) participants engaging in the activity. Of the respondents, all lecturers,
PhD, and technical staff stored personal data but only 5 (25%) of clerical staff did. This is
perhaps due to the working environment where clerical staff share their work space in an
open plan environment (and perhaps do not wish to be shoulder-surfed) compared to the
other participants who often have their own private spaces. The results could also depict an
uncertainty in what constitutes as personal data. Of the devices chosen, 15 users chose USB
sticks, personal laptops and mobile devices (combined response); and the remaining 5 used
university or private email accounts via attachments.
Question 6. Of the population, 25 (71%) users stated that they moved electronic university
data (others noted that they did not or that they simply logged into another computer and
used their private server space). Of the 25, all lecturers, PhD students and technical staff
were included as well as a further 10 clerical staff. The most common methods were the use
of an unencrypted USB stick (15), personal laptop (15), mobile device (6), hard-drive (2)
and email (12).
Question 7. The predominant method of moving personal data was by personal laptop or
mobile device. Of the 20 who answered from question 5, 18 used either a personal laptop
or mobile device with 2 using USB sticks. This indicates that there a great deal of mobile
devices (including personal laptops) within the working environment.
Question 8. Daily (25) was the most common frequency of data transfer as users were
either required to perform it to complete tasks, or would work from other locations. The
most common location was to and from home (18) whilst collaborative meetings (3) and
public locations (4) were also featured.
Question 9. 20 participants carry the media on their person (around neck, or in a pocket)
if small enough (i.e. smart device, usb stick) and 5 store it in baggage or luggage elsewhere
(typically laptops).
Question 10. The most common response was the transfer of ‘work’ data (21) which
often included a mixture of personal data and university owned IPR (experimental results,
papers etc.). This number featured all lecturers, PhD and technical staff, and 6 clerical staff.
Of the 6 clerical staff, all transferred university data.
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Question 11. Of the 21 respondents from question 10, 12 highlighted that authentication
on their personal laptops was their method of securing the data. The remaining participants
did not provide an answer although they may still have used the previous method.
Part (a). 12 participants highlighted specific hardware such as encrypted USB devices
or external hard-drives. An additional 4 participants mentioned software based encryption
that could then be placed on unencrypted media. The remaining 5 did not mention any other
methods.
Question 12. All 35 participants answered this question. Of these, 12 indicated specifi-
cally that it may cause financial or reputation damage towards the university. 5 participants
said that they would personally be affected as it would interrupt their work. The remaining 23
participants were unsure of the implications of losing university data but did mention that it
would be damaging for both themselves and the university. With respect to (a), 8 participants
(of which 2 were lecturers, 2 were PhD students, 3 were technical staff and 1 were clerical
staff) were able to indicate that they should inform the support team or someone else at the
university.
Question 13. All 35 participants answered this question. The most common response
(12) was that time would be lost with respect to work (it is unclear whether there was
an uncertainty as to who owned their work). 2 participants highlighted that personally
identifiable information would be lost (photographs, bank details) and this may have future
implications. With respect to (a), participants declared that their report would be context
dependant (8 - if it was important, would not cause embarrassment) and if there was a genuine
chance of recovery (2 - accidentally deleted emails or files on remote servers).
Question 14. Of the 25 respondents, the majority of answers were context specific and
related to the role of the individual. All lecturers stated that either publications could be lost
or stolen (2), the likelihood of future grant applications could be affected (1), and that other
sensitive data could cause significant reputational and financial losses for the university (3 -
specifically so in the medical department and the inclusion of corporate sponsors). All PhD
students responded by reiterating publication loss (5), or mentioned facing penalties for the
loss (6 - perhaps removed from the programme). Technical staff responded by mentioning the
theft of volume licensing keys for software (1), gaining unauthorised access to user databases
via stolen credentials (1), and further impersonation and associated access (2).
Question 15. Of the 25 respondents, 13 replied with concerns regarding unauthorised
access to their personal files and the subsequent use of this (2 mentioned blackmail). 4
responded more specifically with unauthorised access to accounts as they stored access
credentials in an unencrypted, non-passworded form on their device (3 of these were clerical
staff). The remainder provided no specific response in relation to a particular issue, but
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eluded to it causing an inconvenience and were worried with respect to knowing that their
data could be in the hands of somebody else.
Question 16. Of the 25 respondents who transfer data, 4 (clerical staff) noted that they
did not have a back up of their data. Upon questioning, it was apparent that their device was
the only copy of the document in question. It is unclear as to whether they were aware of the
implications of doing so.
Question 17. Of 35 participant answers, 19 answered ‘yes’. All lecturers and PhD students
said that they created data remotely either due to working from home or collaborating with
partners elsewhere. 1 technical member of staff said that they also worked from home on
certain days. 4 clerical staff also noted to working some evenings and weekends in order
to complete their duties. With respect to (a), none of the respondents mentioned that they
produced specific backups on dedicated devices but instead detailed that they had other
consumerisation and BYOD based approaches. 5 PhD students mentioned that they used
Dropbox for their backup and synchronisation of work whilst the remaining respondents
used the storage medium on their device (be it personal or university owned).
Question 18. Of the 19 respondents, the most commonly used device was a personal
laptop (19), whilst personal tablets featured (4).
Question 19. All participants connect to their home Wi-Fi network. An additional 12
of these also commented that they connected to public Wi-Fi’s with the device (Cafe’s 10 -
public libraries 4 - and transport 6).
Question 20. Of the 19 respondents, 8 replied by stating that other users had access to
the device (family members - 6, friends - 1 and partners - 6).
Question 21. Of the 35 respondents, 7 had stated that they suffered an error that required
reporting. Of the 7, 3 participants engaged the official procedure of contacting support
with respect to the issue. The remaining 4 either dismissed the error and continued (using
alternative methods), or sought assistance from other colleagues without the issue being
officially recorded. Of the 7 incidents, 3 were access issues related to their work allocated
computer or email account whilst the remaining 4 were software failures, crashes, or malware
instances.
Question 22. Of the 35 respondents, none had reported an issue that transpired off-campus
even if it were relating to a university owned device. Whilst 3 participants acknowledged
that an event had occurred, they did not wish to report it for fear of disciplinary action as
they were unclear as to the rules governing device usage in such environments.
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3.4.1 Challenges in the Policy Decision-Making Process
This section highlights the omissions in data sets and identifies the unknown behaviours
within the study environment. We aim to define these unknown variables through our pilot
study and determine their impact on our methodology, its development, and more specifically
how it impacts our data collection strategy.
Current Policies
From meetings with the CISO and support staff, we know that it is current practice for all new
and existing machines to be registered for use on the campus network (wireless devices are
able to connect freely provided the user has an active campus account, i.e. they are a current
member of staff or attending student). This network, however, is separate from the central
network and requires additional verification through a VPN in order to be able to access
remote storage and printing etc. This registration process records the devices Media Access
Control (MAC) address, brand and model, along with its location and registered owner.
Access to this database via the IRIDIUM project [186] has provided us with a rich dataset
containing 34549 entries at present. This has enabled a quick assessment of the concentration
of static devices and at finer granularity, the number of mobile devices (specifically laptops
and mobile phones). Of the previously mentioned 34549 computers on campus, 1932 belong
to the Computing Science Department alone. Critically, 620 are described as mobile devices
and are typically in the possession of lecturers and PhD students in the form of laptops, tablets
and mobile phones. This highlights the mobility of the data and justifies the concerns of ISS.
The dataset has also provided an approximation with respect to the spatial distribution of
machines that can be cross-referenced with device type and department in order to determine
where possible high risk may lie (i.e. some departments are likely to hold more sensitive data
than others). In summation:
• It is possible to highlight areas of high concentration - the most popular departments,
libraries and other open study domains. Areas such as these potentially pose a higher
risk to the network purely through the increased number of interactions and likelihood
of collaboration (sharing of data and media devices).
• We can visualise when the device was last seen by the network. If it is a campus
controlled device (it receives updates from a central server) we can assess whether
virus definitions are up to date and whether critical operating system patches have been
installed. It also highlights mobility and the frequency with which the device leaves
the network (it is possible, however, that the device may simply be turned off).
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• It is possible to categorise devices based on their owner with the belief that higher
levels of seniority grant higher levels of access, thus posing a more significant threat if
successfully attacked.
Having access to such a rich dataset has also allowed for a rapid deployment of our pilot
study (utilising findings highlighted in Chapter 2 and observations from the above). We have
been able to identify areas of significance related to the CISO’s concerns, as well as those
areas of potential high-risk as denoted by the analysis of the dataset.
Issues With the Current Policy and Environment
To devise a new strategy and design more effective policies we must first identify common
threats with respect to current practices and user behaviours and understand the relationships
between these and our environmental variables. To do so, we must highlight these issues
with example.
The first issue is the unknown number of non-registered, mobile/static machines within
campus under ISS governance (these are typically devices that are personal or bought outside
of ISS jurisdiction through project grants). Without this knowledge, it is almost impossible
to understand the scope of the problem as we do not know the percentage of devices that
are currently under management. This also presents yet another problem. Even if this value
were to be known, it is highly unlikely that there is a uniform data value distribution (users
may prefer to store more sensitive data on their own personal machines) and also it is very
difficult to ascertain the level of security (patches, virus definitions etc) on the device, a
problem noted in Morrow [166]. Factors such as the machine’s user, their practices, area of
study and access (a property of location) further add to this complexity.
Of particular interest is the issue of value and what exactly this metric reflects. Moreover,
how it impacts user behaviours and their decision-making process. This typically falls into
personal value (that which individuals place on their data) and the organisation’s value (what
the data is worth to the organisation - often a calculation of financial, legal, reputational
and time based approximations). For this study we concentrate on the latter (using a rating
system similar to the SANS Institute [201]) but understand the importance of the prior with
respect to behavioural influence. Being aware of this phenomena is important with respect to
our pilot study and user interviews. To exemplify the issue, consider the following:
• A student’s essay:
User Perspective: The student will most likely place a high value on their essay as
it has a profound impact on their progression and success during studies. It takes time
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to complete (and ultimately lose this if the essay is lost) and is a personal reflection of
their ability and in some cases beliefs.
Organisation’s Perspective: From a university perspective there is little value
placed on the asset. It is the student’s responsibility to complete the work by a specified
deadline (often detailed within university regulations) and ultimately there are no
repercussions for the university if the student fails to do so (one could argue that it may
affect the overall pass-rate).
• Data Loss from a Corporate Contract:
User Perspective: Whilst the user may be responsible contractually for the secu-
rity of the data in some circumstances (failure to do so may result in the loss of their
job, or legal action if it is determined to have been malicious), there are numerous
cases with which the user may be exempt from prosecution or fault. In this example,
the user is not personally attached to the data and therefore they may regard it with
having a lower value. They may feel that the protection adopted by the organisation is
proportional to the value they place on it and ultimately it is not their responsibility.
Organisation’s Perspective: Contracts within organisations can be highly sensi-
tive especially when dealing with classified information (medical research, defence
etc). Such contracts are often influenced and governed explicitly under law and con-
tractual obligations with heavy financial and reputational losses related to breaches of
contract. From this perspective, the value placed from the organisation will most likely
be several orders of magnitude higher than that of the user even if the user is aware
that they need to protect it.
Without being able to quantify this value, it is difficult to assess the appropriateness
of current security practices as asset value should be mirrored by the level of security. In
a non-uniform environment (uneven data value distribution) this will require a detailed
approximation of asset values across a broad area. For this, we will need to determine how
the university categorizes data types, determine the data type users transfer as well as the
locations and devices involved during the process. It is then possible to approximate the data
value based on the findings detailed in chapter 2. Doing so ultimately aids the model building
process as we are able to express these values within our variables and bounds to provide
visual assistance to decision maker.
In an effort to address the above issue and provide basic protection for users who request
it, ISS have initially responded to data security concerns by piloting an encrypted USB stick
programme granting a ‘secret’ (an industry standard level of encryption suitable for secret
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documentation [10]) level of security (encryption based). The introduction, however, does
not follow a controlled implementation and has been conducted irrespective of any statistical
data to backup the claim of increased security gains. This programme is small-scale and has
had less than 50 adopted users at the time of questioning. Importantly, there are no tools in
place to monitor the effectiveness of this strategy or analyse its impact.
3.4.2 Human Behaviour
Human behaviour with respect to policy design is critical to our methodology. We wish to
develop a modelling environment that depicts specifically targeted user actions to be tested
with a prototype policy. The actions we investigate are chosen from our pilot study participant
answers and are further examined in separate chapters to fully highlight their intricacies and
understand the behaviours that govern them. This requires bespoke experimental design and
provides a scalable framework with which to test in order to populate our model variables.
Specifically, we investigate how to change these behaviours (a process of understanding user
preferences through MINDSPACE), and how users form decisions with reference to security
decisions. From this increased expressiveness of user behaviour, we are able to build more
accurate models that reflect the target environment and enable to the policy decision-maker
to design, implement and test new policies.
With any security decision, it is important to note that there are often two seemingly
conflicting objectives. Firstly, users do not want to be inconvenienced (lose productivity) by
‘overly aggressive’ encryption or security policies, and secondly that organisations wish to
protect their data and assets (but need to balance risk aversion). To remedy this, we need an
holistic approach that involves users’ behaviours in the policy decision-making process.
If poorly implemented, an increase in security often hampers productivity through ad-
ditional user authentication procedures. These extra processes impact the time it takes to
complete a task either through additional verification processes, an increase in the time it
takes to be authenticated, or a combination of the two. Introducing such policies modify a
user’s typical behaviour presenting a somewhat unnatural activity pattern from perceived
habitual processes. Deviations from expected procedures create additional HDPs that in turn
have an associated thought processing time and ultimately affect the decision outcome (we
are often causing the user to turn from system 1 to system 2). Moreover, from chapter 2
we are aware that users have a finite cognitive budget, and once exhausted, the willingness
to comply with procedures greatly diminishes. Increasing the number of additional steps a
user must navigate in order to complete a task consumes this budget. In chapter 4 we aim to
combat this problem by employing nudges to improve the security decisions that users make
without inconveniencing them with additional processes or authentication measures.
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User profiling plays an important role within our pilot study and participant selection
requires grouping prospective participants in relation to common practices and procedures
they conduct (often a result of occupational contract). This will typically relate to the data
that they handle and the department they belong to with technical knowledge and security
awareness being a crucial factor.
3.4.3 USB Sticks and the Role of BYOD
The methods in which users utilize hardware and software (specifically USB Sticks and
mobile devices) in order to secure and transfer their data is a complex process. From a
Human Influenced Task Orientated Process (HITOP) [89] perspective we are able to represent
these processes using a subset of variables which we obtain through experimentation and
subsequently implement into our modelling environment.
Within the field of HCI (detailed in chapter 2) it is important to understand the com-
plexities and relationships that are present between user and device, and the method in
which policy can influence this. As discussed in ’Human-Computer Interaction’ [81], HCI is
often regarded as the junction between Computer Science, Behavioural Science, and Design.
How we represent and populate such data sets is critical to the validity of our work and the
process in which we design successful policy. This is useful in our example when we try to
understand how users utilize their chosen hardware for data migration.
Opportunity, Willingness and Capability (OWC) from a HITOP perspective is necessary
in the understanding of the present environment. It is an assessment of the user’s ability to
complete a given task [89]. We use an assessment of this in our Data Collection Strategy.
Fig. 3.2 Access locations and Data Mobility
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Fig. 3.2 details the complex nature of the study environment with respect to mobility.
There are a multitude of access locations each with an associated risk. The manner in which
the USB stick or mobile device is transported and subsequently accessed has a profound
impact upon data security. For instance, public locations are heavily susceptible to malicious
behaviour as there is no record of who has previously used it, and what they were doing (has
the network or machine been compromised?). There is also more importantly no control
over how that environment is maintained. From an organisational standpoint, the machine
is not trustworthy as we cannot trust the environment nor verify the integrity of the device.
Governing access from devices outside of the university’s control is a difficult issue.
The overarching problem with a standard unsecured USB stick from a DLP perspective
is paradoxically its main advantage. Once data has been placed on the USB stick it can
be accessed on any device with a USB interface provided it is unencrypted. This provides
quick, simple access to anyone who has acquired the USB stick and presents a significant
opportunity for data loss and misuse in the hands of an attacker. This problem is exacerbated
for unsecured mobile devices that run their own operating system as they can be accessed on-
site without the need for additional hardware. Moreover, these devices often boast networking
hardware enabling the rapid transfer of data. Such devices often store saved user credentials
and personally identifiable documents that often contain private and perhaps confidential
information. One may feel that enforcing encrypted USB stick usage or making password
protection mandatory for mobile devices would help to remedy this but it is important to
consider the impact such a strategy would have on the workplace. Our methodology is aimed
towards investigating such user behaviours and subsequently providing a modelling test-bed
of our environment to provide a valid method of testing such a policy.
3.5 Discussion and Outline for Future Study
The pilot study has enabled a rapid assessment of our problem space. This forms the
preliminary stage in our iterative methodology as depicted in figure 3.1. Prior to this
investigation, the CISO had a limited understanding and restricted visibility pertaining to the
current environment and the practices of users within the environment. Through conducting
this investigation, we have enabled a more thorough, scientific evaluation of the risks and
threats within our problem space. From our results, we are now able to target specific
behaviours and formulate bespoke investigations in order to increase our understanding of
specific threats and where vulnerabilities may be exploited.
From our results, several important factors have been highlighted:
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1. User Expertise: There is a stark divide between users in relation to their knowledge of
IS and risk aversion. Lecturers, PhD students and technical staff were more risk averse
than clerical staff who were typically unaware of current procedures and often lacked
knowledge pertaining to data security (Q1-7). This divide is further visualised through
an assessment of the types of data that were being handled and the method in which
this took place. Often, their choice was not clear, nor could it be rationally justified
through further dialogue.
2. Data Mobility: Users actively transfer data between locations on a regular basis.
Subsequent access to this data is typically off campus and is done so whilst connected
to unknown networks. All four categories of users partake in this practice, and it
includes a mixture of many different data types with differing values and consequences
regarding loss. The use of multiple device types both personally and university
managed furthers the risk the university faces with respect to security.
3. Devices: Many users employ BYOD in their daily practices. Personal laptops are seen
as the most common form of device for data transfer and off campus data creation,
whilst USB sticks are seen as the most popular transfer media. Of note, however, is the
use of smart devices such as tablets and mobile phones which some users adopt and
are typically less secure (for example, many users adopt swipe to unlock to hasten a
common task). As previously discussed, these devices typically hold more personally
identifiable information and often store user credentials.
4. Device Access: Numerous users share their devices with other people. Whilst it is
understandable to trust family members not to maliciously steal or delete/alter data
(irrespective of whether policy allows sharing in this fashion), it is possible for these
users to unintentionally install malware or other malicious software through unsafe
internet browsing and other activities. This poses a significant risk for the user as they
may be unaware that their device is infected, and indeed infect other devices on the
campus network.
5. Method of Transport: We discovered that the majority of users transport their chosen
devices on their person. This is most likely due to the popularity of mobile devices
and USB sticks and their attributed portability. However, some users still chose to
transport laptops and leave them in communal baggage areas providing an opportunity
for thieves and targeted attacks.
6. Data Loss: Only one third of participants were aware of the implications that data
loss may pose for themselves and the university. This is important as it suggests that
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users do not actively match their level of security, represented by device choice, to
the sensitivity of the data they are transferring. This is furthered by the discovery that
many of the participants were unaware as to the implications of what losing this data
may cause.
Consultation with the CISO regarding these results and the above findings has highlighted
numerous areas for further in-depth investigation. These areas reflect the concerns of the
CISO and the necessity to adopt policies to govern these particular practices based on user
assessment. With respect to our methodology, the above numerical list has demonstrated the
benefits of a rapid, targeted user interview strategy that has identified numerous relationships
and trends with which to investigate. For the remainder of this thesis we identify the top
three behaviours and practices as highlighted by our CISO in order to demonstrate and test
our methodology. This decision aids in scoping the project and provides sufficient example
to demonstrate our aims and objectives. As stated, we believe this process to be a proof
of concept and one that is scalable. As such, it would be possible to investigate numerous
identified behaviours simultaneously with sufficient resources.
The following sub-headings denote the behaviours we wish to examine. These behaviours
relate to the following chapters within the thesis where we detail bespoke experimental design,
data collection and a more thorough analysis of these specific behaviours.
3.5.1 Connecting to Unknown Networks Using BYOD
Connecting to an unknown, unsecured network presents a myriad of risks that increase the
likelihood of data leakage. Misconfiguration of device settings such as auto-network enrol-
ment, sharing of shared folders along with using non-encrypted web tasks and connections
increases the likelihood of attacks through avenues such as man-in-the-middle. We have
chosen to examine this particular practice as it presents a genuine threat to the users within
our pilot study. In this investigation we aim to understand how users connect to networks,
what preferences affect their selection process, and understand their rationale for a given
choice. We wish to simulate a real-world scenario where we promote a choice architecture
that utilises nudges in order to steer users towards selecting a more secure wireless network.
If successful, our behavioural interventions should reduce the likelihood of data leakage and
provide a strong evidence base for policy design.
The experiment is detailed within chapter 4.
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3.5.2 Online Behaviour and Privacy
Secure behaviours when online are a necessity in today’s cyber environment. The annual cost
of cyber-crime is approximately $ 100 billion [101] and rising at an estimated 17% annually.
It is imperative that organisations take the necessary precautions to protect themselves from
this avenue of attack. One such method is to understand how to protect users, or perhaps
more importantly, how to enable users to help protect themselves. One such area where this
is highly relevant is in online privacy. Users value their privacy, but do not readily protect it -
a phenomenon known as the privacy paradox [210]. As such, we must understand how users
form their privacy decisions by examining their decision making process.
The experiment is detailed within chapter 5.
3.5.3 Error Reporting
The importance of error reporting cannot be underestimated. It is a critical component of error
prevention as the mantra ‘we learn from our mistakes’ dictates. For security systems, it can
be viewed as an integral part of an iterative process. By definition, no system is perfect, and
thus when errors do occur it is important to understand what happened and how it occurred
in order to emplace barriers against that particular event. This process relies heavily on
reporting and often involves user interaction with the submission of logging events of system
errors. If errors are not reported, it can leave a system vulnerable to attack through the same
vector. As we witnessed within our pilot study, almost a quarter of users had experienced an
error where they needed assistance, however, less than ten percent actually reported them to
the proper authorities.
In response to this, we wish to understand how users behave with respect to error reporting.
We wish to investigate what decisions ultimately determine whether or not an individual
will report a given error and devise strategies for influencing this. If we can increase the
number of reports that are submitted, we will reduce the likelihood of preventing future
events through mitigation strategies and countermeasures. Ensuring reports are easy for the
user to conduct will be an important process as we do not wish to increase their cognitive
load or diminish their compliance budget.
The experiment is detailed within chapter 6.
3.6 Chapter Contribution
This chapter has demonstrated that an iterative methodology is an effective approach towards
aiding the design process of DLP policies. We have shown the value of targeting user
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behaviours to develop bespoke investigative methods that aim to identify how users make
their choices and to ultimately gain a more detailed insight of our problem space. Through
these investigations we improve the expressiveness of our modelling process through finer
articulation of the processes and sub-process that are present. Furthermore, we have demon-
strated the importance of conducting a pilot study in order to begin this iterative process.
Feedback from our stakeholders has validated our findings and examining these behaviours
has enabled subsequent experimental design witnessed in the following chapters.

Chapter 4
Nudging Towards Security
The previous chapter detailed the methodological approach towards aiding the policy decision
making process. Within, we emphasise the necessity to investigate specific behaviours and
practices within the current environment that reflect the needs of our partner in managing
such an environment. This chapter represents one such area of enquiry and aims to determine
how users connect to networks to access and transfer data remotely.
This chapter details experimentation with respect to nudging users towards selecting a
more secure wireless network on their mobile device. As discussed throughout chapter 2,
users pose one of the most significant risks to organisational information security and the
trend in BYOD is set to continue. By understanding how users select networks, we can
begin to build intervention methods that ultimately influence user selection with the goal
of mitigating data loss and exposure through understanding which networks pose the most
significant threat. This knowledge ultimately aids the policy decision making process as we
empower the CISO to design more appropriate policies that aim to operate holistically with
users whilst preserving security.
The remainder of the chapter is as follows: Section 4.2 provides an overview of the
problem space and the formulation of an investigative aim. Section 4.3 details the devel-
opment of a prototype application for investigating the issues detailed within section 4.2.
Section 4.4 evaluates the results from experimentation and presents an analysis of the adopted
nudges. Section 4.5 discusses the significance of the findings with respect to aiding the policy
decision making process and highlights limitations within the research along with future
experimentation.
This chapter includes results and experimental design detailed in Turland et al [231] and
includes collaborative work declared within the ‘Publications’.
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4.1 Wi-Fi Experiment
This work aids our understanding of the problem space through the investigation of user
behaviour with respect to network connection. As previously highlighted in chapter 3, the
CISO has little knowledge pertaining to the amount of information transferred by users, and
the methods in which this is done. By assessing how users connect, and importantly what
influences their decision making process, we can design policies that aim to ‘nudge’ or guide
users towards more secure connections with the goal of minimizing data loss.
4.1.1 Chapter Contributions
Within this chapter a prototype application is presented which promotes the choice of secure
wireless network options, specifically when users are not familiar with the wireless networks
available. The application is developed based on behavioural theory, choice architecture and
good practices informed by HCI design. The application includes several options to ‘nudge’
users towards selecting secure public wireless networks. Explicitly, this chapter outlines the
development and the results of an evaluation of some of the potential application nudges
(specifically, presentation order and colour coding of the wireless networks). In summary,
colour coding was found to be a powerful influencer, less so with the order in which we listed
the Wi-Fi networks, although the colour × order combination was the most effective.
4.2 Introduction
Organisations rely on their staff to make numerous different security decisions when complet-
ing different tasks, whilst on the premises and on the road. An example of such a decision is
the selection of which public Wi-Fi to connect to if working remotely from the office. Over
one billion workers are believed to work remotely [64] - over a third of the total worldwide
workforce. Unsecure wireless network selection becomes problematic as more employees
use mobile devices (possibly their own) to access various networks outside their workplace
and transmit potentially sensitive information. Unless employees have local, trusted wire-
less networks or use 3G/4G data communications, they will often utilise locally available,
public options. When employees face time pressure, they may be tempted to make hasty
decisions that allow them to access the internet via unknown hotspots. This behaviour poses
a significant risk to the security of the device and its data, as these networks provide many
opportunities for cyber-attacks, including spoofing and man-in-the-middle [45].
Exploiting and influencing wireless network selection is possible in numerous fashions,
some as simple as changing the network name [91]. Aiding users to select secure, appropriate
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networks for their tasks, be it on personal or company owned devices is imperative to
maintaining security. Wireless network selection is a potential area in which to encourage a
more security-driven decision. Selecting a secure and trustworthy Wi-Fi connection is one
of the top 10 security behaviours promoted on sites such as www.staysafeonline.org. The
question is how can we ensure that people make a secure decision whilst still permitting
choice and preserving productivity?
Through understanding how users connect and ultimately share/access data we are able
to begin to more accurately articulate and identify where threats lie. This process details an
investigative method which compliments the overall methodology highlighted in chapter 3.
The work detailed here aims to understand how users choose networks and investigates the
effectiveness of nudging towards more secure alternatives as part of improving the policy
decision making process. The development of tools provides an opportunity to deploy and
test an intervention method in a real-world environment, a key limitation of simulation-based
study.
4.2.1 Designing for Persuasive Security
When using a mobile device and connecting to the internet, people rarely think about security,
yet the choices they make have implications for the security of their device. Leaving such
decisions to chance and simply ‘trusting’ employees to do the right thing may not be the best
course of action. We need to understand how we can influence this behaviour to be more
security orientated and develop more effective policies.
In recent years, we have seen the popularisation of Thaler and Sunstein’s [228] approach
to ‘nudging’ behaviour towards a particular outcome. Nudging is based on choice architecture
and promotes the idea that the manner in which a choice is presented will affect the decision
outcome. Several studies have considered nudging as a means to affect behavioural change
in the area of privacy. For example, behavioural nudging has been considered in terms of
encouraging less information disclosure via social media [245], on mobile devices ([26];
[55]) and to improve general privacy behaviours ([3], see also [110]).
Nudging is a logical approach to investigate within this problem space. As documented
in section 2.3 the application and merits of such an approach are witnessed through numerous
examples. As we are investigating an undocumented environment, nudging can be seen as a
bridge between enforcement and open access. This is beneficial as the introduction of new
systems that are considerably different than current systems often meet the greatest resistance
or adaptation time (particularity so if perceived as negative), and subsequently have a lower
adoption rate as discussed in 2.2.2. The ‘art’ of this approach is to present users with the
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complete set of choices, but fashion the most desirable choices in such a manner that it makes
choosing sub-optimal choices difficult to justify.
The principles of a good choice architecture ([228]) can be attributed to how different
aspects of security options are depicted. For example, in terms of selecting wireless network
options, we must consider [231]:
1. Incentives: What rewards (or disincentives) are in place to encourage the desired secure
choice? For instance, does the most secure wireless connection require payment?
2. Understanding mappings: Can people understand how to use the system properly to
achieve their goals? Is it possible to map the choice to a desired outcome? Some choices
are simple and vary only on one factor, others vary on multiple factors simultaneously
and we have to decide which is of greatest importance.
3. Defaults: If for a given choice, a default is set, many people will simply follow that
path. Is the default the secure choice?
4. Give feedback: Behaviour will improve if feedback is provided about the successful-
ness of the behaviour.
5. Expect errors: Users make mistakes, so how can we reduce the likelihood that an
unsecure Wi-Fi connection will be chosen?
6. Structure complex choices: Help people to make a choice.
These rules are not new to HCI studies. Norman summarised several approaches in ‘The
Design of Everyday Things’ [171] where he discusses the connection between design and
the user; specifically, how to optimize this experience and make it more pleasurable for
the user. Similarly, B.J.Fogg and ‘Persuasive Technology’ [93] focused extensively on the
role of technology in this process. Persuasion design embeds various forms of influence
and ‘choice architectures’ in products and services to maximize the likelihood of positive
behaviour change and experience. This work has been further explored by Lockton et al
[153] in ‘Design With Intent’. These authors utilised choice architecture within the context
of ‘Design with Intent’ - design intended to influence user behaviour.
4.2.2 Research Aims and Scenario
We employ several of these good principles of choice architecture in the development of a
new application in order to support decision-making in situations of uncertainty. Our aim
was to investigate security-related decision-making via design in a specific setting: The user
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has no access to a whitelist of wireless networks, their device has no mobile data access
to the internet, and they are under time pressure to complete a task involving submitting
potentially sensitive information from a personal mobile device. This task was selected
for several reasons in full knowledge that an increasing number of mobile devices have
inbuilt 3G or 4G capabilities. Importantly, however, there are several physical issues that can
render this technology unusable. For instance, network coverage may not be present in all
areas, especially when travelling abroad, and tariffs for overseas internet access tend to be
significantly higher than national rates making them financially non-viable. Data caps may
also influence wireless network behaviour as exceeding tariff quotas often causes significant
financial burden.
This approach is of merit for the evaluation of current Wi-Fi behaviours and the docu-
mentation of an application constructed using behavioural insight and user-centric design.
At present, mobile devices tend to use different parameters for displaying available wireless
networks even on the same mobile operating system (proprietary ‘skins’ often create visual
discrepancies). For example, at present the default Android behaviour (‘non-skinned’) lists
all available networks in alphabetical order with a padlock denoting those which require a
password. This presentation of options may influence decision-making in a number of ways.
Either individuals select the first available choice, they search for a trusted wireless (one they
recognise by name) or they search for the strongest signal. We investigate which options
users select and assess the potential to change their decision-making process.
4.3 Application Development
To develop this application we consulted and followed guidelines presented in the SCENE
process ([63]). In summary, we identify target behaviour, i.e. selecting the most secure Wi-Fi
network available, explore the underlying mechanisms that influence that behaviour and
design the application to utilise these factors and nudge the target behaviour.
An important part of the process is to understand the different ways in which behaviour
can be influenced. This allows for future policy development to be sensitive to user actions
and behaviours.. A critical component of this is the MINDSPACE framework summarized
by Dolan et al ([83]). This framework summarises a number of the ‘influencing factors’ that
have been shown to affect behaviour through years of research in the behavioural sciences
([1]; [161]). Many of the guidelines and observations within feature prominently in the
design and implementation of the application.
MINDSPACE [83] can be adopted to explore design solutions in different ways:
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• Enhance: MINDSPACE can help designers to understand how current designs are
influencing behaviour and how they could be improved. A pre-cursor to effective
application design.
• Introduce: There may be some of the elements from MINDSPACE that are not
currently used within the design and there may be space for an innovative use of some
of them.
• Reassess: The designer needs to understand the ways in which the design may be
influencing the behaviour of its users unintentionally. It is quite possible that the design
produces unintended and possibly unwanted behaviour.
Using the MINDSPACE framework, we generated a number of potential design possi-
bilities that considered the following ‘influencing factors’ in relation to wireless network
selection (Table 4.1):
• the extent to which messages are trusted due to the messenger is (e.g., messages from
company manager rather than network provider).
• the incentives to stay on a secure network and drop an insecure network.
• the behavioural norms or common experiences of the user’s important social groups
(e.g. infection rates of users of the same network).
• changing the default options (e.g., by listing the most secure networks at the top of the
available networks list).
• changing the salience of secure vs. unsecure options (via highlighting company-trusted
networks in green, secure networks in yellow and unsecure networks in red) and
• the use of emotive (affect-based) interventions (e.g., voice concern over selecting
flagged options).
Many of the above scenarios can be viewed as the testing phase of a prototype policy
implementation. Through investigating users (their behaviours and practices) and the direct
manipulation of security mechanisms, the CISO is able to test proposed impacts on the
user and their environment. This approach enables an optimization of the policy design
process through a rapid deployment and small-scale testing platform with the advantage of
understanding impact analysis at an early stage.
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Table 4.1 Definition of MINDSPACE Influencers
Influencer Definition
Messenger we are heavily influenced by who communicates information
Incentives our responses to incentives are shaped by predictable mental
shortcuts, such as strongly avoiding losses, optimism bias
and perception of risk.
Norms (Social) we are strongly influenced by what others do
Defaults we ‘go with the flow’ of pre-set options and take the lazy
way to decisions and behaviours, habits become pre-set be-
haviours.
Salience our attention is drawn to what is novel and seems relevant to
us
Priming our acts are often influenced by subconscious cues
Affect (Emotion) our emotional associations can powerfully shape our actions
Commitment we seek to be consistent with our public promises, and recip-
rocate acts
Ego we act in ways that make us feel better about ourselves
4.3.1 Problem Identification and Applicability
Encrypted Wi-Fi connections on trusted networks, and Virtual Private Networks (VPN) over
any Wi-Fi offer a reasonably secure method with which to connect. It is important to note,
however, that they are susceptible to attack through various hardware and software based
products such as WiFi Pineapple and Dumpper that exploit weaknesses in the implementation
of popular protocols by certain vendors. These attacks however, typically require large
periods of time as packet analysis requires large volumes of traffic. For this work, we will
ignore these attacks and focus on open networks such as those commonly found within many
public environments. There are numerous situations where it is not possible or practical to
use encrypted connections and instead unsecured networks are necessary.
Public Wi-Fi’s often require a subscription that may dissuade users from choosing it, thus
increasing the likelihood of selecting other free, open access points which in-turn pose a
multitude of security risks. Furthermore, many Small-Medium Enterprises (SME’s) often
lack the finances to implement and maintain a VPN for their employees. This, coupled with
the ever increasing need to ‘work on the go’ produces an environment where it is imperative
that you are able to work securely. Consumerisation further exacerbates this problem as not
only is the device multi-use (often changing the way users interact and secure their devices)
it often contains a mixture of both company and personal data on third party servers (often in
an unknown locale).
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Ferreira et al ([91]) states that it is relatively simple to influence a user’s choice when
selecting a network. This provides a perfect opportunity for an attacker who wishes to gain
access to a device or sensitive data as the user is placed in an unknown environment with
unknown threat vectors. A relatively simple example of such an exploitation is the changing
of the broadcast ID (SSID) or more fundamentally the changing of the MAC address, (known
as MAC spoofing). Employing such a strategy exploits the user’s familiarity and habituation
to certain networks and working environments. Upon erroneously connecting to a spoofed
network, users may believe that they are indeed safe as they trust the provider and are more
likely to undertake confidential activities (i.e. checking one’s bank account, sharing files).
If indeed this is a man-in-the-middle attack, the user is at serious risk of losing data or
credentials (some of which may not be their property).
It is therefore essential that we have some form of intervention method at the point where
the user chooses a Wi-Fi network. We must influence the user to choose a more appropriate
network for the type of activity they wish to undertake. This mentality is the rationale behind
our application which aims to impact the ‘thinking fast’ system 1, habitual process of wireless
selection (see Bravo-Lillo et al [42]). It is important to stress, however, that we do not wish
to hamper or increase the time in which it takes to connect to a network; simply that we wish
to empower the user towards making a more appropriate, informed choice with respect to
security for the task they are undertaking.
4.3.2 The Prototype Application
The Android mobile operating system was chosen as the platform for our application as it was
the most popular mobile operating system in the third quarter of 2013 with an 81% market
share ([40]). The interventions designed and tested on this platform are not operating system
specific and can be adapted to suit other devices. One attractive feature of Android, however,
is the openness of the environment and source code enabling one to have total control over
the specific device. Such an approach differs from competitors like iOS [19] where many
alterations of source code, or changes in device behaviours are prohibited. Whilst such an
openness may create security vulnerabilities, we are not concerned with this in the current
investigation and only adopt default calls and methods.
The prototype application provides the following additional features:
• Reordering the network list so that the most ‘secure’ networks are first (appropriate
default). Secure is defined as the most desirable to the CISO.
• Applying a colour scheme (appealing to user’s social norms). The most secure choice
is coloured green and the least secure red (explicitly defined later in section 4.3.3).
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• Implementing an approved wireless network list that is editable by the user/CISO
(Chief Information Security Officer), marking reliable and secure networks as ‘trusted’.
Approved networks are placed at the top of the network list.
• Showing all named wireless networks at the scan location (Android currently combines
SSIDs and does not display duplicates making it difficult to verify authenticity and
avoid spoofing).
• Additional information buttons presented alongside scan results to inform the user
about potential risks pertaining to their actions (messages to educate and empower the
user if they are unsure).
• Pop-ups and notifications (providing potential audio, visual and haptic feedback)
alerting the user when connecting to an unsecured network (expect errors, provide
feedback) and discouraging them from persisting.
• No additional confirmation steps when connecting to a network. Does not hamper
productivity or deviate from familiar behaviours. Instead, provides additional contex-
tual information with which to make a more informed decision (expect errors, provide
feedback).
The application is written within the Official Android IDE (Eclipse) and conforms to
API 8 with a target API 18. This ensures that the application is compatible with older
Android devices but can take full advantage of newer features found in more recent releases.
Specifically, we take advantage of numerous new notification features (audible, haptic and
visual feedback).
The application in its current iteration consists of two activities. An activity represents
‘a single screen with a user interface’ ([102]). The rationale for this design is that we wish
to present the user with a familiar splash screen, in our case the organisation’s logo and
additional relevant contextual information first(perhaps a contract or code of conduct). This
approach adopts the Messenger element within MINDSPACE (‘we are heavily influenced by
who communicates information to us’), reminding the user of either expected behaviour or
perhaps more importantly, contractually obligated behaviour. Figure 4.1 denotes a possible
implementation of this proposal (this is untested at present) and figure 4.4 represents a
possible popup aimed at informing the user.
Figure 4.1 presents a design view of activity 1 from within the Eclipse workspace. This
rudimentary design features a company logo, an information button for assisting users, the
ability to add and delete trusted SSID’s (automatically given preference in the Wi-Fi list in
activity 2) and the button to perform a scan.
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Fig. 4.1 Activity 1: Potential Mockup (Untested)
The second activity is called when the user presses the scan button. This displays the
wireless scan result at that given instance. Results shown follow our colouring, ordering and
contextual format as described previously. Results are not auto refreshed but can be manually
rescanned by pressing the ‘rescan’ button. This is a conscious design choice which allows
the user to focus on a static list rather than one which dynamically updates. Dynamic lists
(android default is 5s refresh) increase the risk of selecting the wrong, potentially unsecured
network through user error creating security risks and additional user input as they must
re-select a Wi-Fi. A comparison of the before and after effects in a real-world example of
our interventions can be witnessed in figures 4.2 and 4.3 (discrepancies in the number of
networks and signal strength are the result of natural variation at the time of capture).
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Fig. 4.2 Default Android Wi-Fi List with-
out Interventions
Fig. 4.3 Default Android Wi-Fi List with
Interventions
The second activity also utilises popups (4.4) that are generated on user interaction. The
‘help’ button displays useful information relating to which network is appropriate for the task
wanting to be performed. This empowers the user to make their own decision and utilises
incentives (‘our responses to incentives are shaped by predictable mental shortcuts such
as strongly avoiding losses’) from the MINDSPACE framework. The popup itself builds
upon findings supported by Raja et al ([190]) with the aim of providing warnings that are
‘understandable to users’, rather than the often convoluted and technically based solutions
that many software programmes implement. Example tasks and solutions are displayed in a
brief pictorial form.
4.3.3 Ordering Networks
Upon scanning, results are ordered using an algorithm that lists the Wi-Fi’s in order of their
whitelist approval (managed by the CISO) and security (encryption protocol strength, 802.1x
> WEP etc). We define whitelists as a set of preferred networks based on these criteria.
However, this does not include networks that the user has previously visited (so the whitelist
is not a visitation list). The ordering is such:
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Fig. 4.4 Pop-Up: Potential Mockup (Untested)
1. Whitelist (Green) (protocol strength) (high to low signal strength)
2. Secured (Amber) (protocol strength) (high to low signal strength)
3. Open (Red) (protocol strength) (high to low signal strength)
Firstly, the algorithm ensures that company approved whitelisted Wi-Fis are always
presented at the top of the list and coloured green (the most commonly chosen from our
results - see 4.4). This implies that a user is most likely to choose a network that is trusted
by their organisation and offers a ‘secure’ encrypted connection (such as WEP, WPA-PSK,
802.1x). Importantly, it ensures that if a data leak were to occur, the employee was operating
within company policy. The term ‘trusted’ is added to the network metadata to inform the
user that the network is known to the device (i.e. in the whitelist and managed by the user’s
organisation). This builds upon the standard use of the word secured that is default Android
behaviour and expected by the user.
Secondly, ‘Secured’ networks are displayed in amber and below the whitelist. These are
networks which encrypt traffic (802.1x, WPA etc) but where the network owner is unknown.
To reiterate, we do not want to limit choice, we wish to nudge users into making a more
informed and appropriate choice. In our definition, ‘Secured’ networks represent Wi-Fi’s
that are not trusted (not in the whitelist) but do offer an encrypted communication. Typical
occurrences include home/public hotspots where the network key is shared. Whilst this does
not protect the user from ‘man in the middle’ attacks (even though each client derives its own
session key) it does provide the user with a choice if there are no whitelisted Wi-Fis available,
or the connection of a trusted Wi-FI is unstable. The use of such networks will be familiar
with many people in public locations and requires the user to assess their threat environment.
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Lastly, ‘Open’ networks are displayed in red and presented at the bottom of the list. These
represent Wi-Fi connections that offer no form of encryption, require no login credentials
nor offer vendor identification. Anyone is able to freely connect and use the service. As such,
this is by far the least secure network type for data transfer and sensitive activities and thus
the least desirable. Fig 4.5 represents a test slide presented to users with our interventions
included (network names are obscured to remove user familiarity).
Fig. 4.5 The Default Android Wi-Fi List with Colouring and Ordering
Currently, default Android behaviour combines SSID names into a single access point
(see Fig 4.2) regardless of whether the access point is physically different. This is potentially
highly problematic and something that is easily exploitable as highlighted by Cassola et al
([52]). This application has the ability to display multiple networks with the same SSID (see
Fig 4.3) or MAC address by displaying all results. By listing all access points with the same
name we raise the user’s awareness by indicating that there may be more AP’s than should
be expected, a potential security risk. For instance, if a user expects to find one access point
but instead finds two in their local café, they may hesitate, think, and ultimately decide not to
connect to it, thus avoiding connecting to a malicious network. In larger networks, several
AP’s with the same name may be displayed, but listing these presents the user with greater
choice and increased control over network selection (for instance they can connect to the
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network with the strongest signal for optimal productivity). The use of a whitelist can help
to reduce the number of repeat network SSIDs by actively adding MAC addresses to the
allowed connections.
The whitelist itself is a top level filter that parses the scan results subject to specified
criteria (essentially, but not restricted to, trusted MAC addresses). The whitelist is operated
and maintained by the company CISO and uploaded to the user’s handset at regular intervals
at a trusted location or network (possibly on the premises). This allows the whitelist to be
modified and importantly kept up-to-date. It also removes user inconvenience and further
limits user error. The specific deployment of the whitelist and the security concerns related
to this are not covered.
Selecting a Network
Selection of a Wi-Fi remains synonymous with the default Android method (scan -> select)
for whitelisted networks. To connect to a whitelisted Wi-Fi, a user simply presses the
appropriate list field and connects, entering any required details when prompted. This is the
most convenient method for the user as it compliments habituation and is the desired ‘nudged’
behaviour from the CISO’s perspective. Upon selection, the default connection method will
be called and the standard Wi-Fi symbol will be displayed in the notification area signalling
a successful connection. It is important to stress that with this example (desired behaviour)
there are no additional steps either during connection or once successfully connected, and
the phone ‘behaves’ in the default Android fashion.
Connecting to a Wi-Fi that is outside of the whitelist prompts the user with additional
steps and notification frequencies. These increase as you move from amber to red. These
interruptions specifically aim to hamper productivity when not behaving securely and promote
the adoption of whitelist network selection by reducing interruption frequency. To exemplify,
consider a connection to a red (Open) network. Here, the user adopts the typical behaviour
of scanning and subsequently selecting a Wi-Fi name. However, instead of automatically
connecting or being prompted with credentials, the user is notified that the network may
not be secure (Fig 4.6). This additional step breaks the user’s habituation and introduces an
unknown process which requires additional cognitive processes to bypass. By alerting the
user in such a fashion we empower the user to validate their network choice and ask them to
question their selection.
This approach is similar to Maurer, De Luca and Kempe ([159]), where prompts and
warnings ‘appear in-context’ to user actions. This heightens their impact as habituation
dictates that ‘passive indicators are mostly overlooked’. By interrupting typical procedures
we are impacting user behaviour and increasing the likelihood that notifications will be
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Fig. 4.6 Warning Dialogue Presented to Users When Trying to Connect to an Unsecured
Network
observed. Upon selecting cancel, the user is returned to the previous Wi-Fi list with no
additional prompting (see Figure 4.6 and 4.7) and allowed to select another network.
In contrast, if the user wishes to continue with this unsecured network, they are provided
with a three pronged notification (audio, haptic, and visual see Fig 4.7). To implement
this, we call the default Android Notification Manager (Android, 2003). This provides
customisable text informing the user that they are connected to an unapproved network
(this could include company policy to further stress the implications to the user). It also
makes the device sound the default warning tone, flashes the LED, and vibrates the device
(if applicable). These processes may occur at regular intervals (or not at all, defined by the
policy), and can be seen as a means of limiting productivity for an undesired network. Whilst
this approach may seem intrusive, it may be warranted if the user is accessing sensitive data
over a less secure/unknown network and placing the organisation at risk. The immediateness
and method of the notification may be sufficient to dissuade users from continuing on the
unsecured network.
This implementation provides a clear, simple yet informative user interface that enables
the user to quickly make informed decisions as to which Wi-Fi to choose. The display builds
on defaults, familiarity and habituation, as well as common Android methods and behaviours
(the way in which events are presented) and format (takes advantage of newer Android draw
features) but adds additional layers of usability that enable a safer, more secure environment.
This framework is scalable between devices and operating systems and requires limited
interaction from the user.
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Fig. 4.7 Notification Symbol in the Android Status Bar Upon Selecting an Unsecured Network
Stage-wise Development of the Application
As with any prototype application it is important to test the validity of certain features before
implementation. As our interventions are designed and influenced from recommendations
within relevant literature, it is necessary to ascertain whether the findings within hold true for
our explicit purpose and execution.
An important element at this stage was to consider the need to evaluate each possible
nudge, or a combination of nudges. This would allow for an independent assessment of
how effective each nudge was, the outcomes of such a nudge on behaviour, and any new or
unexpected behaviours that may result as a combination of the two. As such, the remainder
of this chapter discusses how the first two nudges were employed within the new application;
chiefly colour and ordering. This approach combines salience (prominence of certain options
listed at the top) and affect (the impact of using red->green colours and the associated
emotions and meanings). Support for this approach is seen in Choe ([55]) where visual
framing was adopted to nudge individuals away from privacy-invasive applications.
Materials to Test First-Stage Nudges
The new application is designed to change user choices and defaults by moving individuals
away from the Android default of alphabetical ordering to one where network options were
ordered by security or organisational preference (see 4.3.2). In addition, we introduced
a colour coding scheme where whitelisted networks were green, secured networks were
amber and the least secured (open) were red. The new application subsequently includes
two nudges: first, one involving ordering (thus eliminating the bias of picking the first and
most convenient network regardless of security) and second, colour (informing and capturing
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the attention of individuals when selecting wireless networks). Similar visual feedback and
framing of information techniques have been employed in other studies (see [55], [236]).
In order to be able to examine the potential effectiveness of these nudges in combination,
and to compare them to more standard network displays (without these nudges), we used five
different screenshots of wireless network lists. We eliminated familiarity and signal strength
effects by creating random network names and presenting network options with the same
number of bars (indicating signal strength) which were either half or full strength (2/4) for
the same number of options on each screenshot (Fig 4.3 & Table 4.2).
Colour nudge
Security Colour White
Order present. (most secure on top) OCp OWp
Random present. (no order) RCp RWp
No Padlock (Order) OCn –
Table 4.2 Overview of screen shot characteristics including nudges (security ordering and
colour)
4.4 Evaluation
We evaluated the effectiveness of our nudges with 138 participants (university non-computing
students and staff) who were familiar with using wireless networks on a university campus
but were not technical experts. As we were sampling non-experts, we also included a
fifth screenshot that featured order and colour but no padlock (OCn), thus representing an
alternative to the same option with a padlock (OCp). We include an overview of the four out
of five screen shots in Table 4.3 above.
All participants were given the following scenario: ‘You have an hour to complete and
submit some urgent work and have decided to go to a public cafè to connect to the internet’.
In this setting, subjects are presented with various network options relating to the above
declared screenshots. Participants were then asked to pick which network (out of six listed)
on each screen shot (totalling 5) they would select. Furthermore, participants were asked to
order the 6 network names for each screenshot (participants took 10s on average to make
a choice). Network names were randomly generated and six characters in length to avoid
familiarity [91] and thus potential bias.
Participants were further asked to discuss why they had picked specific networks in
order to examine which features were effective and how the presence or absence of the
padlock symbol influenced their decisions. All screenshots for all participants were randomly
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Fig. 4.8 Nudged Application Screen Including Security Ordering Without Colouring
presented to reduce ordering effects. Figure 4.8 provides an example of the OWp condition
for reference where all secured networks are listed at the top, while the less secured options
are listed at the bottom (ordered, no colour labelling, with padlock) (see Table 4.2).
4.4.1 Evaluation Results
Our evaluation showed that ‘trusted’ also implied ‘secure’ for almost all participants, which
led us to cluster secure and trusted choices into one group. When computing Chi-square for
all five screenshots simultaneously, we observed a significant difference across the response
options (p<.001). Following this, we wished to examine specific features by comparing
the different screenshots against one another. We tested using a Chi-square test whether or
not the results were statistically significant when comparing the frequencies for open vs.
secure/trusted network selection across the screenshots that varied with respect to a specific
feature (e.g., order or colour). We found that nudging by order alone was not significant but
that colour was (leading to the selection of secure and trusted network options (p=.002)).
When colour and order were combined, 70.3% of participants selected secure options - a
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significant improvement on the default condition (p<0.001). An overview of the preliminary
results is provided in Table 4.3.
Participant Choices
Screenshots Open Secure / Trusted
RWp - networks not ordered by security, white
labels (default Android)
80 (58%) 58 (42%)
OWp - networks ordered, white labels 71 (51.4%) 67 (48.6%)
RCp - networks not ordered, coloured 49 (35.5%) 89 (64.5%)
OCp - networks ordered, coloured 41 (29.7%) 97 (70.3%)
OCn - networks ordered, coloured, no padlock) 1 (.7%) 137 (99.3%)
Table 4.3 Frequencies Observed (N=138)
Further improvements were noticed when we compared the coloured and ordered results
to the final and fifth screen shot featuring no padlocks. In the absence of a padlock (OCn),
users were more likely to select secured (amber) options, which suggests that a key component
of the decision-making process involved an assessment of the symbol itself. Open response
options informed us that this effect may have been due to the fact that some users interpreted
the padlock as a barrier (‘locked out’) rather than ‘security’. It is necessary to stress that
this does not imply that OCn is a better design, but that user’s perceptions play a role in
network selection. Figure 4.9 shows this more clearly. The vertical axis lists the frequencies.
All options with C included colour, all options with O included ordered networks (see
abbreviations in Table 4.1).
Open responses also suggest that some users look primarily for familiar names, a common
reason why SSID and MAC spoofing is a successful venture. What is also apparent in these
results is that the colour nudge in isolation produced a significant change in behaviour from
the default, where as the order nudge by itself did not. As stated, however, both colour and
order operated most effectively in combination.
4.5 Discussion
This work makes several important contributions to the field of HCI and proves the legitimacy
of such an approach. Firstly, it outlines an application development process that integrates
behavioural theory into the creation of a security intervention. Whilst the software develop-
ment process was specific to this application, it may present an effective example of how
interdisciplinary design considerations can support the development of application-based
interventions. Secondly, the intervention achieves this without changing the default behaviour
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Fig. 4.9 Nudged Application Screen Including Security Ordering
(actual available options, i.e. it does not create a more restrictive environment nor does it
introduce additional steps where security inconveniences the user). Instead, the application
modifies and enhances the existing choice architecture to empower the user to make a more
informed decision, providing the same set of choices as Android provides but changing
the default presentation of those choices. Complimenting existing behaviours whilst also
increasing security is an effective method for intervention.
Another important aspect of our work concerns the particular method in which it was
framed. In essence we wish to preserve the ‘your’ in BYOD. We are not concerned with
how people actually use their mobile devices in private or for work on an average day in
familiar surroundings. Instead, our focus was to help participants make securer decisions in
situations of increased uncertainty and unfamiliarity whilst under time pressure and accessing
or transferring data that was not their property. Specifically, where users are forced to
use unknown networks without the aid of the whitelist or the use of a VPN. This is also
a situation where the user is potentially using unknown, local equipment that may not be
secured effectively.
With respect to the policy decision making process, it is necessary to refer to graph 4.9 and
the previous declaration regarding the padlock symbol. This figure details important findings
and highlights the importance of tailoring interventions and policy implementation towards
user perceptions. We must design policies that are simple to understand and compliment the
user’s method of thinking. Many ineffective policies fail not due to their purpose or aims, but
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the way in which they are deployed within the environment. Without fully understanding
issues such as user interpretation and behavioural practices one cannot deploy effective
policy. Critical failing in this area leads to increased circumvention of policies and outright
infringement.
4.5.1 Information Security and BYOD Issues
From an information security perspective there are a number of alternative methods that need
to be considered with respect to network choice and to further validate this approach. In
particular, in the event that network selection is strictly controlled by the organisation (the
user does not have a choice). Whilst this may be the case for company owned devices (and
is perfectly reasonable), it is an unfair assumption that users are willing to conform to such
an approach when using BYOD as issues of device ownership often compliment expected
behaviour. This work predominantly considers the trade-off (security vs. productivity
decisions) associated with this and nudges towards a trade-off optimum, instead of a security-
only optimum. This creates interesting challenges in determining the trade-off and the
optimal choice in which one tries to nudge towards.
One of the major challenges facing companies that embark on a BYOD strategy is the
ability to understand, and more importantly influence user behaviour (see also Yevseyeva
et al [258]). The prototype presented in this paper, and the subsequent evaluation results
highlight the effectiveness of the nudges (colour and presentation order) and suggest that this
application can remedy some of the potential security issues that arise in relation to wireless
use with the adoption of BYOD. This is a critical component of the policy decision making
process and further reiterates the importance of understanding user behaviours within the
target environment.
Perceived familiarity with network names [91] may also create potential security vulnera-
bilities as users may not scan such network names as carefully, relying on recognition and
habituation to select networks (also increasing the likelihood of spoofing). Our interventions
combat this by providing an alternative method of ordering and displaying of network lists.
4.5.2 Limitations
Some, possibly critical, points must be raised with respect to the validity of our findings.
These include usability concerns, context / applicability, and methodological / design issues.
Firstly, aspects concerning the usability issues related to coloured screens must be
addressed. Whilst the design elements related to this are a core component of effective
HCI design, and an integral part of our interventions, it is important to note that they are
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not effective for everyone and a solution must be offered. For example, it is possible to
accommodate visual impairments such as colour blindness (a condition that affects 7% of
people in some form) in numerous methods. There are also tools which test whether or not
colours are distinct enough for people who are colour-blind (usually via contrast functions or
other visual distinctions). Jefferson and Harvey ([126]) detail the importance and methods
with which you can begin to reduce the impact of such factors by manipulating the way in
which images and texts are presented. Their findings portray an effective method with which
to alleviate some of the issues revolving visual impairment. Ensuring that policies are fair for
all users, and importantly are equally able to be adhered to is another critical component of
the policy decision making process. Failure to include such user groups may lead them to
face heightened risk and ultimately higher consequences to both them and their organisation.
Secondly, with respect to the applicability of the application, we readily acknowledge
the trend that many phones are now equipped with 3G or even 4G networking options.
Nevertheless, as previously outlined in our introduction, there are numerous situations where
convenience, costs and unfamiliarity in a new setting leads to Wi-Fi usage being the preferred
connection method. As a result, this remains an issue for companies especially considering
the fact that their employees are using BYOD or employer-issued mobile devices. As
mentioned earlier, the trend in BYOD is increasing a growing rate and the need to adapt the
policy decision making process towards tackling this issue in a timely fashion is becoming
evermore pressing.
Lastly, it is necessary to reflect upon the experimental design of our investigation as
it is not clear if our participants would select the same network choice if the passwords
had been made available to them (this information was not included in the experiment as
many situations involving public Wi-Fi frequently feature similar uncertainty). It is possible
that making the explicit statement of the password may have led a greater number of users
choosing the whitelisted results. Understanding this will be critical to further improving the
decision making process for policy creation.
There are methodological decisions that may also warrant discussion. We decided to
select six options per screen in the evaluation in order to control for list length, as the number
of perceived options may influence decisions. This may have an effect on the user’s decision
making process because if you only have two choices you are somewhat forcing the decision
compared to having several options where there are a greater number of variables to consider.
At the same time, we did not want to present too many options that required scrolling or
lengthy evaluation times. Further work is required to see if the effects still hold true if
scrolling and larger lists are introduced.
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Furthermore, the urgent task was not specified which may cause some participants to
behave differently to how they would in situations of urgency. The sensitivity of the data
was also undisclosed and its data type undefined. This ultimately may have influenced
participants’ responses.
As a smaller follow-up to this work, we also added a sixth screenshot featuring the
default setting but eliminating the padlock so that we could compare the effect of padlock
presentation on network choice in the default as well as nudged conditions. This further
confirmed the role of the padlock as an important feature (for participants); however, more
data is required to determine how relevant this feature is for different user groups.
Lastly, some research further suggests that habituation can possibly reduce the effective-
ness of certain nudges such as messages warning users about posting certain content, e.g.
Wang et al ([245]). However, that is a potential issue for all interventions and not something
that is specific to our implementation.
4.5.3 Future Work
Future work will investigate more intricately the role of other interventions (see Figure 4.6
and 4.7), to educate the user and empower them to make a more informed decision that does
not rely on Android defaults. This will be tested using the prototype application on a mobile
device to improve ecological validity. Information will include explicit location references
(e.g., expected networks within in the user’s given location) and relate to real-world, possibly
personal settings. In addition, the statement to users would provide data type and data value
details to the users to allow them to make a more appropriate choice based on a greater
number of variables.
To test the whitelist algorithms’ dynamism with respect to variable data type and data
values (e.g., the network order can change based on user input where a user selects which
data type they have and what they are trying to accomplish). This will require testing a
robust and clearly understandable method with which users can successfully assess their data
sensitivity.
Furthermore, we wish to implement a monitoring solution that will collect anonymous
data relating to the user’s actions in a field experiment in order to evaluate the intervention in
a real-world, real-time environment where users are making spontaneous decisions. A field
study of this nature would also pave the way for data collection that may help organisations
to determine the type of networks being accessed and thus inform organisational policies
(which includes the whitelist). This may also enable organisations to track behavioural trends
when users are presented with two identical networks (one being possibly spoofed).
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Another challenge for future research is to conduct a more complex evaluation of the
proposed intervention that considers security as one of only a plethora of trade-offs (security
vs. performance/time required for connecting, convenience, or for particularly sensitive tasks
such as choosing a Wi-Fi when conducting online banking). We do not at present know how
the nudges play out in such circumstances.
4.6 Chapter Contributions
This chapter has highlighted the method in which a joint disciplinary approach can begin
to manage and understand a user-centric information security problem. The methodology
highlighted here presents a small-scale, rapidly deployable approach that aims to better
understand user behaviours with respect to network security and data transfer. Such an
approach provides an effective method in which to test-bed new policies in a scalable and
controlled fashion with a statistically significant evaluation of the impact on the user base
before adopting a more widespread deployment.
Through better understanding the users in our system from a user’s perspective, and
focusing on addressing specific issues that are highly relevant to the problem outline we are
able to more effectively solve these issues. In relation to this work, we are able to understand
how to work with users and compliment their current behaviours whilst also improving
security. This is beneficial as it does not inconvenience users, reducing their productivity,
and ultimately reduces the chance of non-compliance.
Chapter 5
Understanding Security Behaviours
The previous chapter documented the design and testing of an experimental nudge that
aimed to modify a user’s behaviour with respect to their wireless network preference. The
following chapter documents an investigation conducted in Jeske & Turland et al [128] that
examines how users behave with respect to online practices and privacy, specifically the
role of cookie acceptance. We examine the role of cognitive factors and social nudges to
influence the acceptance rate of such cookies. Understanding these behaviours is important
to our methodology and were highlighted through our pilot study and subsequent interaction
with the CISO.
The chapter is organised as such: Section 5.1.1 introduces our investigation and problem
domain. Section 5.2 identifies our aims and scenario with reference to our methods and
investigative procedure, section 5.5 highlights our results and subsequent analysis of these,
section 5.7 concludes our findings with reference to literature, limitations and future work.
5.1 Cookie Study
Within this chapter we examine the effect of framing instructions and social norm nudges with
respect to the acceptance of cookies. Through this, we understand how personality influences
such responses through an assessment of risk-taking, impulsiveness, sociability, and the users
willingness to self-disclose information about oneself. Through the experimental design
process highlighted here, we gain a more detailed understanding of how users make privacy
decisions. This in turn, enables a more expressive modelling environment where we can
more accurately represent the users within our system.
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5.1.1 Introduction
The privacy paradox declares that users value their privacy, but do not readily protect it
[210]. This is often due to a combination of factors such as: being unaware as to the
numerous methods in which they leave themselves vulnerable online, their inability to protect
themselves, the effort required to preserve such privacy, or they may readily accept a trade in
privacy for improved productivity and personalisation (sharing details to improve shopping
experiences etc.).
From an organisational standpoint, privacy is an important issue. To incorporate this,
organisations must develop tools and solutions that employ privacy preservation. The HCI
development cycle must adopt a privacy by design approach [43] to ensure that privacy is a
core component of the final design outcome. Alternatively, it is possible to augment final
systems (systems that are already implemented) through the addition of new functionality,
forcing mechanisms and also choice architectures that aim to nudge users towards desired
behaviours.
Nudging in this fashion has been extensively documented in the economics of privacy [8]
where users’ privacy decisions change with respect to time as social and economic benefits
present themselves. The implication of this means that users are susceptible to framing
effects and personality variables where risks can be presented as more or less salient. In
essence, "what people decide their data is worth depends critically on the context in which
they are asked - specifically, how the problem is framed" [8].
With this knowledge, we examine some of the behavioural and contextual influencers
that affect the privacy decision making process with specific reference to the acceptance
or rejection of cookies. We wish to ‘nudge’ user choice through presentation effects to
determine which interventions are most effective. In doing so we examine:
• Personality effects: The influence of different behavioural traits.
– Impulsiveness - Making decisions without having all the facts at hand [78].
– Risk taking: Those who take risks are less concerned with the consequences;
those who are more risk-averse often regret taking risks [263]. Risk-takers often
make decisions in the moment and are less influenced by emotions.
– Willingness to self-disclose: A greater willingness to self-disclose (i.e. through
social media) may expose individuals to privacy and security risks as they do not
fully consider the consequences [4].
– Sociability: a form of extroversion complimenting a greater interest in relation-
ship management and information sharing. Sociable individuals are often more
vulnerable to social influencing [146].
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• Cognitive framing effects: The impact of the current task on the decision making
process. It does not include the detailing of new information and instead relies on
the way existing information can be manipulated in order to influence change (e.g.
showing the benefits and risks associated with a particular choice [233]).
• Social framing: The role of social norms in our decision making process.
– Social conformity: "if we engage in behaviours of which other approve, others
will approve of us, too" [56]. An increase in the likelihood to follow social norms.
– Adaptation of behaviour: Users may adapt their behaviour to match that of those
they care about or trust [72]. People try to behave in a manner they believe to be
appropriate to their social setting [77].
5.1.2 The Role of a Choice Architecture
From chapters 2 and 4 we have understood the importance of a choice architecture and
demonstrated its application. For privacy, a similar strategy may be applied that recognises
that users have the freedom to readily trade their privacy for a range of benefits they see fit
[8] even if this is seen to hamper productivity in cases such as reading additional terms and
conditions. Such a case is witnessed with respect to the following UK government report:
‘One key aspect of the use of social media data is the tension that exists between
the generation of data by individuals and the use of that data by organizations.
We have not been convinced that the users of social media platforms are fully
aware of how their data might be used and what redress they may, or may
not have if they disagree with how an organization exploits that data. This is
exacerbated by our finding that terms and conditions contracts are simply too
long and complex for any reasonable person to make any real sense of’ [175].
Within this study we examine how the adoption of a choice architecture can influence
cookie acceptance or rejection. Through adopting an economics of privacy style approach,
this enables an assessment of known benefits (e.g. personalisation) as well as known
costs (targeted advertising and undesirable profiling). We acknowledge that users often
default to habitual behaviours with respect to accepting cookies, often unaware of the
implications of their actions. As such, users typically do not read the associated text which
is presented alongside the choice and ultimately have little idea who has access to or can
use the information that they are agreeing to share. This phenomena is known as the control
paradox [7] and is often exacerbated by the user’s lack of understanding as to the means that
exist to protect one’s privacy [5].
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5.1.3 Cookies
A cookie is a small file that is designed to ‘hold a modest amount of data specific to a
particular client and website’. This cookie is subsequently accessed by the client computer
and web server in order to negotiate authentication on a particular website and allow it to
create tailored content specific to the verified user. Common applications of such a process
include ‘remember me’ logins and a plethora of retail and social media based websites.
Cookies are promoted as being necessary to enhance the user experience by enabling the
streamlining of access (automatic login and authentication), personalisation, and targeted
advertising. The issue of privacy has long been discussed with reference to cookie acceptance
as there is an unclear notion of anonymity that pertains to their acceptance. This is especially
evident with the ability to track user behaviours and browsing patterns through the monitoring
of these files [177]. Therefore, although cookies cannot contain malware or viruses, it may be
possible to intercept these cookies and use them for malicious purposes such as masquerading
as somebody else. A man-in-the-middle attack on an open, unsecured network (see chapter
4) would present an ideal opportunity for such an attack provided any encryption methods
are successfully decrypted. As cookies provide user identification and an associated token,
it is possible to gain access to specific accounts. Moreover, it is important to stress that the
security of the cookie is also a component of the target web server, the users computer as
well as the browser itself, domains which the user may no influence or governance over.
The scale of adoption and the continued concerns regarding the use of cookies led the
EU to introduce a directive in 2002 that required online providers to seek consent from users
with respect to cookie usage. This later became law in 2011. Importantly, what started
off as a somewhat explicit consent has been seen to shift to a more implicit choice where
users are offered little in the way of actual choice regarding the manner in which their
privacy is handled. The problem with this is that users become habituated to the processes of
rapidly dismissing prompts in an effort to minimize productivity loss through the addition of
extra user input requests. This can have knock-on effects with respect to additional security
behaviours such as error-reporting (chapter 6) and the dismissal of software updates through
‘update later’ functionality [264].
5.2 Research Aims and Scenario
In this experiment, we wish to examine the following research questions:
• To what extent can contextual cues pertaining to the privacy and security implications
of a task influence the decision-making process?
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• Can social framing effects influence this choice?
• Do personality factors affect how users are likely to respond in a privacy context, and
how does the implementation of a nudge within the choice architecture impact this?
To address this, we examine the following hypotheses:
1. Cognitive framing: Participants who receive instructions that make reference to security
concerns are less likely to accept cookies than participants who receive no such
reference to security [128].
2. Social framing: In comparison to a base rate (control) which is likely to lean towards
acceptance of cookies, participants’ responses will be affected by a social nudge,
such that a low social norms reference will effectively nudge participants away from
accepting cookies [128].
3. Personality: Cookies are more likely to be accepted when individuals are more im-
pulsive and willing to share information, when they are greater risk takers and more
sociable [128].
5.2.1 Study Design and Task
The study involved six experimental conditions in a 2*3, independent groups factorial design
with 2 cognitive framing conditions (security vs convenience) and 3 social framing conditions
(low, high and social norm).
With respect to our security frame, we presented participants with the following statement
"We would like you to tell us what security/risk factors you consider when utilizing such
websites" [128].
For our non-security frame we asked "We would like you to tell us what factors (e.g.,
convenience) you consider when deciding to go shopping using different sites" [128].
For social framing we augmented the text in the dialogue box. The general text in all
cases was identical and read as follows: “Our use of cookies. This cookie stores basic user
information on your computer, potentially improving the browsing experience and helping
us deliver more relevant information to you" [128]. The control condition had no further
text, whereas the other two conditions made reference to a minority and majority social norm
as follows: "37% (74%) of MTURKers like yourself have used this option". All cookie
dialogues concluded with the following: "Do you want to use this option? Accept/Don’t
accept". The allocation of each cookie was randomised from the possible 6, and an example
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(a) Social Norm Condition 37% - Low (b) Social Norm Condition 74% - High
(c) Social Norm Condition - Social Norm
Fig. 5.1 Example of Cookie Conditions - Security & Convenience [128]
of each is included in figure 5.1. Please note, these cookies were used in both cognitive
framing conditions (security and convenience).
The descriptive social norms (37% and 74%) are in acknowledgement of Glynn et al
[100] who used the same figures in a study of similar context and found these values to
effectively demonstrate significant differences in responses. Similarly, group references
have been shown to be effective in behaviour change in Terry & Hogg [227], providing the
rationale for our choice of phrase "mTurkers like yourself". As such, direct referencing in
this fashion is expected to increase potential conformity to social norms.
The task itself required participants to rate the trustworthiness of four different accom-
modation booking websites. Participants were instructed as follows: "We will present four
different screen shots to you. Please have a look. Below each screen you will find five
questions on whether or not you consider these trustworthy and would consider using them
to book your next trip" [128]. Of the five questions, three related to trust, one investigated
familiarity with the site, and the final question related to the probability of using the site in
the future. Figure 5.2 provides an example of one of the web pages and subsequent questions.
Of the websites selected for our study, two were of high familiarity, and two were of low
familiarity as reported in Skift [207]. These were 1) Booking.com, 2) Tripadvisor.com, 3)
Bookingbuddy.com, and 4) Airbnb.com respectively. With respect to figure 5.2, the screen
shot featured the home page of the web site and it was specifically designed to fill the screen
to emulate visiting the official website.
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Fig. 5.2 Example of the Website View and Questions
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5.3 Method
For this study we the Mechanical Turk Platform (mTurk). The rationale for this decision
is two-fold. Firstly, many of the users of this site are familiar with online browsing and
cookie acceptance procedures, and secondly, these participants are predominantly driven by
financial gains and optimal task completion times (a process similar to individuals working
online in other tasks). As such, users will be driven by their primary goal of task completion
which provides an ideal opportunity to explore how a choice architecture can be applied with
respect to privacy and security nudges.
The experiment featured a total of 309 participants of which 19 were removed for repeat
participation, errors in data or omission of data fields. The average age of participants was 35
years (MN=35.30, SD=11.96), with an age range of 18-71 years. Gender representation was
almost equal with females (53.1%, n=154) and males (45.9%, n=133). Three participants did
not wish to disclose their gender.
5.3.1 Participant Procedure
All participants accessed the study through the mTurk portal and were given $1 in payment
for their time (a figure determined to be in-line with other studies of similar duration). After
completing a consent form, the users were taken to the study site and randomly allocated one
of the six conditions (1 of 2 conditions, and 1 of 3 cookies). Regardless of their response to
the cookie acceptance, all participants viewed and completed the same content. First, they
were asked to rate the trustworthiness, familiarity and intention to use the current site and
secondly, participants were were presented with a questionnaire to asses their compulsivity,
self-disclosure, risk-taking and sociability. Formal control questions and demographics were
presented last along with a statement detailing that no actual cookie was downloaded by the
user (we use Session Variables in the browser to call mySQL functions).
5.4 Results
The results section is formatted thus; first we outline the task results (the rating of trust-
worthiness) and secondly, the items and scales detailed in the follow-up questionnaire. The
responses to all items have been ‘combined into one score for each scale and the composite
subsequently mean-centred, creating a scale measure with the same range as the original
items’ [128].
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• Cookie reporting: More participants accepted the cookie than rejected it - 201 (69.3%)
to 89 respectively.
• Trust/task-related questions: Trust was measured using three questions adapted from
Lynch et al [155] to assess the trustworthiness of the websites, an example of which is
"This website is trustworthy" with answers ranging from "Strongly agree to Strongly
disagree" (see figure 5.2). The reliability and scale statistics for each of the four
tasks are reported separately. The reliability was generally high (above 0.7 [172]):
Task 1: α=.90, M=3.65, SD=.71 booking.com; Task 2: α=.86, M=4.26, SD=.56
Tripadvisor.com; Task 3: α=.86, M=3.33, SD=.61 Bookingbuddy.com, Task 4: α=.89,
M=3.40, SD=.73 Airbnb.com.
Following our trustworthiness questions, we asked “How likely is it that you will use this
site yourself?” with responses ranging from "(1) “extremely low” to (5) “extremely high.”
and “Have you ever heard of this site before?” with the available options "Yes, (2) No, (3)
Not sure" (see fig 5.2). A detailed discussion of the results from these questions follows in
the next section.
The following questionnaire (see fig 5.3) included several measures to assess the users
impulsiveness, risk-taking, self-disclosure, sociability, and demographics. Upon completion,
participants were able to progress to the debrief and final page of the survey. The instructions
of the follow-up stated: “Thank you for completing the task. We would hereby like to ask
you a few questions about how you generally make decisions and share information about
yourself.”
Fig. 5.3 An Example of Part of the Website Questionnaire
For reference, we will take each in turn:
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1. Impulsiveness: This was measured using a five-step sub-scale as witnessed in Eysenck
et al [90]. Instructions asked participants: “Please tell us how you tend to go about
making decisions on a day-to-day basis.” We changed the questions into personal
statements. An example item is: “I buy things on impulse.” Each item included with
five response options that captured the frequency with which participants engaged
in the behaviours, ranging from (1) “never” to (5) “always.” The fourth item was
reverse-scored while the fifth items was excluded (α=.74, M=2.27, SD=.58) [128].
2. Risk-taking: We measure risk using a scale adopted by Dahlbaeck [68]. An example
item is “I think that I am often less cautious than people in general.” The answering
options ranged from (1) “strongly disagree” to (5) “strongly agree.” The third item was
reverse-scored (α=.62, M=2.31, SD=.73) [128].
3. Self-disclosure: Measured using four items from the International Personality Item
Pool (IPIP) and Wheeless [251]. The instructions were as follows: “Please tell us to
what extent you share personal information about yourself on a day-to-day basis.” An
example item is: “I share and express my private thoughts to others.” The answering
options ranged from (1) “never” to (5) “always” (α=.77, M=2.93, SD=.60) [251].
4. Sociability: Measured using four items from Zuckerman-Kuhlman-Aluja Personality
Questionnaire [16] and retaining the original instructions. An example item is: “I have
a rich social life.” The response options ranged from (1) “strongly disagree” to (4)
“agree strongly” (α=.85, M=2.47, SD=.73) [128].
5. Control question and demographics: These included: “Do you normally accept cookies
on websites?” Participants could select either “Yes” or “No”. Demographics were also
collected, such as age (including an option “prefer not to say”) and gender (including
an option “prefer not to say”) in order to describe the sample in later analyses [128].
5.5 Discussion
The discussion is separated into the following respective sections: Firstly, we examine the
data relating to cookie acceptance, and cognitive and social framing; Secondly, we detail
the impact of personality effect, before briefly considering some of the incidental findings
around personality and trust in the accommodation booking task.
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5.5.1 Cookie Acceptance and Cognitive Framing
We predicted that participants who received instructions framed with security concerns would
be less likely to accept the cookie than participants who received instructions framed with
no reference to security (see Table 5.1). In terms of the number of participants in each
of the experimental conditions, 134 were in the non-security domain and 156 participants
received the security-related instructions. Chi square analysis showed that the cognitive
framing manipulation did not influence the likelihood with which participants would choose
to accept or reject the cookie (x2(1)=2.446, p=.118), i.e. the security framing hypothesis was
not supported [128].
Cognitive Framing Conditions
Cookie Non-Security Frame Security Frame n
No (rejected) 35 54 89
Yes (accepted) 99 102 201
Table 5.1 Cookie Responses to Framing Instructions [128]
5.5.2 Cookie Acceptance and Social Framing
We predicted that cookie acceptance would be responsive to social framing effects believing
that people will be less likely to accept the cookie if they believed that similarly-minded
people were also rejecting it. Our results support these predictions. A Chi-square analysis
revealed a statistically significant effect across the three conditions (x2(2)=22.153, p<.001).
The Cramer’s V statistics result (Cramer’s V=.276) also indicates that there is a moderately
strong relationship between cookie framing and subsequent acceptance (range: .25-.30).
Cookie acceptance across the three social conditions tends to increase, as shown in Table 5.2.
Social Framing Conditions
Cookie Control Conditions Minority (37%) Majority (74%) n
No (rejected) 19 51 19 89
Yes (accepted) 69 57 75 201
Table 5.2 Cookie Responses Based on Social Group References [128]
Additional pairing analysis (37% and 74%) was conducted on the results within table
5.2 highlighting that the rejection rate was higher when participants believed that their peers
had higher rejection rates (x2(1)=16.191, p<.001; Phi=.283). This suggests that the minority
accepts frame moved participants away from cookie acceptance. Importantly, however,
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there was no statistical difference between the control group and the majority accept group
(x2(1)=.052, p=.819). This finding is not unexpected as default settings typically require
participants to accept cookies.
We depict the ratio of observed and expected counts across all three group conditions in
figure 5.4. If observed and expected values were equal, all bars would lie between the 1-2
range. The truth, however, is that there are two separate trends. Several bars fall below the
1 value reflecting a trend where the observed count was significantly lower than expected.
In contrast, those values over 1 represent conditions where the count was significantly
higher than expected. This leads us to conclude that cookies were rejected more often when
presented with the smaller percentage (37%). Cookie rejection rates were lower for both
control condition and the majority condition (74%) so these did not visually differ.
Fig. 5.4 Ratio of Observed vs Expected Counts
5.5.3 Cookie Acceptance and Personality Effects
We proposed that cookies were more likely to be accepted than rejected for individuals
with high impulsivity, sociability and willingness to share information. This hypothesis was
examined using an analysis of covariance technique with control for age and gender. We
visualise this in table 5.3.
Impulsiveness Risk-taking
Cookie M (SD) M (SD)
No (rejected) 2.13 (.51) 2.09 (.69)
Yes (accepted) 2.32 (.59) 2.41 (.73)
Table 5.3 Cookie Responses as a Function of Impulsiveness and Risk-Taking [128]
a The cookie was rejected by 89 participants, whilst 201 accepted it.
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As hypothesised, cookie acceptance or rejection was affected by impulsiveness (F(1,288)=6.353,
p=.012, partial n2=.02) and risk-taking (F(1,288)=11.660, p=.001, partial n2=.04). Further-
more, those who accepted the cookie also reported higher levels of impulsiveness and
risk-taking. The figures also suggest a moderate effect from personality (.01 and .06).
Analysis of cookie acceptance and rejection based on different norms produced no further
significant results. Additionally, no significant observations were noted in relation to either
willingness to disclose information (F(1,288)=.032, p=.857) or sociability (F(1,288)=.322,
p=.571) and as a result, only partial support was obtained the our personality hypothesis
(chiefly, risk-taking and impulsiveness).
5.5.4 The Booking Task
Numerous analyses focused on the trust scores for the online booking sites, with four trust
measures (one for each task) being positively correlated with each other as expected (p<.001).
Trust reported for each respective website was positively correlated with the intended use of
the first (r=.723, p<.001; n=274), second (r=.594, p<.001; n=289), third booking site (r=.663,
p<.001; n=289), and the fourth booking site (r=.594, p<.001; n=289). The correlation matrix
illustrating the relationship between personality and trust in the online booking sites is
provided in Table 5.4 [128].
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(1) Trust_t1 1
(2) Trust_t2 .291** 1
(3) Trust_t3 .433** .210** 1
(4) Trust_t4 .232** .270** .279** 1
(5) Impulsivity .011 -.006 -.52 .28 1
(6) Risk-taking .10 -.34 -.32 .185** .589** 1
(7) Self-disclosure .060 .073 .129* .192** .106t .114t 1
(8) Sociable .054 .083 .056 .181** .060 .193** .264** 1
(9) Age -.094 -.136* -.152** -.273** -.169** -.177** -.122* -.81 1
Table 5.4 Correlations Between Trust Responses in Relation to Hotel Booking Sites, Age,
Personality [128]
a** p<.01, * p<.05. t indicates marginally significant correlation (p<.10)
We acknowledge that the tendency to accept or reject cookies was not associated with
differences in trust across all tasks (F(1,285)=.917, p=.339), or for any individual task. No
significant differences emerged in relation to cookie responses task 1 (F(1,288)=.162, p=.687),
task 2 (F(1,288)=.006, p=.936), task 3 (F(1,288)=.257, p=.613), or task 4 (F(1,288)=.588,
p=.444).
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Following this, we wished to investigate whether our cognitive framing manipulation also
affected website trust values. There was no evidence obtained that suggested that security
or non-security framing was associated with different levels of trust across all four tasks
(F(1,285)=.002, p=.969), nor was there any significant effect for any of the individual booking
tasks: task 1 (F(1,271)=.434, p=.511), task 2 (F(1,286)=.023, p=.880), task 3 (F(1,286)=.546,
p=.460), or task 4 (F(1,287)=.051, p=.821). To summarise, there was no evidence to support
the claim that the security vs. non-security nudge affected trust for each of the websites.
Our final analysis investigated website familiarity and was examined with respect to trust
(see also Table 5.5). We observed that trust values were higher for the two high familiarity
sites than for the two low familiarity sites. Intended use was also higher when the booking
site was declared more familiar as suggested by our online site ranking source [207].
High Familiarity Condition Low Familiarity Condition
Site Reports Task 1 Task 2 Task 3 Task 4
Trustworthiness 3.64 (.71) 4.26 (.56) 3.33 (.61) 3.40 (.73)
Intended Use 2.92 (1.06) 3.90 (.93) 2.67 (1.02) 2.62 (1.12)
Familiarity Yes 126 (46%) 255 (90.7%) 39 (13.6%) 89 (31%)
No 130 (47.4%) 26 (9.3%) 255 (78.4%) 189 (65.9%)
Not 18 (6.6%) 0 (0%) 23 (8.0%) 9 (3.1%)
Sure
Table 5.5 Responses to Websites With Respect to Familiarity Condition [127]
aThe first two rows list the mean and standard deviation in brackets. Task 1: booking.com; Task 2: Tripadvisor.com; Task 3: Bookingbuddy.com, Task 4: Airbnb.com
5.6 Summary of Findings
Within this chapter we have investigated the impact of social and cognitive framing, as well
as personality effects, on cookie acceptance. Throughout this process, we have examined
cognitive effects through the manner in which the task is introduced, as well as social effects
through the implementation of high, low norms in relation to a control that provided no social
information. In doing so, we have also obtained several personality characteristics such as
impulsivity, sociability, self-disclosure and risk-taking.
By implementing our cookie discretely into the online survey, it has been possible to
observe actual rather than intended behaviours. This is important as intentions in security do
not necessarily translate into behaviours within security [65]. It is necessary to discuss these
findings in relation to our hypotheses.
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5.6.1 Hypothesis 1 - Cognitive Framing
Even with our holistic approach to cookie inclusion, our first hypothesis, with respect to
cognitive framing, was not supported. We proposed that when individuals are made explicitly
aware of the cookie with respect to privacy concerns, the adoption rate would fall as users
would question the trustworthiness of the website. There are a number of reasons why this
may not have occurred.
1. Users did not fully understand the privacy and security concerns related to cookie
acceptance [4], nor did we highlight any specific negative outcomes of accepting it
[262].
2. As proposed by Levin et al [149], the impact of persuasive messages depends on
what kind of consequences the user may expect when they do not perform an action.
As our task did not actually require users to purchase anything, they may not have
interpreted the cookie as a threat to their security or privacy. Furthering this, our study
was highlighted to be part of a university experiment and therefore users may have
placed trust within our actions not to deceive them.
5.6.2 Hypothesis 2 - Default Control Behaviour
Our second hypothesis predicted that cookie acceptance is a normative behaviour, i.e., more
people would accept the cookie than reject it. As previously highlighted, EU law now
dictates that websites must explicitly disclose their use of cookies which has led to a change
in the default behaviour towards acceptance. A possible impact of this can be observed
in our results where the social nudge aimed towards increasing cookie acceptance had no
measurable impact. Das et al [72] predicted, however, that social references can in fact shift
cookie acceptance and rejection rates introducing some fuzziness with respect to their impact.
On the basis of our research, however, we can confirm the hypothesis.
We can also confirm this conversely when a social nudge was introduced to highlight
that others were less likely to accept the cookie. Such a statement led to a higher rejection
rate in our participants. This was therefore in line with previous studies such as Stok et
al [216] which stated that social identity is a salient feature and can affect attitudes within
computer-mediated communication.
5.6.3 Hypothesis 3 - Personality & Decision-Making
Our third hypothesis reflected on the role of personality within the decision-making process
stating that users would be more likely to accept if they were 1) more impulsive, 2) were
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greater risk-takers, 3) more willing to share information and 4) more sociable. This was
partially supported for two of the four traits where we determined that the more impulsive
individuals were more likely to accept cookies, which also fits with findings that participants
are less likely to deliberate on their options (see Halpern [108]). With respect to our
implementation, the manner in which the cookie appeared unexpectedly when individuals
wanted to start may also have tapped into the distractibility aspect of higher impulsiveness
(see Stanford et al. [212]).
Contrary to our predictions, there was no evidence to suggest that cookie acceptance was
related to either self-disclosure or greater extroversion (sociability). It is possible that the
association between self-disclosure and privacy concern is only found when the primary task
is made to more explicitly reflect the sharing of sensitive information. This suggests that
context-dependency plays an important role, as different environmental cues may influence
the disclosure of private information (seen in Acquisti [8]; Joinson et al [132]). Moreover,
the fact that the cookie was presented as part of a task in a separate section of the survey,
rather than the questionnaire on self-disclosure, may have reduced participants’ recollection
of the cookie. This could mean that the observed results may be due to the online setting of
the study and the fact that self-disclosure and information were not made salient [128].
Our results compliment similar findings within Nurse et al [174] where it is stated that is
imperative to design systems and communications in a way that caters towards individual
strengths. Personality traits may subsequently shape these strengths and weaknesses. From
this, along with our results, we can conclude that impulsiveness and risk-taking may present
potentially unfavourable traits in security-related decision making.
5.6.4 Limitations
With respect to our findings, we highlight the following limitations within the study:
• Nudges: it is difficult to assess the longevity of our nudge interventions as they impact
the system 1 thinking process (see Mols et al [164]).
• Sensitivity to risk: Those who accepted the cookie also reported higher risk-taking
tendencies. It is therefore possible that our sample was largely insensitive to security
risks (see Druckman [86]).
• Group identification: It is difficult to ascertain group affiliation and linkages between
mTurkers. This may have caused us to overlook some of the greater persuasive effects.
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5.6.5 Practical Recommendations
This chapter documents the continued development and application of nudges within a choice
architecture in the field of security and privacy decision-making.
Our results support several principles and recommendations, chiefly:
• Our results support that Nudges are most effective when placed just before the moment
of decision-making.
• If a nudge is to be based on social norms, they should be credible and based on
empirical evidence (Stok [216]). Furthermore, these nudges should be clear with
respect to their direction of intended behaviour change (Das [72]).
• The most effective choice architecture will consider personality characteristics (e.g.,
impulsivity and risk-taking) as these may influence the effectiveness of nudges.
• Numerous theoretical frameworks exist which may, in combination with evidence-
based research, provide useful starting points for future nudge-based interventions
[128].
5.7 Conclusion
The current research contributes to current knowledge by building on the work by Das
and colleagues [2014], but furthermore expanding on this work by considering the role of
personality. The effectiveness of social proof in this setting also builds on past evidence [see
Glynn et al., 2009; Stok et al., 2012] but in a different context, which further cements the
influence of others on decision-making.
5.7.1 Future Work
The listed contributions would benefit from repeat experimentation through increased sample
size and closer examination of specific areas. Such an approach would enable the following:
• The investigation of affect and risk communication (detailed in Visschers et al [241])
which could provide further avenues of investigation in relation to IS.
• An examination of other individual characteristics that were not under investigation
within this study such as agreeableness [150], gender [86], conscientiousness, and risk
preferences.
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• As discussed in Levin [150], further research into framing effects and the role of
individual differences on decision-making may help us to better understand under what
circumstances and with whom framing is effective. This is also relevant because it
would allow practitioners to frame decisions to maximize impact.
5.7.2 Chapter Contributions
This chapter has contributed to our understanding of nudge applicability in privacy and
security. Specifically, in the realms of online security and privacy with respect to the
acceptance and rejection of cookies, a common procedure in day-to-day browsing.
The findings presented here not only support similar applications and results in other
studies, but also expand them by applying a nudging framework to cookie acceptance. Our
methodology benefits from being able to more accurately articulate this process and ultimately
represent the problem space. This empowers the policy-maker to form a richer expression of
our environment and the users that populate it, allowing for a more encapsulated approach
towards policy creation and implementation.
Chapter 6
Understanding Security Behaviours -
Part II
The previous chapter documented the testing of a nudge on privacy and security using
two framing conditions. The following chapter highlights work conducted in Jeske et al
[127] which aims to understand user behaviours with respect to error-reporting; a behaviour
highlighted as ‘of significant importance’ from interaction with the CISO and results obtained
from our pilot study. We examine how users form their decision-making process with respect
to error submission reports. In doing so, we develop and test an intervention method based
on social norms and nudges with respect to framing effects to investigate how we can modify
the report and non-report rate. The application of this work will aid the understanding of how
to build policies that increase the likelihood of error-reporting, ultimately improving security
through the subsequent development of mitigation strategies.
Section 6 documents work conducted in Jeske et al [127] and aims to investigate the
error-reporting process
6.1 Error-Reporting Study
User feedback is an important component of both security and software development, en-
abling the detection and response to current threats. Error reporting is an important feedback
mechanism, but many users do not respond to error reporting requests; a trait acknowledge
within our pilot study (see chapter 3). The following chapter presents an investigation aimed
at improving the rate of error reporting by presenting 126 participants with different types of
messages as part of an online study. Within our study, we asked users to rate four booking
sites in terms of the sites’ trustworthiness. The displayed messages differed in terms of how
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the issue was described (cognitive framing: messages triggered due to technical or security),
and the benefits associated with the reporting of the error (benefit with respect to the user,
and user to other user). The inclusion of the benefit statement is based on the literature of
social loafing which suggests that redundancy may affect performance when individuals
perceive themselves to be one of many attempting the same task. Our results revealed that
the cognitive framing had a significant effect on whether or not participants reported an
error intentionally when it presented itself. Error reporting was found to be lower when the
message suggested a security issue rather than a technical problem. Furthermore, participants
were more likely to report the error if doing so implied some self-benefit. Without reference
to such benefits, error reporting was significantly lower. Our findings reveal that error framing
has a significant effect with respect to the likelihood of reporting (security and technical).
Additionally, the benefit statement may have made error reporting more relevant and more
personally meaningful for the individual users, an important effect that is known to reduce
social loafing in group settings.
6.2 Introduction
Anticipated and actual user behaviours often diverge, particularly in regards to their respon-
siveness to different system requests and software. Several theories explore why this might
be the case. One such theory is based on the concept of social loafing (Karau [138]) that
stipulates: when in the presence of many other users, the individual user may not react to
a request that many other users will have already responded to. One explanation for this
inactivity focuses on the perceptions of redundancy of effort, where any action from the
individual user may be interpreted as a duplicate of inputs generated by others (particularly
prominent in a collective working environment - see Karau [139]). This impacts the user
as the apparent significance of any contributions that they may make is reduced, further
lowering their motivation to engage with subsequent requests.
Error messages are a frequent occurrence when individuals interact with many forms
of technology, often requiring users to submit report errors on any issues they encounter.
These requests typically require users to decide whether or not they wish to respond to these
requests. Despite their unpopularity, legitimate error requests serve a variety of important
functions. For example, these reports enable programmers to identify and formulate solutions
towards specific problems [21], [117], [112]) by using patches, improving design and quality
of products to name but a few [21]. They also represent an important feedback mechanism
between organizations and their users enabling awareness of potential errors that may affect
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their operations [265]. This is of particular significance to our CISO through continued
interaction.
We must therefore determine how to most effectively assess this user behaviour utilising
existing theories and frameworks. The following section details numerous reasons as to why
error requests may not be addressed. In addition, we outline several suggestions on how to
reduce this redundancy, of which some are subsequently investigated to evaluate their utility.
6.2.1 Understanding User Reactions to Error Requests
The presentation of error messages with respect to HCI is often met with an habitual response.
This typically manifests with a feeling of annoyance from the user and the subsequent
dismissal and rejection of the notification. This reaction is often due to a variety of reasons.
Firstly, error reporting requests share characteristics with other prompts that are often
unanticipated, potentially disruptive and, on occasion, indicators of an infection (e.g., updates
and cookie requests - see chapter 5). Secondly, it is often unclear how doing so benefits the
user and whether or not the error requests are generic or specific. Thirdly, the degree of effort
required to report errors is often uncertain and undocumented within the message. Fourthly,
many system errors are encountered repeatedly within day-to-day tasks, reducing the sense
that a report will be useful or lead to some personal or overall benefit and thus contributing
to non-reporting [117]. These factors are often exacerbated when the semantics of system
settings and messages are unclear to the non-technical user, leading to misunderstandings
and possible confusion [160]. Moreover, the standard user is typically unaware of security
threats and vulnerabilities [95].
Some errors may be triggered by new software and the implementation of new processes.
Having little prior knowledge pertaining to how a user should respond to errors may also
influence an individuals’ response to error requests. In this context, many users prefer to
avoid or reject information when they have this option [152], [115]. This may also be the
case when engaging with new information that may also disrupt the processes, having a
particularly negative effect on subsequent but primary task performances [87]. These negative
effects may differ depending on who is disrupted and during what kind of tasks (e.g., for
those with low working memory capacity [85]) and the amount of cognitive load that users
experience at the time [173].
Other issues related to error reporting include whether or not an individual believes that
their actions or non-actions are identifiable [111]. Specifically, some individuals may not
wish to report an error because they are unclear as to what information they are sending (e.g.,
the data they send may identify them). Furthermore, anonymity may lead individuals to not
report errors, since they believe their inaction is not likely to lead to any negative conse-
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quences. These findings explain why error reporting has been linked to threat (mis)perception,
security beliefs, perceptions of risky behaviour, and avoidance of security interventions [118].
Concerns about what is reported may be exacerbated when large corporations publicly ac-
knowledge that such personally identifiable information (e.g.,Microsoft) is included in error
reports, and this information is subsequently shared with their partners [224]. This anxiety
may be reinforced by the difficulty that users have in assessing the credibility of different
messages, which may then reduce the acceptability of the message and, over time, lead to a
reduction in the error reporting rate. Some support for this is found in Workman et al. [257]
who observed that perceived vulnerability, perceived response efficacy and response-cost
benefit all predict omissive behaviours.
6.2.2 Redundancy of Effort and Perceived Personal Relevance
With respect to social loafing, there are a number studies from social psychological literature
that may help to understand why the under-reporting of errors is so prevalent. Some research
suggests that task characteristics may play a role in terms of whether or not individuals
will be motivated to contribute and complete a task. Such task characteristics include the
‘attractiveness’ of the task [261] providing some insight into why many organizations invest
in incentives to encourage employees to report errors. Another interesting factor is that
complex tasks are also less likely to lead to personal engagement [124] as the unknown
requirements involved in error reporting may dissuade users from doing so [194]. Thirdly,
error requests do not represent creative tasks that are typically preferred with IT users [29].
Lastly, it is often unclear to the user how meaningful it is to report errors, a phenomenon
similar to the redundancy effect noted earlier.
It is possible that there may be no immediate solution available to addressing redundancy
concerns and the characteristics of error requests within HCI. While providing incentives for
reporting errors in an organizational setting may be an option, incentives in other settings
may not be as easily implementable or effective in persuading users to respond to error
requests. Several generic suggestions, however, can be found within social loafing literature.
For instance, error requests could be timed better (e.g., when these requests are not part of
a critical malfunction) to reduce the likelihood that users will ignore these request in order
to proceed with a primary task. This is in line with calls for designs that do not reduce
performance [173]. While it may not always be feasible to make error reporting “attractive”,
it ought to be in the interest of developers and users to make them less difficult to comply
with.
Another option is to consider the extent to which error reporting is due to perceived
redundancy. Research has shown that information processing is motivated by the extent to
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which the information has personal relevance [181]. Thus, providing a rationale with respect
to the error request context may alleviate the perceived redundancy, and in-turn, highlight the
benefits associated with reporting errors [173]. This could be achieved by either personalizing
the message or outlining the repercussions of leaving a potential issue unresolved over time.
Personal relevance may further promote greater involvement, which has been shown to
lead to more systematic information processing [54]. By increasing personal relevance,
it may also be possible to reduce habitual responses that lead to participants to ignoring
system-generated messages [42], [239].
These findings suggest there is a need to raise the perceived value of the task and
individual input with respect to error reporting. From this, we need to determine how the
expected value of error reporting can be influenced using evidence from social loafing in
both the context of the user and the perceived value to other users [205].
6.2.3 Research Gap and Hypotheses
Our goal is to reduce the potential redundancy of effort and increase personal relevancy by
clarifying the benefits of error reporting. Likewise, this chapter is a response to past calls for
more research in this area [265], particularly research that addresses the lack of theories that
could be used to explain why and how individuals may respond to error requests. Importantly,
this necessity for further research was also indicated from our pilot study (chapter 3) and
discussions with the CISO. The focus of this study is therefore to reduce the perceived
redundancy and increase the meaningfulness of error reporting whilst identifying the role
of error message type. A critical part of this is to understand how error framing, e.g., as a
technical or security-related issue may trigger different responses by individuals.
Framing Hypothesis: 1 & 2
This study examined three hypotheses.
1. Firstly, we predict that the frequency of error reporting is higher for a problem that is
framed as a security than a technical issue (cognitive framing effect).
2. Secondly, we predict that the frequency of error reporting is higher when the reporting
has an implied benefit to the user. When users perceive a benefit to themselves or to
others, they are expected to be more likely to report errors.
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Individual Difference Hypothesis: 3
In addition to personal relevance, individual differences also affect technology interactions.
Past evidence suggests that error-message interruptions can negatively impact the perfor-
mance of users depending on their memory capacity and use of memory strategies [85].
Other traits such as perceived self-efficacy may also impact how often, regularly or for what
reasons users may report errors they encounter [113]. In addition, impulsivity has been linked
to greater distractibility, less deliberate and attentive decision-making as well as selective
information processing [212].
3. We consider the role of individual differences in error reporting and predict it to be
higher amongst individuals that rank highly on impulsiveness and risk-taking, low on
privacy concern, and higher on expectations of reciprocity [59].
Privacy concern were included as they may capture fears pertaining to the type of
information that is transmitted with an error, while reciprocity has been hypothesized to play
a role in shaping contributions in settings such as computer-mediated discussion forums
[247]. It is also expected that perceptions of security vulnerability may be associated with
higher error reporting.
Underlying Motives for Error Reporting
In the final part of our results, we also consider the role of generic error responding in an
exploratory fashion, exploring the extent to which these behaviours can be attributed to
particular motives that either encourage or discourage error reporting.
6.3 Method
6.3.1 Study design and tasks
The primary task for users was to rate each individual sit; whilst the main focus for researchers
was the secondary task which had been embedded into the error-reporting (first task). It is
necessary to discuss this in-turn.
• Site rating task (primary): focused on how trustworthy participants would rate four
different accommodation booking websites. These had been selected from a list of
popular websites ([207], the same as chapter 5) and included (1) Booking.com (2)
Tripadvisor.com, (3) Bookingbuddy.com and (4) Airbnb.com. All four screenshots pre-
sented the home pages of each of these sites (see 5.2). The instructions to participants
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informed them that they will be presented with four screenshots of websites and will
be required to rate how trustworthy they find these sites. Following this assessment,
they would additionally be requested to report how familiar they were with these sites
and how likely they would be to use them in the future.
• Error reporting task (secondary): All participants were presented with a dialogue box
that stated ‘We noted a problem on this page’. This was followed by either a security
or technical message frame. The security message frame informed participants that:
‘This problem may indicate a security issue.’ The technical message frame was almost
identical, only one word was changed: instead of mentioning it as a ‘security’ issue,
this frame referred to a ‘technical’ issue. The rest of the message differed depending
on what kind of benefit condition participants were allocated to. In the benefit-to-self
condition, the message stated ‘Problem reporting will help us identify the source of
the problem and protect you’. In the benefit-to-others condition, the message reported
‘Problem reporting will help us identify the source of the problem and protect you’.
No such message was presented to participants in the control condition. Each error
message ended with a question: ‘Do you want to report the problem? Report/Don’t
report’.
Overall, the error reporting tasks involved six experimental conditions based on a factorial
design (2*3). This included two cognitive framing conditions (security vs technical message
frame) and 3 implied benefit frames (implied benefit to self or others; control condition
without benefit statement). All participants were placed in one of these conditions, but all
would be asked to complete the two tasks. Allocation to the six conditions was randomized
and the error message was presented as part of the first task. The message appeared after the
third screenshot, just before the fourth (always the same screenshot for tripadvisor.com).
6.3.2 Participants
Recruitment involved a pool of university students situated from different departments
(social and natural sciences). Information regarding the task was circulated via email and
a dedicated university online recruitment portal. Students were highlighted as a relevant
sample in this study as they tend to use many different online services throughout daily
activities. In addition, they often rely on and make assumptions with respect to the security
of the university infrastructure and their publicly available open-access services [140]. This
may also make this group of students less informed with regards to the role and utility of error
reporting. As an incentive for participation, all participants could earn research credits for
their respective degree programmes. Participants were recruited between December 2014 and
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March 2015 totalling 147 by the end of this date. Studies that had not led to full completion
of the survey were excluded (n=19). This reduced the final dataset to n=126. Participants
were 18 to 36 years old (M=20.15, SD=2.79, n=125). The sample composed of 84% female
students (n=105, two missing values) and 16% males.
6.3.3 Procedure
Once participants had given their consent to participate they were presented with instructions
to rate the trustworthiness of four online travel sites. Each of the four screen shots were
presented separately with the first 3 being randomised. On the fourth screenshot, they
encountered an error message that gave them the choice to report or not report the error.
This was followed by a series of questions about their online use of travel sites, familiarity
and review activity of such sites. This was followed by a number of short personality
questionnaires. The questionnaire ended with demographics and the debrief statement about
the study.
6.3.4 Measures
The next section describes the different experimental conditions that were employed, the
screen-specific measures, and the follow-up questionnaire.
Screen measures: All four screenshots were presented individually. Each screen had to
be rated on trust, potential use of this site, and familiarity with site.
1. Trust: each of the sites were assessed using three questions from Lynch et al. ([155],
also used by Belanger et al [34]), an example of which is: ‘This website has a good
reputation’. The five response options ranged from (1) “strongly disagree” to (5)
“strongly agree.” The reliability for each site-specific trust measure was appropriate:
Trust 1 (M=3.73, SD=.69, α=.89); Trust 2 (M=3.32, SD=.69, α=.82); Trust 3 (M=3.26,
SD=.62, α=.819), Trust 4 (M=4.42, SD=.64, α=.89). All trust measures collected for
each of the four booking sites correlated to differences between one another. As such,
there was no evidence that trustworthiness was linked to any personality traits.
2. Use of and familiarity with the site: three questions on trustworthiness were followed
by two items measuring the user’s intent to use the site. The first item asked participants
‘How likely is it that you will use this site yourself?’ Response options ranged from (1)
“extremely low” to (5) “extremely high.” The second item asked: ‘Have you ever heard
of this site before?’ Response options included: Yes, (2) No, (3) Not sure.
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Follow-up questionnaire: The follow-up questionnaire included numerous questions with
respect to the participants’ engagement on the various travel sites, general error reporting,
short personality questionnaires, demographics and the debrief information. Unless otherwise
specified, all items in the personality measures were combined and divided to create a mean-
based composite that had the same response range as the original items. Skew and kurtosis
of the new scale composites were largely unremarkable and are hence not listed.
1. Review activity on sites: Participants were asked if they mainly read travel sites and/or
reviews or were typically contributors (reviewers) to travel sites. The answering options
included (1) “Yes” and (2) “No”. In our sample, none of the participants reported
reading travel sites. However, 103 participants stated that they reviewed travel sites.
2. General reporting tendency: All participants were prompted with respect to their
general error reporting tendency in the follow-up (two screens after the presentation of
the error message). They were asked: ‘When you are notified about a problem, would
you normally report it if prompted with a message?’ The answering options included
(1) “Yes” (n=43) and (2) “No” (n=82; 1 missing value). The next question was: ‘When
other people get notified, do you think they would report the problem’. The answering
options included (1) “Yes” (n=34) and (2) “No” (n=90; 2 missing values). Each of
these questions were followed up by the appropriate open question: ‘Please tell us why
you do (not)’ and ‘Please tell us why you think that others would (not) report problem’.
3. Impulsiveness: This was measured using five adapted items from the impulsiveness
subscale by Eysenck et al. [90]. An example item is: ‘I do things on the spur of
the moment’. We presented each item with five response options that captured the
frequency with which they engage in these behaviours and deliberations, ranging from
(1) “never” to (5) “always.” The fourth item was reverse-scored (M=2.76, SD=.64,
α=.76).
4. Risk-taking: This was assessed using three items from Dahlbaeck [68]. An example
item is ‘I take chances in various situations’. The answering options ranged from (1)
“strongly disagree” to (5) “strongly agree.” The third item was reverse-scored. Only
two (r=.538, p<.001) out of three items were used to create a composite as reliability
for the three item was low (M=2.87, SD=.84, α=.70).
5. Privacy concern: This was measured using five items. The first three items came from a
sub-scale by Dinev & Hart [80] which measured concern about abuse of personal data.
The fourth item was proposed by the authors and the fifth item was taken from the
perceived severity scale used in Workman et al [257] and Ifinedo [120]. An example
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of the fifth item is: ‘Having my confidential information accessed by someone without
my consent or knowledge is a serious concern for me’. The response options ranged
from (1) “strongly disagree” to (4) “strongly agree” (M=3.01, SD=.58, α=.85).
6. Security vulnerability: This was measured using four items copied from the perceived
vulnerability sub-scale used by Workman et al [257] and Ifinedo [120]. An exam-
ple item is ‘The likelihood that my information and data is vulnerable to security
breaches’. The response options ranged from (1) “extremely low” to (5) “extremely
high” (M=3.01, SD=.77, α=.83).
7. Reciprocity: Reciprocity was measured using three positive reciprocity items by
Perugini [180]. An example item is: ‘If someone does a favour for me, I am ready to
return it’. The responses ranged from (1) “very untrue” to (7) “very true” (M=3.47,
SD=2.04, α=.87).
8. Sociability: Sociability was assessed using four items from Zuckerman-Kuhlman-Aluja
Personality Questionnaire [16]. An example item is: ‘I have a rich social life’. The
response options ranged from (1) “strongly disagree” to (4) “agree strongly” (M=2.87,
SD=.698, α=.73).
Participants were also asked to report their age (including an option “prefer not to say”)
and their gender (including an option “prefer not to say”) in order to describe our sample in
later analyses.
6.4 Results
6.4.1 Allocation to Cognitive and Benefit Framing Conditions
With respect to framing, 65 participants received the technical framing and 61 participants
received the security framing. In terms of the implied benefit conditions, 41 participants
were in the benefit-to-self condition, 37 were in the benefit-to-others condition. The control
condition included 48 participants.
6.4.2 Error Reporting Across All Conditions
The main output variable of interest was whether or not participants chose to report the
problem when prompted with the error message, with respect to the benefit and framing
condition they were allocated to. Seventy-three participants (57.9%) did not report the error.
However, 53 individuals did (42.1%).
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Error Reporting (n=125)
Don’t Report (n=73) Report (n=53)
Implied Benefit to self to other none to self to other none
(n=10) (n=22) (n=41) (n=31) (n=15) (n=7)
Cognitive Technical (n=65) 0(0%) 11 (16.9%) 19 (29.2%) 24 (36.9%) 6 (9.2%) 5 (7.7%)
framing Security (n=60) 10 (15%) 11 (18.3%) 22 (36.7%) 7 (11.7%) 9 (15.0%) 2 (3.3%)
Table 6.1 Error Reporting Across All Conditions (Framing & Implied Benefit)
6.4.3 Cognitive Framing Effect on Error Reporting (Hypothesis 1)
Security Vs Technical
The x2 statistic was used to examine whether being placed in specific conditions (framing
and benefit) increased or decreased error reporting.
The first hypothesis predicted that the frequency with which individuals report the
error would be higher when the message framed the problem as a security issue, rather
than a technical issue. A significant difference was observed in terms of error reporting
(x2(1)=7.649, p=.006). Error reporting was higher when the problem was framed as a
technical issue (obs/exp=35/27.3) rather than security issue (obs/exp. 18/25.7). The Phi
statistics (Phi=-.246) also indicate that there is a moderately strong relationship between
framing and error responses. Error reporting was lower when the problem message suggested
a security issue. Hypothesis 1 was therefore not supported (see Table 6.2).
Condition Counts Don’t Report Report
Technical Observed 30 (46.3%) 35 (53.8%)
Expected 37.7 27.3
Security Observed 43 (70.5%) 18 (29.5%)
Expected 35.3 25.7
Table 6.2 Frequency of Error Reporting for Both Framing Conditions
6.4.4 Benefit Framing Effect on Error Reporting (Hypothesis 2)
Implied Vs None
The second hypothesis predicted that the frequency with which individuals report a
problem is higher when problem reporting has a benefit to self (benefit effect). A significant
differences was observed (x2(2)=33.842, p<.001). Error reporting was higher when a benefit
was implied, particularly a benefit to self (obs/exp. 31/17.2). In the absence of such a
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statement, error reporting was much lower (obs/exp. 7/20.2; see Table 3). The Cramer’s V
statistics (Cramer’s V=.518) also indicate that there is a strong relationship between message
contents and error responses. This provides support for hypothesis 2.
Condition Counts Don’t Report Report
Benefit to Self Observed 10 (24.4%) 31 (75.6%)
Expected 23.8 17.2
Benefit to Other Observed 22 (59.5%) 15 (40.5%)
Expected 21.4 15.6
Control Observed 41 (85.4%) 7 (14.5%)
Expected 27.8 20.2
Table 6.3 Error Reporting Across Different Benefit Conditions
6.4.5 Individual Differences and Error Reporting (Hypothesis 3)
Several personality measures were correlated with each other (see Table 6.2). Impulsivity cor-
related with risk-taking (r=.611, p<.01), sociability (r=.181, p<.05) and norms of reciprocity
(r=.187, p<.05). Sociability also correlated with risk-taking (r=.294, p<.01) and norms of
reciprocity (r=.184, p<.05). Privacy concerns correlated with perceived security vulnerability
(r=.424, p<.01).
Hypothesis 3 proposed that error reporting was lower amongst individuals who score
higher on impulsiveness and risk-taking. ANCOVA was used to examine this group difference
in error reporting, also controlling for potential covariates such as gender, age, and general
problem reporting tendency of participants (q3) and their perception of other people’s error re-
porting (q4). No significant results were obtained for impulsivity (F(1,117)=.161, p=.689) or
risk-taking (F(1,117)=.030, p=.863). Further analyses with privacy concern (F(1,117)=.727,
p=.395), security vulnerability (F(1,117)=1.143, p=.287), sociability (F(1,117)=.146, p=.703)
and reciprocity (F(1,117)=.621, p=.432) rendered similar non-significant results. Hypothesis
3 was therefore not supported.
6.4.6 Qualitative Analysis of General Error Reporting (Exploratory
Analysis)
Of the 126 participants, 43 said they would report errors in general whilst 82 said they would
not (1 missing response). In order to explore this further, it was necessary to examine the
qualitative comments participants made with respect to what motivates their error reporting
practices. Comments were available from 121 of 126 participants. These comments were
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collected to explore why participants would and would not typically report errors. Several
different themes emerged.
The reporting of errors may have been influenced by a variety of factors. The reporting
appears to be subject to the extent to which participants sensed a potential threat (fear
appraisal), or lack thereof. The first group of participants actually felt that the error message
represented a threat (as an indicator of a Trojan or virus). Participants reported, for example,
that they do not report errors because: “I always feel like the message is a virus rather
than an actual warning;” “[it] could be a virus;” and “in case it’s a scam or a virus". The
second group of participants did not perceive a threat and hence decided not to report an error
citing reasons such as; “I have anti-virus software.” The third group of participants accepted
the error message as they determined that it informed them about a legitimate threat, thus
complying with the request to report the errors.
Another factor was the perceived efficacy of responding to the threat (including the
benefit of response). Those who did not report the error message suggested that this would
have negligible or no significant benefits to one’s self or others. Several commented that it
would be “time consuming". A few additional quotes from participants who do not report
errors reflect their logic for not doing so: “don’t really think that it is important, but of a time
effort”. Not reporting errors may also be linked to uncertainty. For example, two participants
reported that they were “not sure how it works” and “because I don’t know what it means or
what it is". In addition, some participants believed action would not lead to an improvement
(“when reporting incidents in the past nothing has happened”). Another group of participants
did not comply because they expressed a lack of information. That is, they may not have
been knowledgeable enough to know what is required of them or where the information
would end up. This is shown in citations such as “because I don’t know what it means or
where it goes". The third group of participants recognized the importance of error reporting
not just for themselves, but others, leading them to comply with such error request generally:
“To hopefully draw attention to the problem and ensure it is more likely to be fixed"; “to
bring the problem to the attention of the website administrator so they can sort it out faster";
“to try and stop it from happening from again"; “because it may improve future services";
and to “improve site.”
A third factor concerns the potential costs associated with error reporting (e.g., in terms
of productivity costs incurred due to error reporting). Individuals who did not report errors
were particularly attentive to the potential costs associated with reporting errors (including
the time and effort involved). For example, one participant stated “makes it go away quicker
if I say no". In addition, participants reported that “I just want to continue doing what I was
previously and did not want to report an error because of the potential for disruption that may
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result in terms of “time and redirection". Participants who decided to comply with the error
requests did not comment on the immediate cost to themselves, only recognizing that the
error “needed telling” and that reporting it will ensure “it can be fixed” and “to ensure it is
solved.”
6.5 Discussion
Perceived redundancy and the lack of personal relevance of individual contributions are
important work characteristics known to increase the social loafing of individuals in larger
groups [138], [139]. Applying this knowledge to the user on a far grander scale, the current
study aimed to use some of these social psychological findings to promote error reporting
by avoiding perceptions of redundancy that many users experience and subsequently report
when encountering such error requests. The next session summarizes our results and relates
these findings to the existing literature.
Our first hypothesis examined whether or not the cognitive framing of an error message
influenced error reporting in the current study. In contrast to our predictions, error reporting
was significantly higher when participants were presented with a technical, but not security,
framed error message. The difference may be attributed to several different factors. The first
explanation relates to concerns that participants may have had when the error is security-
related. Participants may be more likely to opt against reporting such an error as the label
‘security’ may imply potentially punitive or other unknown serious consequences [137]. This
may evoke protection motivation that discourages compliance with such error requests [113].
In addition, a security framing may raise concerns about perceived control over what
is implied. If individuals feel they are not in control over the consequences, they may not
engage in error reporting behaviour [15]. In essence, the issue may be perceived as less
manageable by the users themselves. This may explain why these participants were more
likely to decide for inaction (not reporting the error). A third and related explanation concerns
the lack of knowledge and experience as a motivation for inaction. Whether or not users
understand and know what to do can also influence their interactions with a system [160].
This may discourage error reporting.
The second hypothesis addressed the lack of meaningfulness. The hypothesis proposed
that when the message implies some purpose (specifically, the benefit of reporting), par-
ticipants would also feel inclined to report the error message presented in our study. This
hypothesis was supported. Error reporting frequencies were higher when the message implied
a benefit to self, followed by a benefit to others. Error reporting frequencies were lowest
when no information was provided. Since this control condition also represents the default in
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the majority of messages users will encounter, the results provide evidence for the role of
meaningfulness in what a user is expected to do. By reducing redundancy of effort, the error
reporting frequency was significantly increased. When considering both factors (framing
and benefit) in combination, the results further indicated that both labelling of messages
and the type of implied benefit could increase error reporting. Error reporting was highest
when the error was technical as well as implied as a benefit to self. These results suggest that
the combination of factors led to highest reporting rate; in line with protection motivation
[113]. The findings also speak to the importance of providing information to the user about
why certain actions are required rather than relying on uninformative requests, similar to the
messages presented to the control groups in our study [173].
The third hypotheses considered the possibility that error reporting was a function of
specific personality traits. In this study, the main traits of interest were risk-taking and
impulsiveness. The suggestion for testing these was based on the fact that the continued
rejection of errors may indicate (a) poor self-efficacy to deal with such challenges, or (b) an
attitude towards ignoring risks and not considering the long-term consequences of ignoring
such errors. There was no significant evidence that error reporting in any of the conditions
(control or implied benefit) were impacted. Further analysis with other traits (such as
sociability, privacy concern, security vulnerability, sociability or reciprocity) played no
significant role in error reporting.
Exploratory analysis focused on the extent to which generic error reporting may indicate
specific motives that encourage or discourage error reporting. This analysis involved the
review of open response options and the coding of all reported rationales. The main themes
that emerged included fear appraisals, response efficacy and productivity costs. These
findings link to existing literature within the field.
6.5.1 Practical implications
The problem of low error reporting is not just specific to HCI, it is also a concern in other
domains. For example, a wrong delivery will often lead to the customer not obtaining his
or her product. However, many customers are reluctant to complain about delivery service
[265], particularly when they have an existing relationship with the provider that they wish
to maintain in the future.
The current findings may have several practical implications. First, users will not blankly
respond to system messages, an observation that may require some revision of the guidelines
outlined by Nurse et al. [173] on how to support usable cybersecurity. These authors proposed
that cybersecurity functionality should accommodate all types of users. At present, many
error and system messages are standardized, without taking into account the knowledge or
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availability of the user to report an error. Another important guideline related specifically
to ‘error prevention, handling and recovery/Undo’. In order to accommodate all users
more effectively and support their decision-making, it may be important to reconsider what
information is and isn’t shared with novice users to support them more effectively. The
current study suggests that the content of the error message can play a critical role in the
reporting likelihood. This is in line with work that explored how risk salience on interfaces
can help increase the attention of users to the message [42]. Further research may wish to
explore if providing more information (and hence increasing the meaningfulness of error
reports) will effectively increase reporting amongst novice and expert users in a similar
fashion as observed in the current study.
Second, concerns about the information that is transmitted with an error message may
be an important barrier when practitioners try to increase error reporting in various settings.
This is in line with current evidence that states: when a system also requires identifying
information, users of this system are often reluctant to use it to report errors [141]. In order
to overcome this apprehension, IT professionals may wish to encourage in-person error
reporting (e.g., via the phone or in person). This gives employees the option to report an
issue without necessarily responding to a system message themselves. This approach may
also make IT departments aware of any issues that may indicated malicious or unauthorized
pop-ups due to some virus or Trojan on the computer of the user.
Third, error reporting represents a situation with minimal or unknown ‘return on invest-
ment’, interpreted as the time the users spends on reporting errors. This situation may only
be reversed when the users also receives some feedback; or systems and programs at least
acknowledge that errors have been detected, reported and subsequently fixed (e.g., when
updates are triggered). This suggestion is based on work from Holden and Karsh [117]. They
argued that error reporting will only be perceived as useful when the data is also used in
system improvement and the reporters are made aware that it was their feedback that led to
these improvements. In addition, habitual responding may be reduced if error messages are
less uniformly and frequently presented, but occur at specific intervals.
6.5.2 Limitations and suggestions for future research
Several small issues arise, some of which may also be addressed in future research. It is our
assertion that the error message was perceived as legitimate. However, this was not assessed
in the follow-up. In addition, it is not clear as to why the personality characteristics did not
relate to error reporting. It is possible that decision-making ‘in the moment’ (as in the case of
error reporting) may not reflect personality but instead situational demands. These findings
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point to several future research avenues that may build on the current study but also address
some of the remaining research gaps.
Firstly, future research may wish to consider how apprehension about what information
is shared influences error reporting. For example, the use of punitive responses to error
reporting may essentially thwart voluntary reporting [117]. While no evidence was obtained
in this study that privacy concerns and security vulnerabilities related to error reporting, these
variables may not capture other variables. Research by Maner and Gerend [158] may provide
an explanation for this. They propose that motivational orientation associated with approach
and avoidance may also influence individual judgements of whether or not a decision will
lead to positive and negative outcomes. While the analysis of the qualitative responses in
the current study provides some starting points in this direction, future research may wish to
consider avoidance and approach orientation in relation to error requests as well.
Secondly, how are errors managed across different disciplines and occupations? Are they
anonymous to engender trust into the reporting process [30]? What are the consequences?
Finally, to what extent does the perceived severity of a problem feature in the decision to
report an error [137]? For example, it is not clear how occupational practices shape tolerance
for errors and influence error reporting practices. For instance, different professions have
error management processes that may also shape how individuals view and respond to error
messages [240]. Certain professions, such as those in the medical realm, have both voluntary
and mandatory reporting schemes [137], [117]. This means there may also be lessons to be
learned from other disciplines. By extension, what kinds of person versus system reporting
systems are most effective and supported by users? Is it easier to avoid error reporting on a
system than in everyday interactions (such as staff meetings that include system or patient
reports)?
Lastly, what kinds of errors are encountered, how often and by whom? The study’s results
propose that how error requests are labelled (in this case, either as technical and security
issues) plays a key role in shaping reporting. The group difference was explained in relation
to the potential lack of control that participants may have felt when facing a ‘security issue’.
Future research may wish to examine the role of stating the benefits to others or self, and
address the response efficacy and costs associated with error reporting.
6.6 Chapter Contributions
This chapter represents further investigation with respect to user behaviours and nudge
interventions, specifically regarding the reporting of errors. This behaviour was highlighted as
an area of significant interest and importance from both our pilot study and CISO interactions.
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Within, we have conducted a review of the relevant literatures and utilised these findings to
produce and conduct a bespoke investigation to highlight the behaviours that affect error-
reporting likelihood; specifically, the role of social loafing and social norms.
The outcome of our work has highlighted important behaviour characteristics of users
which has enabled a more detailed assessment of security behaviours and practices. Several
of our results compliment the findings from our literature review aiding both the validity
of our work, and extending the applicability of previous studies within security behaviour
analysis. Furthermore, we have highlighted several important behaviour traits that are specific
to the realms of error-reporting, providing valuable insight with respect to the modification
of user behaviours through nudge interventions. From a CISO perspective, we are ultimately
more aware of the users within our environment with respect to current behaviours and
practices, and are able to identify how to improve the likelihood of error-reporting. This
helps to promote a more secure environment where users are actively contributing to the
process, and are fully aware of why they are doing it with respect to the greater benefits it
provides to both themselves and others. Further benefits are witnessed with respect to our
methodology and modelling approach as we are able to better articulate our problem space
with respect to user behaviours and actions. With this knowledge, we are able to create and
deploy tested interventions that shift users towards being compliant, and thus more likely, to
report errors.
Chapter 7
Business Process Modelling Notation
The previous chapter detailed the investigation of two user behaviours; error reporting and
cookie acceptance ([127], [128]). Both of these findings, along with chapter 4 ([231]),
present methodologies for the testing of user behaviour interventions and allow for a better
understanding of the problem space and the users who operate within. Improving our
understanding of user behaviours and practices is an important process of aiding the policy
decision making process.
This chapter introduces the Business Process Modelling Notation 2.0 (BPMN) formalism
and discusses its applicability with respect to our problem space. This chapter represents the
modelling phase of our model-based methodology as depicted in figure 3.1.
Through the utilisation of BPMN and the knowledge obtained in previous chapters
pertaining to the increased understanding of user behaviours, we are able to more accurately
model our threat environment and determine potential risk areas related to user practices.
BPMN allows for an abstract modelling of this process in an effort to provide the visual
representation of tasks with the goal of optimising throughput and maximizing performance
(the efficiency of a user to complete a given task). Within, we utilise BPMN to focus on a case
study related to thrombolysis (see Nesbitt & Turland [69]) and the subsequent optimisation
of patient throughput (specifically reducing the waiting time of patients that require urgent
medical attention). We use the BPMN formalism as a decision support tool and through this
process we identify, propose and implement six new notations to the BPMN 2.0 specification.
These notations are then applied to the policy decision making process with respect to
our methodology in chapter 3 and build upon the knowledge obtained through previous
chapters relating to better understanding user behaviours. Ultimately, through improving
the expressiveness of the formalism via new notations we aid the modeller within decision
making process.
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The remainder of this chapter is as follows: section 7.1 introduces the BPMN formalism
and discusses its purpose and goals. Section 7.2 documents other work regarding extending
the formalism. Section 7.3 introduces the case study and its applicability. Section 7.4
discusses the proposed additions to the formalism with respect to the case study. Section 7.5
discusses the impact, limitations and future work.
This chapter includes discussions and experimental design detailed in Nesbitt & Turland
[69] and includes collaborative work declared within the ‘Publications’.
7.0.1 Chapter Contributions
This chapter adds to the BPMN 2.0 formalism by proposing further extensions in the form of
new notations. These notations represent new model nodes and transitional visualisations
that aid with the shared decision making process under the umbrella of enhanced tool support.
The additions specifically aid in the expressiveness of the formalism by introducing further
visualisation elements that provide further contextual information to the decision maker.
7.1 Introduction
The Decision Making Process is complex and features a high degree of uncertainty. This
complexity is furthered when the decision making scenario involves human actors who
perform unknown behaviours, practices and processes. As discussed within chapter 2, human
actors make decisions based on a plethora of variables that are further masked by influence
and interpretation (the method in which they may be presented) as well as personal preference.
In shared decision making the effect is multiplied as additional parties have an impact on the
overall decision output. The challenge therefore, is to attribute these variables to a modelling
environment to effectively reflect the intricacy of the problem space.
BPMN 2.0 provides a robust environment in which to model such an environment. Using
a graphical formalism such as this to provide a visual representation is highly beneficial to
the overall decision making process. The adoption allows for a party to design and coordinate
the sequence of processes and messages that flow between participants (and interdependent
systems) of different activities [252].
Decision making activities are represented within BPMN via the use of ‘gateways’,
and are used to define the node traversal within the model following a successful decision
outcome. As such, a gateway can be interpreted as a decision point with the outcome of
the decision impacting upon the next successive node. This symbiotic definition promotes
the need for the collection of ethnographic data relating to the users and their environment
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(methods for obtaining such information can be seen in chapters 4, 5). This is complimented
by a ‘rich set of flow and connecting objects’ which enables the modeller to create bespoke,
user-centric representations of the problem space [191]. These factors combine to create
an effective method for aggregating processes where macro-level observations are required
(typically large organisations or populations such as a university or hospital).
Our extensions to the formalism are expressed through the Unified Modelling Language
(UML) in the form of new node symbols similar to Stroppi et al [217]. Specifically, we
utilise XML to define the problem space both graphically and programmatically and attribute
contextual information (both human and environmental) in this fashion. Once defined, we
apply these to real-world scenarios highlighting the benefits of our proposals. In addition, we
evaluate how technology from a Computing Science approach can use contextual information
captured within our model to aid the decision making policy. This involves an assessment of
devices (hardware) and their applicability for a given scenario. We have coined this extension
BPMN for decision making, or BPMNdm.
The need for such an approach is justified and supported by both literature and empirical
industrial observations. In the medical profession alone, the use of decision making tools
is commonplace and can be seen through software installed on computers, manually via
whiteboards, and increasingly on mobile devices such as tablets and smartphones (health
applications etc). Each platform has attributes which make it more suited to a particular case.
We aim to identify these strength and weaknesses and discuss how they can be adopted for
specific scenarios.
The goal of this work is to extend the BPMN formalism and to enable BPMNdm the
flexibility and scalability to more accurately define and support the decision making process.
Given the inter-disciplinary nature of the problem space and the collaborative decision
making process this extension provides an effective method of increasing expressiveness and
encapsulating the multitude of aspects that are necessary in formulating a solution.
7.2 Related Work
Numerous studies adopt the BPMN formalism because of its adaptability and flexibility in
a wide range of scenarios. Specifically, the ability to extend the existing set of notations is
appealing as it allows bespoke expressions of unique problem spaces. It enables designers
to compliment the existing notation set with additional nodes that suit specific domains as
detailed in [41], [96], and [62], making BPMN a natural selection for our problem space.
Modelling the decision making space is not a new phenomenon [35], however, the need
for Computing Scientists to adopt strategies that fully understand the user requirements
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and issues related to non-compliance is comparatively recent (see chapter 2) and moreover,
necessary with respect to policy decision making (see chapter 3).
The decision making process has been described as a cyclical loop [116] where the aims
of a particular venture enter into an iterative state.
Fig. 7.1 Diagram of decision-making activities [69]
Figure 7.1 highlights the transitions between ‘decisions’ and ‘communication’. Within
this, we define decisions as agreements or disagreements with specific points amongst party
members. Communication is argued to be far more complex [116] involving mental processes
such as analysis, information generation and exchange, incorporation of contextual factors
related to the meeting environment and task, visibility and availability of information, and
the roles of particular individuals within the decision making space.
This assessment and conceptualisation of the problem space aids greatly towards address-
ing many of the psychological phenomena outlined in Groupthink [125]. As highlighted, the
main concepts of Groupthink which promote failures in decision making are:
• Decision is limited to a narrow range of alternatives.
• Groups do not survey the objectives that need to fulfilled.
• Groups fail to evaluate the non-obvious risks and issues with their choice.
• Groups do not re-evaluate approaches that were previously rejected.
• The group does not consult experts in the field.
• Selective bias - decisions are made based on external influences.
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• Members fail to sufficiently discuss how to overcome bureaucratic blocks and other
forms of institutional inertia.
This knowledge can be applied to the method in which we govern tool support, specifically,
how we utilise technology in our decision making process. We need to support and adopt
technologies that combat Groupthink and actively aid the group decision making process
[39], [76].
Other examples of BPMN extension include Herbert & Sharpe [114], where the formalism
was applied to multiple decision criteria such as cost and technical quality. Their work
developed a limited formalised variant of BPMN that extended support towards simple
probabilistic branching and rewards. Planning Support Systems (PSS) have also witnessed a
similar approach in Campagna et al [49] where the authors claim that it is simple to adapt the
BPMN formalism to aid with designing PSS. Bahrani et al [25] similarly adopt BPMN in
their work focusing on short-term operational decision making in healthcare, reporting that
the model aids the maker with more accurate and timely decisions.
7.3 Case Study and Worked Example
The following four activities provide real-life decision making scenarios that help to exem-
plify the benefits of our notation changes. The principle example in this work is the treatment
of thrombolytic stroke patients as this process involves high-risk, multi-person decision
making which highlights effectively the applicability of our contributions.
Three other smaller-scale examples are also documented utilising some of the proposed
notations.
Thrombolytic Stroke Treatment
In a clinical environment, shared decision making is increasingly considered good practice. In
this context we define shared decision making as the interaction between medical practitioner
and patient (the sharing of medical information and even particular faiths, beliefs or practices
related to treatment). In essence, the medical staff will provide the medical knowledge for
the process, and the patient will give their preferences. This new approach to care replaces
the traditional more paternalistic role of the clinician and patient where many of the decisions
were solely conducted without the patient’s input [88].
The following scenario is taken verbatim from Nesbitt & Turland [69]:
‘John (67 years old) was admitted to hospital with a suspected stroke. His wife, Sheila
attended with him. During the initial assessment phase, the A+E consultant asked Sheila the
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approximate time at which John began to exhibit the signs of a stroke. John was asked if
had taken either Clopodogrel or Aspirin recently and if he was receiving any hypertensive
treatment. Following these questions, the consultant looks at the patient’s medical records
for indications of a previous cerebravascular event or a history of diabetes. At this stage,
the consultant can ascertain whether the patient is a candidate for thrombolysis. In the
meantime, an A+E nurse has recorded John’s systolic blood pressure, his blood glucose value,
approximate weight and has performed a National Institutes of Health Stroke Scale (NIHSS)
assessment on him. Finally, John has a CT scan to look for evidence of infarctions in his
brain. At this point, John’s indicators meet the licensing criteria for thrombolysis. Since
his stroke is moderate, the treatment has the greatest net benefit compared to non-treatment.
With this in mind, the consultant asks Sheila for consent for treatment, explaining what her
husband has and discussing thrombolytic treatment. The consultant states that out of 100
patients like John, approximately 33 extra patients would make a successful recovery with
thrombolysis than without it. However, there is a small risk of a brain haemorrhage that
could result in death or serious injury. After some discussion, Sheila asks what the consultant
would recommend; the consultant recommends treatment. Sheila signs the consent form and
the drug is administered’.
With this scenario the BPMN formalism can aid considerably in modelling the problem
space and mapping the decision points. For example, whether or not to proceed with further
decision making if the patient does not fit within the licensing criteria. With any tool, however,
design is critical (see HCI in chapter 2.4, 4).
Security Policy
Security policies are often governed by fixed budgeting and resource allocation. Relating
specifically to a university environment and the transferral of data (see chapter 3), our
notations enable a better understanding of these finite variables through graphical and
programmatical representation. The impact of this is to suggest new tools and technologies
that may or may not be available at a given instance related to a particular resource (for
example, with cost - less expensive options are available once a certain budget constraint is
exceeded, with time - more efficient processes are highlighted for optimisation purposes).
Security Policy - with Tools
The use of tools in this scenario would allow for automatic allocation of node traversal based
on set criteria and bounds within the model.
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Cardiovascular Disease Risk Reduction
‘A GP is using their practice’s EMIS (Egton Medical Information Systems) computer system
(a database that stores a practice’s patient records) to check patient records. In this scenario,
EMIS will flag patients who are at high risk of cardiovascular disease (such as stroke or heart
attack). The GP will invite each patient flagged at risk for a discussion on reducing their risk.
This is achieved using a tool called CVdecide that displays risk presentations in the form
of a Pictograph, showing risk of disease based on such factors as the patient’s weight and
smoking status. Based on these factors, both GP and Patient will discuss a plan for reducing
the patient’s cardiovascular risk’ [69].
With the above scenario, a consent point could be added to the BPMN model indicating
the goals that have been agreed by both parties.
The following table (7.1) summaries these scenarios and relates specifically to the
application of the new notations detailing their salient features.
Feature CVD MBA Security Stroke Comparable BPMN construct
Cost † * none
Time * * * Time start event only
Multi-person * * * * Swimlanes
Confidentiality * * * none
High risk * * none
Information capture * * * * Data object
Private * * * * none
Defined goals * * * * none
Output information * * * * Data object
Share documents * * none
Workflow data * * * * none
Scope data * * * * none
†In the context of the scenarios, cost is defined as a scalar values that is given to a financial, effort or other quantifiable variable.
Table 7.1 Summary of salient decision making activities in each of the examples [69]
The table documents important similarities between the applications, notably that all
scenarios generate their own data (risk presentation, policy document etc.) and can defined
on an aggregate level by the existing data object constructs. In addition, the actors from each
scenario conform to the swim-lane constructs already defined within the BPMN specification
along with information flows denoted by arrows.
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Workflow data is defined as ‘data that is accessible to the entire group’ [69]. Scope
data can be considered as ‘any kind of data that is private to an individual or a subset of
individuals’ [69]. The existing BPMN formalism includes document elements that can be
adapted to encapsulate these details.
The remaining contributions have no similar definitions within the existing BPMN
formalism. The next section details their features and implementation.
7.4 Extending the Formalism
When modelling a decision making process we must first consider how we are going to
capture and represent a plethora of environmental and contextual data sets, and second
determine the constructs that define how the model will simulate real-life decisions. These
requirements apply to both the environment in which the scenario is based, as well as each
individual task and sub-task within the model. To enable this we utilise a BPMN management
suite (jBPMN) that enables us to ‘store information by applying the principles of composite
types as seen in programming languages by providing data structures to all of the BPMN
objects’ [69].
By adopting jBPMN and providing the definitions to our notation extensions, we have
enabled developers the ability to ‘freely extend a given BPMN object’ [69] allowing data
storage within the object. Using this platform, modellers will be able to store and access
‘strongly typed variables, such as Ints, Strings, Booleans’ simply through basic BPMN XML
and Java class instances allowing on-the-fly manipulation and declaration [69].
A pseudo code representation of this process and connections can be visualised in table
7.2.
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Example code Description
{Object Name}.all Returns all items in the named object
{Object Name}.age Returns the item “Age” from the named
object
{Object Name}[0] Returns an item located at the named ob-
ject’s array index 0.
{Object Name}.size Returns the number of items a named ob-
ject stores.
{Object Name}.has(item) Returns TRUE if an object has an item
that corresponds to the parameter, returns
FALSE otherwise.
Table 7.2 Summary of BPMNdm Object Notation [69]
To exemplify table 7.2 let us consider figure 7.2.
Fig. 7.2 Illustration of License Criteria document and Check sustainability task [69]
Observing figure 7.2 we see that the data object ‘Licensing Criteria’ contains an array of
integers that relate specifically to the maximum permitted patient statistics for thrombolytic
treatment (age, time, etc.). The blue box labelled ‘Check Suitability’ denotes a condition that
checks whether the patient’s values are lower than that of the specified Licensing Criteria.
Individual values can be checked by providing the name of the object in square brackets
[example] and performing an array search similar to many other programming languages.
As seen in figure 7.2 explicitly, the .all method can be called to check all criteria within the
array.
Traditional BPMN gateways are preserved in our notation change, but receive enhanced
features. We extend the expressiveness of the gateway to incorporate common programming
statements such as IF/ELSE/ELSE-IF (Fig 7.3). This allows us to specify triggers that
determine model traversal and defines explicit pathways.
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Fig. 7.3 Gateways and Underlying Statements [69]
With specific reference to figure 7.3, we can see that the ‘Check Suitability’ process
returns a boolean object. The boolean value is returned subject to a checking condition and
the subsequent path (whether or not the patient is suitable) is determined. This process uses a
simple XML schema and is easily adjustable by the modeller allowing for specific scenarios
to be depicted within the node. This allows for extensions and further additions to be made
as the modeller becomes more informed with respect to the target environment and/or users.
The iterative nature of our overall methodology (see chapter 3) compliments this approach.
7.4.1 Proposed Notation Changes
The following sub-sections denote the proposed notation changes with respect to their purpose
and scenario applicability (see table 7.1). Of the six extensions listed in order, Daniel Nesbitt
[69] is responsible for Workflow Data, Scope Data, and Decision Points (listed first), I
claim no ownership. They are defined with respect to their sub-heading and are included
for the overall validity and expressiveness they provide. All other notations and subsequent
evaluations are my own work.
Within our proposal, ‘Workflow Data’ and ‘Scope Data’ form the basis of our data
representation and data flow. For decision-making , this relates to both the physical (i.e.
a hand written piece of information) and the virtual/mental (anything that is stored and
visualised electronically) data. The summation of this can be seen in table 7.3.
Workflow data
As stated, this extension definition is the work of Daniel Nesbitt [69]. It is included to aid
the overall validity of our approach and is taken verbatim from Nesbitt & Turland [69]. The
sub-heading ‘Information Security Applicability’ is my own work.
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Proposed BPM-
Ndm construct
Description Implements miss-
ing feature(s) (see
Table 7.1)
Cost Swimlane Modified Swimlane that represent in-
creasing, or decreasing cost on a scale
with child nodes
Cost
Time Swimlane Modified swimlane that represent in-
creasing, or decreasing time on a scale
with child nodes
Time
Scoped and Work-
flow data objects
Scoped Data objects are owned by a
actor, and not visible to other actors
unless shared. Workflow data objects
are accessible to all users
Confidentiality, Pri-
vate data, Sharing
documents
Weighted Paths Weighted paths represent the predeter-
mined preference of a outgoing edge.
Defined goals
Table 7.3 Summary of BPMNdm Formalism [69]
Russel et al. define workflow data as: ‘Data elements that are supported with and are
accessible to all components in each and every case of the workflow’ [197]. In decision
making contexts, workflow data can be considered public data that is accessible to many/all
in the decision making environment. Examples of this include documents that are shared
between participants or files on a server that are accessible to all users. BPMN does not
support the representation of workflow data [238]. In the context of decision making, using
the BPNM data object, workflow data could be represented by data objects that are not
explicitly connected to any other object and are outside of any swim lane or similar construct.
Figure 7.4 illustrates the concept of workflow data (Risk Presentation) seen alongside
Scope data (Pateint stats/history and Persons characteristics). The definition of workflow
data follows Russel et al’s definition with all given tasks and processes having access to the
object.
Information Security Applicability
In a typical IS setting, the ‘workflow data’ extension would represent data that is accessible
globally. For instance, this may include the company e-mail directory that houses all
employee e-mail addresses. On a smaller scale, this could be visualised in collaborative work
such as a data repository that is available to all parties (e.g. shared Dropbox). The mapping
of such data is important in reference to its availability. As more users have access to the
document or repository, a more closely monitored access management system is required.
This will no doubt scale as data sensitivity and the number of users who have access increases.
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Fig. 7.4 Workflow data object (Risk presentation) and Scope data objects (Patient
stats./history, Person’s characteristics) [69]
The main advantage of introducing this expression is the ability to monitor assets.
Through an assessment of risk and data value (detailed in chapter 2) one can attribute
value to the asset as well as its perceived risk. Visualising access with respect to the parties
who have access rights is an effective method for understanding and evaluating the threat
environment. Modelling and simulation can address how manipulation of these rights, or the
access mechanism utilised in order to gain access, reduce the risk posed to the organisation.
Such investigation benefits from an improved understanding of the user base and ultimately
aids the decision making process through a more accurate assessment of the problem space.
Scope data
As stated, this extension definition is the work of Daniel Nesbitt [69]. It is included to aid
the overall validity of our approach and is taken verbatim from Nesbitt & Turland [69]. The
sub-heading ‘Information Security Applicability’ is my own work.
Scope data is defined as ‘Data elements [that] can be defined which are accessible by a
subset of the tasks in a case’ [197]. Scope data is useful in a decision-making context as this
notion can be used to account for private artefacts that a user or group possesses. Private
artefacts could be defined as anything that holds information, such as an address book, report
or anything else that can be considered private to a user or group. BPMN does not support
scope data [238]. In order to visualise scope data, data objects must be placed in swim lanes
or visually grouped with objects in order to imply where the object belongs.
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Fig. 7.5 Scope data object [69]
Figure 7.5 illustrates the use of scope data and how it can be passed from one subset
to another. In the example, “Patient Stats/History” and “Persons characteristics” are data
objects that belong to two actors, a Patient and a Family Member respectively. Scope data is
only visible to the actor or group it belongs to unless the object is passed to another process
as part of a flow. An example of this is the consultation process between a clinician, patient
and the family member, which involves discussing the patient’s characteristics as well as
adjusting the course of the consultation to minimise distress to the patient and family member
by the clinician judging the emotional states of both of the other actors. Unless the object
is explicitly duplicated by the clinician (i.e. writing down the necessary information), the
clinician will retain the object for the length of the task it is assigned to, only after which it is
assumed it is passed back to the sender process or destroyed.
The metamodel for Scoped and Workflow data is provided in 7.6.
Information Security Applicability
The use of scope data can be applied to our example in a number of ways. As scope data
determines who the data belongs to, and moreover, who has access to it, there are many
similarities with BYOD. This is increasingly relevant when dealing with data that is stored
on a BYOD. As described in chapters 3 and 4 the role of device and data ownership greatly
impacts the decision making process, similarly to location familiarity with respect to network
selection. This impacts future security decisions and a modification of these factors can
greatly enhance the security of the environment. Providing a visual tool for the assessment
and representation of this is highly beneficial and allows future policies to more accurately
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Fig. 7.6 Metamodel for Scoped and Workflow data [69]
target specific vulnerabilities. Such an approach could allow policies to nudge users towards
more secure alternatives. The likelihood that these nudges are effective is increased through
better expression of the target users and their environment.
From a modeller’s perspective, the policy decision making process is enhanced as the
practitioner is able to understand how the ownership of the data and the device impact
user decisions (and subsequent node traversal). Omissions can be rectified through repeat
investigation, obtaining a better understanding of how this effects the outcomes of security
decisions. Being able to model potential conflicts and offer conflict resolution boosts the
productivity and security of the environment through enhanced optimisation.
The movement of data and its subsequent access can also be modelled with areas of
potential risk highlighted. The parties who have access to the data can be visually represented,
as well as the fashion in which they do so. Once identified, it is possible to produce bespoke
solutions and test them within the modelling environment until the desired level of access is
met.
Decision points
As stated, this extension definition is the work of Daniel Nesbitt [69]. It is included to aid
the overall validity of our approach and is taken verbatim from Nesbitt & Turland [69]. The
sub-heading ‘Information Security Applicability’ is my own work.
Decision points (denoted by the use of hatched squares, typically used for grouping tasks
in contemporary BPMN) are used to explicitly indicate the portions of a BPMNdm model
7.4 Extending the Formalism 167
Fig. 7.7 Decision point [69]
at the point where a decision is being made as well as the critical tasks and documents that
leads to this decision. With respect to tool support, this is useful as it provides a visual
cue to the user about the most important tasks, users and elements that are associated with
a specific decision point. In the above example, a decision point is formed where a user
has to decide if a patient is suitable for treatment. This decision involves the user looking
up the licensing criteria for the treatment and comparing it with the patient’s stats. These
steps are enclosed in the task ‘Check Suitability’. If the patient is suitable, donated by the
exclusive gateway, the next stage is to populate a decision making tool with the patient’s
stats, otherwise the treatment is terminated due to the patient being unsuitable. This could
be achieved by implementing a algorithm which identifies exclusions gateways and iterates
back through the incoming connections to identify tasks and/or data objects that influence
the decision to be made (i.e. an assessment of tasks that use a licensing criteria to evaluate
the patient’s characteristics).
Decision points can also be used to identify when consent is required for a task to
be undertaken, such as a medical procedure. Deciding which participants are involved
in providing consent can be determined by the incoming edges and/or if the gateway is
positioned between two swimlanes.
It is envisioned that the Decision Points would be generated automatically by BPMNdm
based on the symbols chosen by the user. In the example above, BPMNdm would have
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identified the gateway ‘Suitable Patient?’ as a decision point and worked back to identify the
preceding tasks/attributes/data sources that are closely attributed to this gateway. BPMNdm
would then work forwards to identify the immediate tasks that are executed following the
decision. This is necessary, as BPMNdm would then use the information contained in each
activity/symbol to determine what tools/services would be most appropriate for this Decision
Point.
The metamodel for Decision Points are provided in 7.8.
Fig. 7.8 Metamodel for Decision Points [69]
Information Security Applicability
The application to IS shares numerous similarities to the previously mentioned example. A
decision point aids the modeller in the policy decision making process as it highlights the
many inputs that form the decision. If we refer to chapters 4 and 5 we begin to understand
the factors that influence user decisions. This may be past experiences or familiarity in the
case of the Wi-Fi example, or the willingness to report an error or accept a cookie.
The added expressiveness is beneficial as we are able to map the individual elements
that comprise the decision making process. Through the above noted investigations, we
improve our understanding of these variables and ultimately iteratively refine our model.
From a modellers perspective, this aid the policy decision making process as it highlights key
areas of importance with respect to the users decision. This allows the policy maker to cater
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for specific requirements that have been identified, and if they are insufficiency understood,
allows for subsequent investigation into these areas.
7.4.2 Weighted Paths
The current implementation of BPMN 2.0 does not provide any method for defining the
likelihood of node traversal after a gate. Whilst this is satisfactory for defining a process
model, it can be greatly improved to provide more detailed knowledge of a given process with
tool support. Below is an example of a weighted path with the most likely route highlighted
with a bold arrow and their respective probabilities.
Fig. 7.9 Weighted Paths [69]
Weighted paths address the issue of unknown output from a gate by relying on assump-
tions or prior knowledge. In its most primitive form, a weighted path can be seen as the
likelihood with which the next node is chosen. There are several benefits that such an
extension provides.
Firstly, if data relating to the target environment is available (obtainable through exper-
imentation similar to chapters 4 and 5) it will be possible to highlight particular trends or
patterns in either the user’s behaviour or how the system reacts to given stimuli. This likeli-
hood can be statistically represented with a value between 0-1 within the model visualisation.
With tool support, this helps to determine the most probable path and provides valuable
insight that will help with optimisation and throughput.
With reference to our thrombolysis scenario, there are many examples of where an
increased expressiveness benefits the decision maker. For example, weighted paths can be
adopted to visualise the outcome of treatment based on previous patients, or visualise a
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preferred care pathway within a given demographic. With reference to figure 7.9 we witness
the point at which a doctor will seek consent for administrating thrombolytic treatment after
an event. Typically, the patient is unlikely to be sufficiently conscious or lacks the cognitive
ability to formulate a reasoned response and thus the decision is often discussed with relatives.
Therefore, consent from a relative tends to be the most likely path (exemplified by 0.8).
Specific treatments and medications also benefit significantly from the introduction of
such a notation. As drug trials are extensively tested and their results statistically quantified
it is a simple process to incorporate this probability into the XML. Patients will also have
a record that can be visualized as a data object. In essence, this is a predefined document
stating all medical knowledge pertaining to the individual. This data is incredibly useful in
determining how treatment should progress and benefits similarly to the above. As we are
more aware of the patient’s ailments and previous treatments, documentation and medical
trials will indicate the probability of how the patient responds and subsequently which steps
should then proceed (represented as node traversal within the model).
In time critical scenarios such as thrombolysis, it allows for an optimization of node
traversal relating to a reduced waiting time for the patient. This is both a time and cost saving
feature as it is possible to plan future activities and processes based on a given probability
(drug trials and patient records). For example, it enables the clinician or medical facility
to be able to inform staff of potential surgery and aids with the general hospital logistics.
Having such data available on a tool would empower medical staff to make these decisions in
a mobile environment where decisions are based on prior knowledge and quantified statistical
likelihood.
Financial allocation and budgeting is also an area where this notation change is beneficial.
Through more effective resource management and finance allocation it would be possible to
improve those services that are most commonly used in an effort to streamline and manage
patient throughput.
The metamodel for Weighted paths is provided in 7.10.
Information Security Applicability
The introduction of weighted paths within the BPMN 2.0 formalism provides significant
benefits to our problem space highlighted in chapter 3, and provides further rationale for the
case studies documented in chapters 4 and 5.
Within IS, let us consider the wireless network selection problem (chapter 4). Through
our experimentation we know that we are able to manipulate the wireless networks chosen
by our participants. By nudging users we are impacting the network that they choose and
ultimately changing the environment, moreover, the threat environment. Applying this to
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Fig. 7.10 Metamodel for Weighted Paths [69]
our current BPMN implementation, we can view the policy as scope data where there is a
given probability (obtained from experimentation such as chapter 4) that users will select a
given network. This network will have properties which can be expressed through the XML
schema and subsequently visualised. As such, a weighted path would highlight the most
likely node traversal after a security decision based on statistical testing of the policy. Being
able to quantify user behaviour in such a fashion is a powerful tool and supports the validity
of our methodology.
A similar adoption is possible when we consider the findings in chapter 5. As described
in the literature review (2), risk and frequency are often known by the organisation either by
past events or an assumption based on identified risks, and user behaviours can be examined
more closely with studies such as 4 and 5. If we focus on error-reporting for example,
the likelihood that a user experiences an error and subsequently reports it can be of high
significance to the organisation and the user (identifying and reporting problems should lead
to them being avoided in the future). By including a likelihood within a process that it may
fail, the modeller is able to more accurately depict subsequent events based on behavioural
observations and statistical analysis.
In both of these scenarios we witness an enhancement to the visualisation of the decision
making process. This aids the decision maker to make a more informed choice based on the
ability to utilise additional data sets. We validate the applicability of the findings within our
user studies and ultimately aid the decision making process.
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7.4.3 Cost
With respect to our application, cost is interpreted as a scalar quantity that apportions a given
financial value to an item, process or activity. Cost is a vital component of any business
process as it is a finite variable that is directly correlated with budgeting and financial
health. Operating profits, specifically in the corporate world (and also in areas of resource
management) affect success and overall functionality of the business. Controlled, precise
allocation of these resources optimizes the business work flow, maintains peak efficiency,
and promotes successful business.
Integrating cost into BPMN is a natural choice. Being able to attribute values to a given
decision compliments tool support by providing clear, contextual information. The benefits
of such an approach become increasingly clear with respect to budgeting. Node traversal can
be impacted by a cost value that is declared within the XML. This will impact the model as
pathing will be determined by checking the cost of a decision point or node and comparing
this to the remaining budget. Below we see the possible application and impact of such a
strategy.
Fig. 7.11 Cost Notation [69]
Relating to thrombolysis, we visualize the cost function as an assessment of resource man-
agement and optimization. If a budget is allocated on a per person per operation/consultation
basis and the cost of the activity is documented, BPMN with tool support is an effective
method of aiding the DMP. Tool integration would allow for a visual representation of the
problem space with the implications of specific decision outcomes clearly mapped. Choos-
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Fig. 7.12 Metamodel for Cost element [69]
ing a specific treatment for one patient may require altering subsequent treatments, or the
treatments available for other patients. This granularity enables a more informed decision
that allows for an assessment of the impact of the decision outcomes on a larger scale.
Within the United Kingdom, every resident citizen has access to free health care via the
National Health Service (NHS). Within the NHS, there is a specific protocol that depicts how
treatment is funded and paid for. This process is as follows:
• Patients are provided a HRG (Health Resource Group) code that is a record of proce-
dures and treatments conducted.
• This document is then passed to your local General Practitioner (GP).
• The money for the procedure is then debited from the Primary Care Trust.
• These funds are controlled by Practice Managers whose duties involve careful moni-
toring of what has been spent. In documenting these expenditures, statistical auditing
systems are used.
• In an effort to optimize expenditure, Practice Managers analyse the most costly proce-
dures in order to allocate resources in an attempt to save money. Procedures with high
capacity will often have more money invested in order to optimize the process. This
process also involves Practice Managers looking at alternatives to treatments if a high
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percentage of the budget is being spent on procedures. Examples include procedures
being conducted at local clinics and home instead of the hospital.
The points noted above provide a clear example of why this approach is beneficial. We
can visualise these steps as a business process that naturally benefits from the introduction
of cost into BPMN. Being able to document cost at the atomic level for a given patient in a
given scenario allows accurate modelling and understanding of where costs are accumulated
and importantly where budget impacts care. This allows hospital managers to better allocate
funds in an effort to save money, maximize patient throughput and streamline the care of
patients.
Cost integration would enable a detailed, accurate representation of financial expenditure.
The scale in Fig. 7.11 denotes a dynamic scale that updates in real-time to reflect the decisions
made. This allows for a structured view of expenditure once you have exited the decision
space. Maximum expenditure can be added to the XML schema and the policy that defines it
may be amended as required.
Information Security Applicability
The benefits to IS are closely reflected within the thrombolysis example. Whilst decisions
are unlikely to affect a patient’s physical well-being, the corporate nature of the environment
often requires a closer budgeting strategy. Any optimisations therefore, will have an impact
on the profitability of a particular venture.
Consider the adoption of encrypted USB devices for staff who wish to transfer data. If
this were to become mandatory, there are several implications with respect to the modelling
process. Firstly, we can attribute the cost of acquiring the devices within the XML as a
constant. Secondly, through modelling behaviour we are able to make assumptions as to the
probability that a user conforms with the policy (do they use the device?). Thirdly, we can
quantify the risks associated with non-compliance through an assessment of vulnerability
(how much will a security breach cost? What will be leaked etc.). If we combine these
elements and provide a visual feedback mechanism via tool support (BPMNdm), we aid the
decision maker. We are able to highlight the cost of an action and can relate this to the fixed
budget defined within our model. Node traversal will be impacted upon user decisions and
subsequent actions.
7.4.4 Time
Time is a complex multidimensional value or quantity that often requires a bespoke definition
through worked example. In a typical scenario we can summarise this as the indefinite
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progress of existence and events that occur in an irreversible succession from the past. In
numerous scenarios, however, where such simple definitions are not appropriate or easily
defined we must augment this. For example, in Computing Science, time is a variable that can
be manipulated to facilitate specific needs. Time does not necessarily reflect the same time
that is associated within the ’real world’ (i.e. 24 hours in a day). Latency is a perfect example
of time dilation where 1s in real-time does not reflect 1s in the system state. Instead, time can
change at a given interval providing little to no continuity. Here we see a difference between
the unit of time and the continued progression of time. As such, we need to understand the
state of the system in order to define it.
This work proposes a new definition of time to be used within the BPMN modelling
formalism. We define time as a meta value within the XML that represents the duration of a
given activity. It is therefore a cumulative variable that defines the time taken to traverse a
given network path. It is independent of any formally defined scale in reference to future
paths that are not predefined. Therefore, altering the route through the network presents a
new time-scale. Furthermore, time increments are non-uniform. Nodes are not uniformly
distributed as activities have different associated completion times. This provides a highly
dynamic environment where time is not a constant progression and reflects the decisions
made by the individual.
Having defined the method in which time is understood with respect to BPMN, it is
necessary to discuss how this will be utilized. The application of time will allow for an
assessment of productivity and efficiency in terms of start - end completion time. From a
modelling perspective, and further abstraction (system analysis), this will allow performance
monitoring that has a plethora of real-world advantages. It is possible to identify particularly
lengthy tasks and determine whether or not this will exceed time constraints. To discuss this,
we must refer to our example scenario.
In a hospital environment, time (typical definition as denoted by real-time, real-world
progression), budget and resources are intrinsically linked. Optimal and cost effective patient
care is imperative to both the success and purpose of the service; there is a balance between
caring exclusively for the individual and ensuring that other patients also receive equal care.
In both these cases we assume that budget and resources are a subset of time by deducing
that budgets are allocated at service level (with time scale and investiture) and resources
are dynamically distributed with respect to demand (a value that changes with real-time,
real-world time). With this assumption we can refer to a implementation of time into BPMN.
Fig. 7.14 demonstrates the implementation of time but it is necessary to discuss the
specific adaptation. For tool support we see immediate benefits in terms of the real-world real-
time representation of the model. Specific routes are defined by their timing and subsequently
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Fig. 7.13 Time Notation [69]
Fig. 7.14 Metamodel for Time element [69]
plotted on a time-line where scale indicates the distribution of events. This dynamically
updates relating to any chosen path. In essence, the time-line provides an evaluative data set
to be analysed for optimization purposes.
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Within this example, node transitions are complimented with tool support. Subsequent
route traversals are defined by given constraints (for instance a typical restraint may be that a
patient cannot wait longer than 30 minutes when suffering fro ma particular incident).
In relation to thrombolysis, Decision Points and timing are critical. Stroke victims have a
small window where action is necessary in order to prevent further medical complication.
Translating this to a physical environment we can assume a party of 1 doctor, 1 patient, 1
other member (possibly family/friend). Given this, our model would contain a ‘run-time time
variable’ that incrementally updates with node transition (this would naturally be bounded
and relative to the patient condition). For example, a specific set of nodes (or task) cannot
take longer than x minutes. Referring to the above example we can visualize a scenario
where certain nodes are circumvented depending on the time. If the patient has too long to
transition from the waiting room to consultation, it may be necessary for immediate medical
intervention based on a doctor/consultant’s approval. This is specifically where tool will
benefit the decision making process.
As time progresses through the system, the optimal route for node transition also changes.
This allows the tool to not only be a process model, but instead to dictate optimal transition
based on predefined constraints. Mobile tool support would allow these decisions to be
made in a mobile environment increasing productivity, potentially availability, and ultimately
enhancing patient care. The addition of time is therefore highly beneficial to the decision
maker and the case study provides clear evidence of its potential.
Information Security Applicability
The introduction of time within the BPMN formalism with respect to IS has numerous
applications. Time is critical in relation to security incidents as response times can signifi-
cantly reduce the impact of a breach or network infection. The need for a rapid response is
paramount, but in doing so, there is a need to understand how events transpire temporally
within the environment. Enabling a finer granularity allows for an assessment of each specific
activity or decision. Human behavioural studies can identify the common response times of
individuals (as seen in chapter 4 where the average response time was 10s) and the analysis
of hardware and network infrastructure (related to computing power) can often dictate the
speed at which events transpire.
With respect to aiding the policy decision making process, the introduction of timing to
the modelling notation presents many benefits. An important part of any working environment
is the optimisation and the streamlining of business processes (for example, logging onto
a computer to send an e-mail). This often involves employee interaction where the task
completion time is a combination of many variables (availability, competence and procedure
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etc.). Each of these variables can be assessed through user experimentation and such
areas have been studied extensively as highlighted in chapter 2. Including time within the
modelling process of policy testing allows the modeller to understand the implications of
security interventions on the population. For example, the introduction of encrypted USB
sticks may seem like a logical step towards resolving data loss. However, there are issues
related to this such as the increased time it takes to access and use the device, along with
the productivity losses that are associated with forgetting the password and thus rendering
the device useless until an administrator is available. Such an implementation allows for an
assessment of time related issues regarding policy implementation and allows for a more
informed trade-off decision between security and productivity. When combined with the
other notation changes, as well as the previous user behaviour studies it allows for an in-depth
analysis of the costs and benefits associated with a given policy.
7.5 Evaluation
The notation changes detailed within this chapter highlight the importance of bespoke models
that fully visualise the intricacies of the problem space. Many of the introductions here,
however, have a multi-faceted application and benefit numerous scenarios from a breadth
of disciplines (including the studies from chapters 4, 5). Our process of extending the
formalism is well documented throughout external literature and many of our notations use
the recommendations that are highlighted within these studies to aid the expressiveness and
validity with which we can define our problem space.
Each notation change is documented with respect to its applicability to a given problem
domain. From our examples, it is evident that the introduction of these notations provides a
more expressive formalism for the modeller. This allows for a more bespoke representation
of the problem space, and ultimately empowers the policy decision maker to design, test and
implement more appropriate and effective policies. The use of tools provides a real-time
decision support system that benefits both the modeller and the users within the environment
through a more in-depth assessment of the decision space. The tool also benefits collaborative
decision making through the inclusion of several new notations, namely ‘scope data’ and
‘workflow data’ that aim to encapsulate the collaborative nature of the working environment
and the problems this can pose.
With reference to our problem space defined in chapter 3, we witness a genuine improve-
ment with respect to the policy design and decision making processes compared to non-tool
based solutions. Investing resources into understanding user behaviours yields valuable
insight towards the variables which impact our environment. Utilising small user studies
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improves our understanding of key practices and highlights areas of risk and vulnerability.
The ability to adequately model these as well as provide alternative routes to a certain goal is
highly valuable.
The notations themselves benefit from being integrated with the use of the XML schema
and the popular jBPMN environment. The ability to adapt the variables within the nodes
allows a modeller to create bespoke, dynamic models that relate to specific actions. Enabling
the modeller to create statements and conditions within the nodes that react to a given trigger
or bound produces a dynamic tool that can react to changes in the current decision space.
Furthermore, this enables alternative routes to be determined that may not have otherwise
been obvious to the modeller.
7.5.1 Limitations
Limitations towards this approach are mainly reflected by the untested, abstract nature of
the scenarios. Many of the scenarios may appear idealised, and without adequate testing to
prove our assumptions, they lack the scientific rigour necessary to fully validate our approach.
Furthermore, it would be necessary to investigate each specific behaviour in relation to the
subsequent model it was aiding and the specific node it may benefit as the accuracy of the
model is correlated with how well we can define our problem space.
To remedy this, it would be necessary to tailor specific investigations to fully ascertain
human behaviours in order to most effectively represent them. One would also need to
conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the current system and robustly determine critical
variables such as asset value. The nodes, however, are fully customisable through the XML
so their expressiveness is sufficient to encapsulate these findings.
7.5.2 Future Work
Having demonstrated the validity and benefits that our notations bring, and highlighted
the outstanding limitations, it is necessary to begin the implementation phase within the
jBPMN modelling environment. Through the implementation phase we will be able to
conduct an empirical study of the process and be able to perform an in-depth analysis as
to the accuracy and validity of our approach using a working model. We could further this
by modelling a ‘real-world’ scenario and assessing the impact that the interventions and
modelling extensions have on the decision making process. Data gained from this approach
could then aid subsequent models by a process of iteration where we refine our model and
ultimately are better able to articulate the problem space.
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7.6 Chapter Contributions
This chapter documents how extending the BPMN 2.0 formalism provides a greater set of
expressions with which to model a specific environment. We use real-world time-critical
scenarios (thrombolysis) as well as promote the applicability towards designing our model
based on previous experimentation detailed in prior chapters. We define how repeat small-
scale user testing can aid this process and ultimately benefit the decision making process
through greater understanding of our problem space.
Utilising commonly adopted environments and languages, we have created a simple
yet intuitive method of creating bespoke models to aid the decision making process. The
notations are customisable through the XML schema and are able to represent results obtained
through experimentation into user behaviours and the environment.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
This thesis has investigated the application and effectiveness of nudges and behavioural
change mechanisms with respect to Information Security practices. In doing, we have
developed an iterative methodology based on user and CISO interaction in order to identify
behaviours that are critical to understanding the security practices within our problem
space. This has required the design of a pilot study aimed at identifying key areas of risk
related to specific behaviours in an effort to better understand them. These behaviours have
subsequently been investigated through bespoke experimental research in an effort to improve
our articulation of the problem space. We utilise these findings to produce a model-based
representation of our environment with the goal of aiding the policy decision making process.
Within this process we have contributed to the field of knowledge pertaining to user
behaviours with respect to specific applications (see chapters 4, 5, 6). Through our experi-
mentation, we have validated the effectiveness of our behavioural interventions and shown
the benefits of adopting a pilot study based on CISO interaction. We have proven the validity
of our work through the cross-reference and analysis of existing studies conducted within the
respective fields, and designed our bespoke research approaches upon the recommendations
found in such literature.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 8.1 highlights the contri-
butions of the thesis with respect to each chapter. Section 8.2 details whether we met our
aims and objectives. Section 8.3 highlights the limitations of our investigations and their
applicability. Section 8.4 discusses future directions the work could follow in order to address
these limitations and improve our understanding of the problem space.
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8.1 Summary of Contributions
This section summarises the key contributions of the thesis with reference to their specific
chapter.
• A background and literature review of security risks, practices and user be-
haviours.
We provided a multi-disciplinary literature review of the problem space with respect to
the broader domain highlighted in chapter 1 and more specifically to our scenario in
chapter 3. Chapter 2 discusses and highlights the key topics and issues related to our
scenario and highlighted relevant theories and practices adopted within the problem
domain. Subsequent chapters (4, 5, 6 & 7) each contain specific reference to literatures
and theories that are included due to their relevance pertaining to the investigated
behaviour. These represent methodologies adopted and improved upon within our
investigation, as well as recommendations from the authors. Our approach benefits
from the multi-disciplinary nature of the literature review through the inclusion of
work conducted in the social sciences in a typically computing science domain.
• A problem formulation for expressing the current difficulties of the policy deci-
sion making process with respect to unidentified user behaviours.
In chapter 3 we document the key problems within the domain with respect to our aims
and objectives and the concerns raised by our CISO interaction and IRIDIUM data.
We formally document the problem and de-construct it, identifying smaller individual
study areas related to specific human behaviours and practices.
• Formulation of an iterative methodology incorporating a pilot study for problem
identification and current security behaviours.
We document the design and adoption of an iterative methodology based on empirical
data for the investigation of the problem space. This approach benefits from continued
CISO interaction and the inclusion of data from the IRIDIUM study and our pilot
study.
• The design, implementation and analysis of three bespoke investigations target-
ing specific behaviours highlighted through conducting our initial pilot study and
CISO interaction.
We design and conduct three separate user studies focusing on specific behaviours
and practices highlighted within our problem definition process (see chapters 4, 5 &
6). These chapters are novel in that they examine the applicability of nudging and
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behavioural interventions within a new Information Security domain, contributing
specifically to the field of research which governs them. These chapters reference and
build upon strategies from other studies, but apply and analyse them with respect to a
new problem domain.
• The design, implementation and analysis of tools used in conducting these inves-
tigations, and the formulation of a modelling strategy to map these behaviours.
The experiments detailed within chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 required the design and develop-
ment of specific tools and testing materials. These tools were built with recommenda-
tions and theories from our literature review and the results obtained from use mirrored
those found in these studies. This highlights the validity of our tools and provides a
further contribution to the research domain. The wide-ranging applicability of our
tools also enables their adoption to other environments and problem spaces.
Our modelling approach contributes to the BPMN formalism through the extension
of the notation enabling greater expression of the problem domain. The benefit of
these additions are demonstrated with respect to a real-world, time critical scenario and
the additions are implemented using an open source environment. Our proposals are
based upon existing literature and research recommendations and provide an effective
method of modelling our environment using the data provided from our investigations.
• A demonstration of the effect of our behavioural interventions on real data.
The interventions and recommendations we propose with respect to our study outcomes,
benefit from their utilisation of real-world, non-simulated data. Using empirical data in
this fashion further supports the validity of our approach as our results reflect real-time
decision-making in genuine tasks. This benefits our methodology with respect to
modelling as we are able to more accurately reflect the problem space.
8.2 Were Aims and Objectives Met?
8.2.1 Aim:
• ‘To design, develop and validate with scientific rigour, a robust methodology for aiding
the chief information security officer in the policy decision making process’.
We formally met our aim by designing and conducting the bespoke experimentations
detailed in previous chapters. To promote rigour, our methods adopted best practice and in
several cases yielded statistically significant results that supported our hypotheses. Ultimately,
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our investigations provide a clearer understanding of our problem space enabling a more
informed decision by the CISO with respect to Information Security Decisions.
8.2.2 Objectives:
• To understand the current (‘state of the art’) practices through a review of literatures
and best practices.
We provide an extensive literature review that targets many critical studies within
the respective fields. This review highlights the applicability to our study along with
formal limitations that may affect our results.
• To accurately interpret and document the issues and concerns from the CISO and
narrow the problem space into a more focused investigative avenue.
As part of the iterative methodology we outline a process for capturing our stakeholder
requirements and use this to formulate an exploratory pilot study. This pilot study
highlights many of the behaviours we subsequently investigate and further supports
both the applicability and validity of our methodology.
• To identify and formulate solutions to specific problems with respect to CISO and user
requirements.
As detailed above, we defined specific behaviours that were of importance to both
our stakeholder and the users within our test environment. We subsequently tested
behavioural interventions designed to influence the user’s decision making process and
validated the effectiveness of such interventions. The results of this process enables
the CISO to develop more suitable policy that is holistic with user behaviours and
practices ultimately leading to an increase in security policy compliance.
• To develop tool support and experimentation to aid in the assessment of these problems.
All of the bespoke experiments required the design and implementation of specific
tools. These tools were either web, mobile or model based.
• To evaluate the effectiveness of such tools and experimentation.
The tools yielded several statistically significant results throughout our experimenta-
tions. This provides strong evidence for their validity but subsequent testing would be
necessary to confirm this belief. It is possible that the tools did impact our results.
• To reflect on the overall impact of the approach, address its shortcomings and outline
the direction of possible future work.
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This objective is detailed within section 8.4.
8.3 Limitations
The limitations of this thesis in relation to the individual investigations are detailed respec-
tively, in reference to the chapter in which they feature (see ‘Limitations’ in chapters 4, 5,
6 & 7). As such, the limitations in this section will feature on the overall methodology in
relation to its applicability and validity.
The main limitation of the proposed methodology is the lack of subsequent testing.
Whilst we firmly believe that this is an effective approach, a belief that stems from the
knowledge that each investigation is designed and grounded with reference to important
literature and theories (some of which follow a similar approach), and that our results through
the design of bespoke methods emulate those of other surveys; it is impossible to validate
this claim without testing. Similarly, interaction with our stakeholder and user-base, along
with empirical study, has ensured that our approach remains focused on their needs whilst
also enabling the identification of additional problem areas through the process.
To remedy this shortcoming, we require additional time in order to utilise our results,
formulate a model to test policy adoption, and subsequently assess its impacts based on the
claims of our behavioural intervention studies. In response to this, however, we see this work
as an introduction to the overall methodology with the knowledge that it is a scalable solution
that benefits from repeat investigation of highlighted behaviours (hence our iterative strategy).
Given greater resources, it would be possible to investigate numerous areas simultaneously
in an effort to optimise the modelling of the environment and ultimately increase the speed at
which new policy can be designed, implemented and subsequently evaluated.
8.4 Future Work
The future direction of this thesis in relation to the individual investigations are detailed
respectively, in reference to the chapter in which they feature (see ‘Future Work’ in chapters
4, 5, 6 & 7). As such, this section will discuss the direction of subsequent investigation with
respect to the overall methodology.
The future work of this thesis typically relates to the limitations detailed in section 8.3,
whereby additional studies related to specific user behaviours would benefit our understanding
of the problem space, and ultimately provide a richer expression with which to formulate
a solution. This process would also benefit from an increase in the number of participants
within the pilot study as we believe more behaviours would be captured by increasing the
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number of users we investigate. In addition, future work would also document the design
process of our environment using the BPMN extensions we propose from the stakeholder’s
perspective. Documenting this process would allow for an analysis of specifically how
and where our methodology aids the policy decision-making process with respect to past
practices.
In relation to specific behaviours and environmental factors, the following investigations
would benefit the validity of the study:
• Additional Devices: It would be necessary to focus more specifically on behaviours
with respect to device type. By understanding how a device choice may influences
behaviours, we could examine intervention methods and nudges that aim to ‘nudge’
users towards a specific device that may be more appropriate for a given task with
respect to security. For instance, the use of a laptop or personal computer may be
preferable to a mobile device when checking the validity of a link in an email. It is
often difficult to highlight the intended destination on a mobile device as their is no
function pertaining to user input.
• Collaborative Decision-Making: As we discussed within our problem identification
(chapter 3), the university environment encourages collaborative working. One future
avenue of investigation would be to investigate how our results relate to the collabora-
tive decision-making process, and what additional studies would need to be conducted
if they do not apply. This would further benefit our modelling strategy highlighted
in chapter 7 where we reference our development with respect to a group decision in
thrombolytic care.
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